In early 2023, the Independent Review of the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Response to Internal Displacement concluded that the IASC humanitarian system was “too slow to respond” and “not joined up, if and when it does respond.” This assessment, echoed across numerous evaluations, highlights a systemic gap: despite years of reform, the sector continues to struggle with adapting and coordinating in large-scale, complex crisis, including Myanmar, Syria, Sudan and Ethiopia.
To avoid this, greater agility is critical in the early days of an emergency, particularly in complex and politicised crises, rather than defaulting to the position of providing ‘more of the same, faster’.
This article provides a brief summary of the learnings from two strategies that agencies, including ICVA, have employed to improve response agility and leadership:
1) Surge deployments,
2) Strengthening NGO coordination.
The reflections are based on an extensive literature review, interviews and workshops, and ICVA’s own experiences.
1. A brief review of surge deployments
Strong, experienced leadership in emergency settings can have a significant positive impact on both individual agency and interagency responses. In several recent large-scale emergencies, humanitarian leaders, including NGO Country Directors, Humanitarian Coordinators and UN Agency Representatives have lacked the necessary emergency response experience or training. This was seen to hinder rapid and agile response in the crucial early months, as leaders struggled to pivot. These challenges were particularly evident in contexts with ongoing development programming or protracted humanitarian operations.
Recognising this leadership challenge, agencies have adopted different approaches including surge deployments, “step aside” policies (i.e. deploying an alternative Country Director or Humanitarian Coordinator during an emergency), temporary leadership from global emergency departments, mandatory deployment of Emergency Coordinators, and shadowing support to existing leadership.
Surge capabilities have received significant attention in recent years. Humanitarian Surge: Stuck in a Rut, built on significant pieces of work in the 2000s and 2010s on surge capabilities within the humanitarian sector. Several UN and NGO agencies have also reviewed their surge capabilities in recent years.
However, effective humanitarian response is often equated too narrowly with surge deployments. Whilst surge is an important tool, principled and effective emergency response does not always require more resources or people. It may instead demand pivoting, agility and alternative ways of working. Discussions on humanitarian response planning and management should include surge, but only as one component of broader, efficient and agile response strategy – and not the default.
The key learnings from surge support are:
1. Resistance to surge and step-aside policies is common; contextualisation is required.
There is documented resistance to surge support among some leaders. This resistance appears to be most acute where there are strong existing relationships and operations in country, and where distrust exists between headquarters and country offices. Interestingly, agencies also noted that experienced senior humanitarian leaders are more likely to request surge support, and those with less emergency expertise can be more resistant.
Most organisations consulted reported challenges in applying ‘step aside’ policies at leadership levels, i.e. temporarily putting in place an alternative Country Director or Humanitarian Coordinator during an emergency. Agencies who have made progress have worked to create a culture to normalise the step-aside process, treating it not as a failure but as a standard emergency protocol in contexts without active emergencies.
Several reviews and evaluations have highlighted that resistance to surge support or leadership changes has had detrimental impacts on responses, particular in the early stages, as the organisation has struggled to adapt and pivot to the large scale emergency.
Some level of balance is undoubtedly needed. International surge that does not understand the culture and nuances of a context risks undermining existing trusted relationships and contextualised approaches.
2. Make surge support work for the context and team
Surge support is generally most effective when it is tailored to the specific requirements of a given context and country team, rather than large scale deployments of standard teams. There is no one size fits all approach to effective surge, as it is dependent on the existing profiles and existing expertise in country.
Surge personnel therefore often require flexible profiles and roles. For example, the ability to actively lead response efforts in one context or provide shadowing and advisory support to existing leaders in another, or to pivot between them to cover gaps as required.
3. Existing community, civil society and local government benefit least from surge
International surge mechanisms are typically centred in the UN, INGOs and the Red Cross Movement, which maintain global or regional standing or flexible capacities. As a result, surge capabilities often prioritise supporting these agencies, even where local community, civil society or government actors are better placed to lead or support emergency response delivery and could benefit more from the support.
There is some positive work ongoing in several agencies to proactively prioritise partnerships approaches and mutual aid to existing first responders through surge capabilities, but it remains an under prioritised area in global approaches to surge capabilities and emergency response.
“Governments and civil society actors in the global South are pushing back against the idea that surge capacity is something to be located at the global level – that is, within the international organisations that already control most of the world’s aid resources – calling instead for investments in local, national, and regional surge capacity and more locally-led responses”
4. The pool of available emergency responders is much smaller than it appears
Many large humanitarian agencies have established surge mechanisms, including standing teams, internal redeployment mechanisms, and rosters that can be called on. However, the pool of available emergency responders is much smaller than it appears:
Many emergency response experts are listed on multiple agency rosters and agencies often report difficulties mobilising qualified staff, as they have already been deployed elsewhere. Recent efforts to develop regionalised and cross-country surge mechanisms, and global south-global south mutual aid surges show potential promise in expanding the pool and diversity of available surge capacity.
5. There is limited coordination between agencies with surge rosters
Coordination of surge capacity across the UN, NGOs and the Red Cross Movement has historically been limited. While initiatives such as collective rosters and the Standby Partnership Programme (SBP) are positive steps, active working-level discussions between global/country rapid response mechanisms are limited. Several internal reviews of surge capabilities have taken place within agencies, but opportunities for collective learning, joint approaches and avoiding surge duplication are potentially being missed.
6. Planning surge transition is critical, but often overlooked
Where surge personnel are deployed, early transition planning is key. In several major emergencies, a lack of such planning has led to emergency responders being repeatedly extended or to positive achievements being lost due to poor handover.
Identifying a clear scale down and transition approach – whether internally or through handover to local or other international actors – can help a response transition more effectively out of emergency mode.
7. Rosters and surge mechanisms require investment and management
To be effective before, during and after emergencies, surge mechanisms require significant effort: This includes managing rosters, screening potential surge personnel, and maintaining a strategic understanding of needs and skills. Where surge capabilities have been most effective, they have functioned not just as HR tools, but as centres of excellence for emergency preparedness and response. Achieving this, however, demands time, financial investment, and dedicated coordination.
8. Access challenges are increasingly threatening international surge
Increased politicisation of aid and direct attacks or blockages of humanitarian staff visas is threatening the ability of international agencies to deploy surge staff quickly to major emergencies. This access constraints vary across contexts and disproportionately affect the UN or INGOs. As a result, there has been an increase in ‘remote surge’ deployment. In some cases, this can be highly beneficial for providing cost effective support to local actors and staff already in situ in a complex emergency. In other instances, remote approaches may have limited impact, and alternative approaches should be prioritised by international actors based on the needs of the context.
9. Developing emergency preparedness and response expertise is fundamental
Several senior humanitarian emergency leaders and evaluations noted that where staff members have strong understanding and experience of emergency preparedness and response – and where there are agency incentives to prioritise preparedness – there is often a quicker response and less need for surge.
Several agencies have noted that surge can be overemphasised in emergency preparedness, and often to the detriment of training and support to existing staff members.
2. Strengthening NGO Coordination in Large Scale Crises
Since 2021, ICVA has deployed dedicated NGO coordination capacity in several ‘system wide scale ups’, including in Ethiopia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Türkiye, OPT and Sudan. These surge deployments sought to reinforce in-country NGO coordination capabilities and support the collective response to rapidly pivot in the face of sudden, large-scale humanitarian crises.
1. More investment in practical preparation for collective humanitarian response is needed.
Collective emergency preparedness planning between NGOs (international and national/local) is also frequently weak or absent. In response to acute early warning signals (for example the likely outbreak of conflict in Lebanon, or conflict escalation in South Sudan in recent years), several NGO Forums have undertaken detailed contingency planning and preparedness exercises amongst themselves and with local civil society agencies with mixed success.
While guidance on inter-agency emergency preparedness exists and several humanitarian responses do have continency plans in place, these are seen to have limited impact when a crisis occurs. Several agencies raised concerns that preparedness planning is largely a tick box or compliance focused exercise at country levels, and ‘preparedness plans are thrown out the window on day 1’, as they are largely theoretical or detailed analysis, that quickly goes stale.
The most effective collective NGO preparedness approaches tend to focus on practical steps, such as establishing agreements on common safety supports and evacuation procedures, and developing simple inter-agency tools, contact lists and protocols.
Operational emergency simulations are still rare at inter-agency level: Few HCTs or inter-sector groups have run a joint exercise before major emergencies, contributing to challenges and confusion in the critical early phase of emergency response. They involve operational exercises around supply lines, evacuations and collective mobile or rapid response team deployments.
These efforts are more common in contexts with recent emergencies, and are often missing in more stable or protracted contexts, which can lead to significant challenges when a rapid-onset crisis occurs.
2. Emergency NGO coordination expertise is a specialised skillset
Whilst there has been significant growth in the roles and effectiveness of NGO Forums and networks over the past decade, NGO Forum secretariats and steering committees can lack emergency coordination expertise – mirroring gaps seen IASC coordination structures.
This can result in emergency preparedness and response not being prioritised ahead of major emergencies and/or delays in collective response during an emergency. Rapid Response Mechanisms (NGO-only, or NGO-UN) exist in many contexts, but these often do not contribute to a broader collective strategic emergency preparedness framework.
3. Collaboration between NGOs, UN, local authorities yields benefits
When diverse actors come together in emergencies, it can significantly enhance the overall response, particularly in highly complex emergencies. For example, the sharing of workspace between NGO Forum staff with UNDAC or OCHA yielded positive benefits, including strengthening communication and trust.
Active, strategic discussions on comparative advantages of differing response modalities can also be highly beneficial. Conversely, competition or silos between the UN, INGOs, NNGOs and/or local governments can significantly hamper collective action in emergencies.
4. Effective NGO coordination requires buy-in and ownership from operational agencies
The most successful examples of NGO coordination – among both national and international actors – have been driven by the operational agencies themselves. These coordination platforms often emerged organically in response to clear needs during a major crisis, based on the collective challenges of their members.
Conversely, when there is limited appetite for collective approaches among NGOs, then NGO Fora and other coordination mechanisms tend to be less effective. In some instances, support for NGO collective action has improved once NGOs have seen the benefits of proactive coordination after support has been deployed, but this is significant less preferable to NGOs actively driving coordinated approaches themselves.
Recent deployments have shown that existing experience of emergency directors or team leads can be instrumental – where surge personnel in an emergency are familiar with coordination and where agencies prioritise it internally, it is likely to drive stronger collective efforts. Where those leading operational response are less used to working collectively or agencies do not incentivise inter-agency coordination internally, more siloed approaches tend to be seen.
5. There are significant opportunities for NGO common services
In recent decades, significant investments have been made in common humanitarian services, including in transport (through UNHAS and the European Airbridge), supply and pipelines, safety and security, and facilities. However, concerns are frequently raised that these services focus on supporting UN agencies rather than the broader humanitarian community, and in particular operational delivery actors and community first responders.
There are also questions over whether the most cost-effective approaches are being used. Duplication across agencies, such as in facilities, warehousing, transport, access, safety, and technical specialities, is common in emergencies and may become increasingly unsustainable in light of the 2025 global funding crisis.
In response, several initiatives have emerged in recent years to strengthen NGO common services approaches before, during and after major humanitarian emergencies. These have shown strong potential to improve cost effectiveness and agility of humanitarian response. These include formal initiatives by NGOs, networks and consortia in areas such as collective safety, logistics and supply chain management, data and analysis, such as those provided by HULO, the H2H network, the Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF), as well as assessment and analysis agencies such as REACH. Informal collaboration also shows benefits, for example NGOs sharing warehousing, supply, transport or facilities, or mobilising collective rapid response teams. These joint initiatives are likely to become more widespread, both due to the savings and efficiencies they offer, as well as opportunities to develop technical specialisations across agencies.
6. Secondments to NGO Fora are valuable
In several contexts, individual NGOs have seconded specialist or administrative staff or coordinators to NGO Fora and networks. These secondments have supported strengthened humanitarian coordination, advocacy, access and safety coordination for the NGO collective.
However, these practices remain largely ad hoc and driven by personal relationships, rather than being systematically supported at global or regional levels. Support to national NGO networks and fora has been more limited. This gap needs to be further explored and addressed given the lack of resources available for coordination and shared services for local NGOs.
Recommendations
The importance of effective solutions to strengthening humanitarian leadership and NGO coordination in large scale, complex emergencies is only set to grow: Rising humanitarian needs will increase demand for effective emergency response support and short-term surge and mutual aid. As realignment of the humanitarian sector progresses throughout 2025, it is essential that emergency response capabilities are not simply downsized, but strengthened to be more efficient, more targeted and better connected to existing emergency responders in-country.
1. Reprioritise emergency preparedness and response capacities – recognise it is a core technical function
As budgets shrink, emergency management must be prioritised as a core technical area. To maximise efficiencies, this requires integrating emergency management into humanitarian training curricula, investing in dedicated emergency experts and systems, and embedding learning from past emergencies to inform future practice.
2. Strengthen overall agility in emergency preparedness and response
Humanitarian emergency response must become more agile and adaptive. This will require a range of solutions including sharing resources and mobilising the comparative advantages of the UN, Red Cross, INGOs, local civil society, government and communities. Practical preparedness exercises and the development of safety protocols and evacuations ahead of time can help build trust among the collective, which is vital to response success. Exploring step-aside policies, shadowing or empowered emergency response leaders for a short period of time can also improve agility and reduce the risk of a “business as usual” approach.
3. Ensure emergency coordination is operationally focused and context driven
Coordination at all levels needs to prioritise the facilitation of operational delivery in the most principled and effective manner possible and be a catalyst for agility during emergencies. This requires adapting emergency coordination structures, membership, locations and coordination leaders in accordance to the needs of a context rather than using a standard model.
4. Support local first responders in an emergency where possible
As the first responders, local communities, civil society and local authorities should be actively supported and reinforced, to the greatest extent possible. This can include financing, people surge, mutual aid and technical assistance as relevant for a context. Supporting diverse pooled funds and rapid financing mechanisms led by foundations and NGOs, as well as initiatives such as due diligence passporting and reducing barriers to accessing financing and risk transfer to local actors will also yield positive benefits. Short term emergency assistance, technical support and shadowing for local coordination structures can be particularly beneficial.
5. Strengthen shared services
Greater efforts should be undertaken by international actors to support collective approaches before and during emergencies, with a particular focus on making these available to local actors. This can include mobilising coordination platforms and sharing technical experts on issues such as safety, access and sectoral approaches. Investing in shared assets such as facilities, warehousing and transport and harnessing specialist common service initiatives and organisations beyond the UN will also be of benefit.
6. Foster a culture of learning, drawing from inside and outside the sector
A culture of continuous collective learning on emergency preparedness and response between agencies and inter-agency structures must be fostered. This will require establishing mechanisms for real-time learning during emergencies and incorporating findings into forward planning. Given the overlapping learning and discussions, drawing lessons from both within the humanitarian sector, but also from other actors from disaster risk reduction, public health and national emergency response seen with emergency management actors outside the humanitarian sector is key.
Read the full report here
