



International
Council of
Voluntary
Agencies

Review of NGO Leadership Roles in Clusters

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Purpose

As a follow-up to the ICVA NGO cluster co-lead review of country experiences in March 2010¹, this report analyses NGO cluster (and sector) co-leadership and identifies recommendations for NGOs considering these roles. Since the 2010 study, NGOs providing co-leadership capacity for clusters continue to gain wide acceptance and are increasingly adopted by UNHCR in sector-led coordination mechanisms.

This review found that co-leadership positions are undertaken by NGOs for a number of reasons, including but not limited to:

- Providing a counterbalance to UN leadership
- Strengthening NGO influence on policy, strategy, or plans
- Complimenting lead agency performance and providing additional coordination capacity

Based on interviews and survey results, NGO co-leadership positions are almost unanimously considered to be a “good thing” by all involved. However, finding evidential support that can measure impact of NGO co-leadership proved to be difficult. In some areas (such as programme quality, co-lead support to NGOs, and linking sub-national and national clusters), there is evidence that co-leadership does improve coordination and provide added value. Furthermore, national cluster co-leads are considered to be influential in strategy development and, to some extent, in governmental policy formulation.

In order to be effective in these roles, the findings suggest that NGOs need to be clearer regarding what they expect when agreeing to be co-leads. Therefore, NGOs must negotiate, plan, and invest accordingly. As NGOs need to be interacting at a number of levels in the clusters, so do NGO co-leads. In addition, clusters (and sectors) are known to create silos, which need to be bridged, e.g. through leadership engagement on Humanitarian Country Teams and NGOs forums.

The findings include practical recommendations, for example, highlighting that co-lead positions should clearly identify if their role is one that complements, supplements, or substitutes another. This should be made explicit in the stated objectives of the Terms of Reference or Memorandum of Understanding. Moreover, to ensure pre-conditions are agreed upon, co-leads should provide desired outputs and outcomes for the cluster leadership at the beginning of the process.

¹ <https://icvanetwork.org/system/files/versions/doc00004217.pdf>

Methodology

Chiefly, this review examined NGO co-leadership in the context of activated clusters while also taking into consideration other coordination mechanisms such as deactivated clusters and Sector Working Groups.²

The work was conducted from late October to late December of 2014 and information was accessed from:

1. 16 key informant interviews (Annex 1).
2. 36 key documents (Annex 2).
3. Survey of 72 co-leadership posts identified, along with 25 UN leads; 16 NGO respondents, of which two were from national NGOs (Annex 3).
4. <http://www.humanitarianresponse.info> and Cluster Lead Agency (CLA) web sites were used to produce a spread sheet with all identified co-leadership roles (Annex 4).

The key limitations encountered during this work are set out below:

- Metrics for measuring coordination impact are rarely established.
- Comparing co-lead situations with those of no co-leads would have been very useful but not possible. However comparisons were made with:
 - Education cluster as Save Children are the global co-lead,
 - South Sudan, often considered as having a very enabling environment for NGO co-leaders, and
 - UNHCR-led sector coordination.
- Fewer than 20% of people surveyed responded.
- The survey was sub-divided into categories in order to make comparisons and were broken down in the following:
 - Survey A: 13 responses from NGO co-leadership positions,
 - Survey B: 3 responses from Lead Agency respondents,
 - Survey C: 3 responses from NGO co-leadership positions in South Sudan
 - Survey D: 0 responses from Lead Agency positions in South Sudan
- Low response rates make conclusions on comparisons between South Sudan and the UN leads hard to draw.
- There was no response from WHO/health cluster at the global level despite repeated emails
- Response from Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) was limited, while the Early Recovery (ER) cluster identified just one NGO co-lead.

² In humanitarian reform terminology, the term “cluster-coordinator” is used for the individual in a cluster coordination role, while the term “Lead Agency” is used for the agency that carries formalised responsibility. However, regarding co-leadership positions, a variety of terms are used; co-coordinator, co-lead, co-chair, co-facilitator, deputy coordinator etc. In this report the term co-leadership role is used as a blanket term given this variance and, at times, imprecise terminology. The term Lead Agency (LA) is derived from the term Cluster Lead Agency (CLA) and is used to designate both cluster and sector (e.g. UNHCR refugee coordination mechanisms) leads.

How and Why NGOs engage in Co-leadership Roles

Mapping NGO co-leadership at national level

A mapping (Annex 4) was compiled of co-leadership roles. It identified the region, country, lead agency, and the NGO hosting the co-leadership. It also provided cluster/sector information and contact details for the individuals involved. The mapping showed the following:

- Afghanistan, Yemen, DR Congo, South Sudan, and Somalia are notable for their longstanding cluster arrangements in place.
- UNHCR-led coordination mechanisms have been operating for a few years in the Syria crisis affected countries.
- The sector/cluster coordination activity in Haiti and Zimbabwe has all but concluded
- Most of the sector/cluster coordination activity in the Philippines has transitioned.
- Consolidated information from 2010 - 2012 is mostly unavailable, leaving the focus on 2013 and 2014. The Global Food Security Cluster was the only cluster that provided such retrospective information.
- It is often unclear whether clusters, after deactivating, remain with residual/preparedness roles or change into development sector groups. This lack of clarity makes historical mapping uncertain.

The key points that emerged are:

- NGOs, such as Save the Children (SCI) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), have heavily invested in the cluster system, specifically in national level co-leadership.
- Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Oxfam, ACTED, and International Rescue Committee (IRC) have moderately taken on co-leadership roles, while others like Islamic Relief, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and Goal, Plan International and Solidities (GPIS) have one or two roles listed. Merlin, now part of SCI, was very active in Health cluster co-leadership roles.
- The concept of co-leadership is evident in other coordination mechanisms, namely UNHCR led sector mechanisms. Both NRC³ and SCI⁴ report their engagement in both cluster and non-cluster co-leadership mechanisms as equal.
- In some cases, co-leadership roles were occupied by other UN agencies, IOM or government counterparts (not included in the mapping).
- The Early Recovery cluster, often without a country level cluster but rather a thematic working group, only has one NGO national co-leadership role.
- National NGOs are very seldom in co-leadership roles at the national level, although they are more likely to take on roles at the sub national level.

³ source key informant interview – numbers not quantified

⁴ source international document Reported as 28 active clusters 30 other sectorial coordination mechanisms

What comparisons can be developed?

In looking for evidence of whether co-leadership roles have impact, it is useful to consider some comparisons; these comparisons highlight the extent to which conditions enhance or impede overall effectiveness.

- **National co-leadership supported by global co-leadership**

The global Education Cluster is seen as particularly coherent and effective⁵. SCI as a global co-lead has produced an internal analysis⁶ of their co-leadership work across all clusters and for the Education cluster. The findings show there are significant benefits brought on by their global co-lead and they strongly believe that their success in national co-leadership stems greatly from their global co-lead.

- **Co-leadership supported by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and/or the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)**

According to this report's findings, clusters in South Sudan⁷ show that co-leadership roles have real impact as a result of an enabling environment- one with the right tone set by the HC and both leads and NGO co-leadership positions are full time.

- **UNHCR led sector mechanisms**

Most informants engaged in the Syria crisis⁸ stated a more consensual approach to cluster coordination works better than the current UNHCR's coordination control approach. A question posed to key informants examined this point, and respondents highlighted differences between the aforementioned coordination mechanisms and how they allow co-leaders to influence matters one way or another.

Key motives for involvement

The mapping exercise provides a picture of NGO motivations to act as national co-leads⁹ by measuring what NGOs assumed could be gained from these roles. The key motives are recorded as:

- Providing a counterbalance to UN leadership
- Providing a greater NGO influence directly in areas of policy and strategy
- Strengthening lead agency performance
- Providing additional capacity to supplement insufficient lead agency coordination capacity

⁵ ALNAP SOHS 2012

⁶ SCI_HUM_GUI_SCIRoleInCoLeadershipOfClusters_EN

⁷ ALNAP SOHS 2012

⁸ Cluster v non cluster coordination in Syria response. R Luff. March 2013

⁹ Responses from key informant interviews don't allow a fully quantitative representation of this information which could be misrepresentative

- Improving status, profile, and influence with national authorities, donors, and other stakeholders.
- Improving access to resources both for NGOs in general and to a lesser extent for NGO co-leaders.

Perceived benefits and disadvantages of co-leadership

A consolidation of stated, perceived, and potential benefits and disadvantages was created through key informant interviews, literature reviews, and survey results. The findings, in general, show NGO co-leadership can and does bring benefits. The key top line benefits and disadvantages synthesised from data sources¹⁰ are summarised below.

Stated, perceived, or potential benefits:

- Providing additional resources to support coordination.
- Improving transparency allocations
- Improving need-based fund allocations.
- Strengthening partnerships in practice.
- Providing a counterbalance to UN perspectives.
- Deepening NGO engagement and increasing diversity of NGO presence.¹¹
- Strengthening ability to influence policy and strategy.
- Strengthening advocacy.
- Facilitating a better connection between needs and resource gaps.
- Strengthening technical and programme quality.
- Increasing NGO visibility.
- Providing particular policy and strategic significance through NGO leadership in Protection coordination.¹²

Stated, perceived, or potential disadvantages:

- Further politicisation of humanitarian space.
- Potential compromising of NGO co-lead's capacity to advocate.
- Co-leadership can be effectively tokenistic if dominated by CLA.
- Role reduced to secretarial duties.
- Possibility of sacrificing NGO operational capacity.

¹⁰ Key sources are; The ICVA review of co leadership at country level, the NRC co leadership coordination guide and SC Lessons_in_co cluster Leadership. An internal document setting out data sources has been shared with ICVA

¹¹ NGO co cluster coordination manual. NRC

¹² DRC lessons_learned-leadership-protection_cluster-2012

- Can exacerbate or create oversized and cumbersome coordination mechanisms.
- NGO co-lead might be prone to prioritising their own agency interest over wider collective interests.

It is believed that “transparency is improved and fund allocations are more likely to be based upon need,” if there is an NGO co-lead. The extent of co-leadership positions’ influence on decision-making regarding fund allocation is dependent on who makes the decisions. A review of the NGO role in Somalia humanitarian reform project¹³ highlights that influence in fund allocation can be problematic when there is a perceived conflict of interest. This warrants consideration and, potentially, an opt-out clause for the co-lead agency. There is an element of risk (and some evidence) that Leading Agencies (LA) may persuade their coordinators to represent the LA interests, rather than those of the wider collective. When project-vetting committees are set up, co-leadership roles are likely to be present and have influence over both project selection and criteria. For this potential advantage not to be misused, NGOs must negotiate with one another in order to ensure that co-leadership positions are given to the proper people and entail the appropriate amount of authority. This in theory will allow NGOs to provide a counterbalance to LA influence. However, in practice, much will depend upon circumstances and opportunity.

There is some evidence that NGO co-leadership positions help with establishing greater NGO engagement and adding diversity to clusters. However, the findings from this review highlight the gap in national NGO involvement in cluster leadership roles. In order to address this gap, it is clear that more detailed thinking regarding trust, recognition of national capacities, and the use of this potential are needed. The analysis below includes specific objectives for NGO co-leadership roles that could unlock this potential should national and international mechanisms be brought into closer alignment. Given national NGO’s greater ability to access affected areas and establish a presence “on the ground,” aligning national and international coordination mechanisms will only serve to add to a NGO’s effectiveness. Ultimately, co-leadership yields better results through multiple perspectives that create a more comprehensive understanding of needs, programme relevance, and quality.

One of the biggest concerns expressed by participants of this research was that the NGO co-lead’s inevitable proximity to UN agencies (and thinking) would enable the politicisation of humanitarian space and the subsequent compromise of said NGO’s operational policies and advocacy. Multiple participants believed that co-leadership could work against their independent advocacy plans and stated, “there are cases where advocating from the outside will be more effective than from the inside.” However, the general opinion was that co-leadership role is only one advocacy route and it is important to consider other avenues of advocacy, such as national INGO forums.

In terms of the 2007 Global Cluster Review’s findings, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals’ response included questions regarding how to best include NGO co-leadership arrangements in the future. Three years later, the 2010

¹³ NGO Voice in the Humanitarian Response in Somalia - December 2012

Global Cluster Review¹⁴ cites progress, highlighting the increase in NGO co-leadership at the national level across a spectrum of clusters and coordination mechanisms. UNHCR's increasing receptivity to co-leadership arrangements and the recent Syria RTE¹⁵ recommendations are signs of further progress.

At the time of writing, the latest version of the coordination reference manual stated, "where possible, co-leadership with government bodies and NGO partners is strongly encouraged."¹⁶ Generally, there is clearly a rising perception that both NGOs and the humanitarian architecture at large benefit from co-leadership roles.

What Influence do NGO Co-leads have?

In order to examine a NGO Co-leads' potential influence, key informants and survey responders were asked about actual and perceived levels of influence over policy, strategy, resources, and programme quality. These elements are all considered to be key aspects of a cluster coordinator's work and are reflected in most relevant Terms of References.

○ **Influencing Global Cluster Policy**

The majority of key informants stated that the national level NGO co-leaderships are unlikely to influence cluster policy at the global level, though there is a potential for them to do so. Overall, the survey results indicate that a national NGO's co-leadership has a somewhat limited global influence; however, a minority of informants cited specific and tangible settings where national co-leadership can and does influence global policy:

- When co-leaders attend global (and regional cluster/sector) forums;
- When co-leaders take on parts of the global work plan (e.g. Child Protection);
- When global cluster coordinators listen to co-leads as much as CLAs (e.g. Child Protection);
- During L3 Operational Programme Reviews and cluster evaluations when co-leads have an important operational opinion;
- When NGOs (such as NRC and SCI) hold a number of national level co-lead posts and thus are able to synthesise and share patterns.

○ **Influencing Cluster Strategy**

Most key informants and survey respondents saw NGO co-leadership as having an impact on cluster strategies, most significantly, in cases where no country Strategic Advisory Groups (SAGs) exist. In these circumstances, holders of co-lead positions ranked their influence at the highest level.

○ **Influencing Strategic Decision Making in Country**

¹⁴ GPPI-URD_Synthesis_Report_DD05-HR[1]

¹⁵ Syria RTE FINAL UNHCR July 2013

¹⁶ IASC Cluster Coordination Reference Module Final, 2014

Inter-cluster and cross cluster strategies are shaped by particular leaders or a combination of leaders, including the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC); the CLAs; the HCT; the Inter-Cluster Coordination Mechanism (ICCM); and, or, cluster members. Therefore it is not surprising that key informants believed that NGO co-leads had an “unpredictable” level of influence in strategy development.

- **Influencing National Level Policy**

Although survey responses suggest NGO co-leads are influential in shaping national policy/ country planning, a majority suggested that the individuals holding the roles determine their own level of influence by their willingness to engage. Examples of positive policy influence were found in South Sudan, Philippines, Zimbabwe, and in DRC. In these places, the individual co-leads were considered very strong and vocal. The main take away is that the co-lead’s level of influence stems from the individual’s approach. By taking on an active co-lead role, as opposed to a passive one, the co-lead will be able to bear great influence over policy.

- **Influencing Broader NGO Community**

There were mixed results related to the level of influence NGO co-leads have regarding the humanitarian community at large. One key informant suggested that the presence of a second NGO coordinator meant wider sectorial/cluster consultation. (This point is also highlighted in the NRC co-cluster coordination manual.) Although there is some suggestion that co-leadership roles can represent some individual NGO views, it is important to understand that multi-sector forums, such as NGO coordination bodies, will help ensure that NGOs will reach a consensus regarding key issues.

- **Influencing the Sub-national Level**

Although respondents were positive that NGO co-leadership roles have the ability to influence the sub-national level, many were doubtful that coordinating the national and sub-national levels would be effective. Most interviewees pointed out that the sub-national mechanisms are often ad hoc and fluid, with weak communication between national and sub-national levels. Many explained that this might be a result of greater national NGO engagement at the sub-national level.

- **Influencing Resource Allocation**

This was one area that the vast majority of key informants declared “no influence” could be harnessed by NGO co-leads; this was attributed to the ad hoc nature of country-based decision-making and the complexities around pool fund allocations. Through the online survey, some respondents indicated that although NGO co-leads have some influence, much depended on whether or not they were chosen to participate in decision-making bodies. A small proportion of respondents cited how key funding decisions were made by the CLA or the HCT. For example, because CERF funds were being transferred through UN agencies, individuals in cluster leads and co-leadership roles perceived the decision-making positions involving those transfers to be “out of reach.”

- **Influencing Programme Quality and Practice**

This was seen as one area where the vast majority of key informants and survey respondents firmly stated that NGO co-leads held a great amount of influence as result of relationships with communities and local civil society. The research indicates that the existence of an NGO co-leadership position enables programme quality to improve. However, the means used to rationalise these relationships' potential are difficult to measure.

- **Influence on National and Local Government**

Overall there was little understanding of whether NGO co-leadership influenced government action and policies at the national level. It was suggested that if a co-leadership role was to be formalised, governments could be more likely to recognise its authority. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that thoroughly substantiate this suggestion. At the sub-national level, one IFRC Haiti case study exhibited evidence of NGO co-leadership having positive impact regarding government decision-making¹⁷.

¹⁷ Coordinating shelter in Haiti IFRC-SCT.

Conditions for effective Co-leadership

The evidence above highlights when and under what conditions NGO co-leadership positions are perceived as adding value. Further consensus was expressed regarding the hypothesis that NGO co-leadership is a “good thing” and clearly endorsed at the IASC level¹⁸. As expressed through opinions on motivations, perceived benefits, and suggested impact, there is some agreement on what NGO co-leadership brings to the coordination mechanism. However, there remains a lack of evidence as to what results co-leaderships achieve.

The conditions under which co-lead posts are most likely to be effective have been examined in the earlier ICVA review of co-leadership at the country level¹⁹. However, some new aspects were identified during this work and are synthesised in Annex 5.

It is proposed that NGOs use the developed list of preconditions as an internal checklist before agreeing to undertake national co-leadership roles. The table below highlights the key recommendations needed for NGO co-leadership to be most effective.

Type of potential support identified	Response from key informants	Response from e- survey
Clear and concise Terms of Reference	3 responses	6 responses
Agreement of expected outcomes & added value for NGO co-leadership	2 responses	9 responses
Recognition of the time commitment	1 response	6 responses
More access to/support from the Cluster Lead Agency & the HC	2 responses	7 responses
More access to the NGO manager	1 response	1 response
Increased understanding of funding mechanisms & direct authority/influence in decision-making		4 responses
Provision of capacity building on how to undertake coordination roles	6 responses	5 responses
More support, mentoring, connections with peers	6 responses	7 responses
Budget controls, permission to connect with and travel to sub-national level		6 responses
Other (1) More evaluation & learning on the effectiveness of the role	1 response	
Other (2) More predictable funding and funding mechanisms	5 responses	
Other (3) building more professional cadre that encourages a career development path	5 responses	

¹⁸ http://drc.dk/fileadmin/uploads/pdf/IA_PDF/relief_work/emergency_roster/Resources-links/7.%20Humanitarian%20Reform%20and%20Transformative%20Agenda/Tranformative%20Agenda%20PDFs/4%20%20Reference%20module%20for%20Cluster%20Coordination.pdf

¹⁹ NGO cluster co-lead review of country experiences final. ICVA. March 2010.

Recommendations for the next step

Recommendation	Potential key actor in leading on next steps	Suggested Time Frames
NGOs complement and not supplement existing mechanisms	ICVA and NGO consortia peers working with OCHA	A statement produced for circulation by end of 2 nd quarter 2015
Explore alternative funding modalities to support NGO co-leadership positions	IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team, global clusters and key donors	To include a discussion on alternative funding modalities and propositional papers delivered by end of 3 rd quarter 2015
Develop clear TORs and ensure they are underpinned by time bound MOUs	ICVA with support by NRC and SC as exemplars	A small working group could be formed with the purpose of adapting NRC's manual for a wider audience during the 3 rd quarter 2015
Develop a capacity building workshop for NGO co-leadership	ICVA with support by NRC and SC as exemplars	Create and publicise a map of cluster training events to widen participation opportunities by end of 3 rd quarter 2015
Develop a community of practice for NGO co-leaders with the aim to provide peer support, learning, and development opportunities²⁰	ICVA through the virtual NGO Coordination Centre	The community of practice could be developed quickly through co-leaders' existing knowledge and supported through ICVA's NGO Coordination Centre website once it is up and running

²⁰ ICVA are working on development of NGO networks to address a range of issues

Annex 1 – key informant interviewees, those included in survey and key contacts

List of interviewed key informants

Date interviewed	Who	Position
30/10/14	Gareth Price Thomas	Oxfam international Geneva advocacy
31/10/14	Aimee Ansari	CARE Country Director for South Sudan
4/11/14	Jake Zarins	CARE shelter advisor
5/11/14	Fausto PRIETO PEREZ	ECHO Sector Support Team, Nairobi
5/11/14	Paul Currian	Consultant and co author of ICVA report strength in numbers
6/11/14	Loretta Hieber- Girardet	Chief of OCHA work on inter-cluster coordination
11/11/14	Miguel Urquia Davide Nicolini	UNHCR Geneva shelter deputy coordinator and focal point.
11/11/14	Byron Pakula	Global Assessment and Evaluation Coordinator. Impact initiatives
11/11/14	Nicki Connel	SC nutritional advisor on Global nutrition SAG
11/11/14	Andy Bastable	Oxfam head of public health engineers
13/11/14	Tom Newby	Head of CARE shelter team and on global shelter cluster SAG
14/11/14	Hanna Tina Fischer	UNICEF child protection AOR. Responsible for backstopping country coordinators
8/12/14	Dominic Portreud	Global WASH cluster coordinator, UNICEF
8/12/14	Randa Hassan	OCHA, head of field support unit in ICC
8/12/14	James Sparkes	SC global education cluster coordinator
10/12/14	Adrien Muratet	UNHCR global protection cluster FP

List of all national NGO co leadership personnel identified

(r) = response received

NGOs survey A

(62 persons – 13 responses)

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UN /RC/IOM survey B

(18 persons – 2 responses)

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washccph@gmail.com
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South Sudan NGOs survey C

(10 persons – 3 responses)

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Washclusterjuba-ngo@medair.org (r)
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South Sudan UN /RC/IOM survey D

(7 persons – no responses)

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mahali@unicef.org
allison@unhcr.org
washclusterjuba@gmail.com

Key contacts/people approached for information and/or key informant interview

Cluster	Agency	Name	Contact	Response
GCCs or global cluster focal points				
Health	WHO	Linda Doull	doull@sakurain.who.int doull@who.int healthcluster@who.int	No response
Nutrition	UNICEF	Josephine Ippe	<jippe@unicef.org>	Contact made but limited engagement
Protection	UNHCR	Adrien Muratet	MURATET@unhcr.org	Interview held
Child Protection	UNICEF	Anna Tina Fischer	<htfischer@unicef.org>	Interview held
Shelter	IFRC Co-Facilitator	Pablo MEDINA	<pablo.medina@ifrc.org>	Limited response
Shelter	UNHCR Co-Facilitator	Miguel Urquia	urquia@unhcr.org	Interview held
WASH	UNICEF	Dominique Porteaud Silvia Ramos	dporteaud@unicef.org sramos@unicef.org	Interview held
CCCM	IOM/UNHCR	Nuno NUNES Kimberly Roberson Cluster Co-Chair (UNHCR)	<nnunes@iom.int>	Request for interview made
Early Recovery	UNDP	Stuart Kefford	Stuart.Kefford@undp.org	Contact made and information provided
Education	UNICEF & SC	Ellen Van Kalmthout, Lisa Sabot, James Sparkes Lauren Burns Keller, Diana	ekalmthout@unicef.org Lisa.Sabot@savethechildren.org james.sparkes@savethechildren.org lauren.burns@savethechildren.org diana.keller@savethechildren.org	Interview held
Food Security	WFP & FAO	Cyril Ferrand (GFSCC) Kaisa Antikainen (IM)	kaisa.antikainen@foodsecuritycluster.net	Request for interview made but no response
OCHA				
	OCHA	Loretta Hieber-Girardet	<hieber-girardet@un.org>	Interview held
	OCHA	Randa Hassan	<hassan50@un.org>	Interview held
Global SAGs				
Global health SAG - No information available about SAG membership				
Global nutrition SAG				
	ACF	Anne-Dominique Israel	adisrael@actioncontrelafaim.org	No response
	Save the Children	Nicki Connell	nconnell@savechildren.org	Interview held
	UNICEF	Dianne Holland	dholland@unicef.org	
	WFP	Britta Schumacher	Britta.schumacher@wfp.org	
Global protection SAG - No information available about SAG membership				
Global shelter SAG				

	World Vision International	Brett More	brett_moore@wvi.org	
	NRC	Jake Zarins	jake.zarins@nrc.no	Interview held
	ACTED	Luca Pupulin	luca.pupulin@acted.org	
	Habitat for Humanity	Kip Scheidler Mario Flores	kscheidler@habitat.org <mflores@habitat.org>	Only 1 co lead role
	Care International	Tom Newby	Newby@careinternational.org	Interview held
Global WASH SAG				
	ACF	jean lapegue	jlapegue@actioncontrelafaim.org	Interview requested but no response
	Oxfam	Andy Bastable	abastable@oxfam.org.uk	Interview held
	CARE	Nicolas Brookes	nicholas.brooks@care.org.au	
Global CCCM SAG - No information available about SAG membership				
Global early recovery SAG				
	Danish Refugee Council	Susanne Brokmose	susanne.brokmose@drc.dk	Interview requested but no response
	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)	Jacob Wennerman Johan Kohler	jacob.wennerman@msb.se johan.kohler@msb.se	Not contacted as not an NGO
Global education SAG - there is no SAG at the global level				
Global food security SAG – there is no SAG at the global level				
Others				
Donors/NGOs – global FPs with cluster overview				
	ECHO	PRIETO-PEREZ Fausto (ECHO Nairobi)	<Fausto.Prieto-Perez@echofield.eu>	Interview held
	UNICEF	Gwyn Lewis	glewis@unicef.org	No response
	DRC	Gerry Garvey	gerry.garvey@drc.dk	No response
	Oxfam	Gareth Price-Jones	Gareth.Price-Jones@oxfaminternational.org	Interview held
	Ex Merlin (now SC)	Lizzy Berryman	l.berryman@savethechildren.org.uk	
	WV	Ian Ridley	<ian_ridley@wvi.org>	Not doing any Co leads
	Independent	Paul Currion	paul@currion.net	Interview held
Country level				
SS HC	UN	Toby Lanzer	lanzer@un.org	No response
Consultant DRC and SS review	consultant	Ellie Kamp	penelopekemp@hotmail.com	No response
Country manager	welthungerhilfe	Ajay Paul	Ajay.Paul@welthungerhilfe.de	No response
CARE rep	South Sudan	Aimee Ansari	aimeeansari@hotmail.com	Interview held

Annex 2 List of Key References

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- SCI_HUM_GUI_SCIClusterCo-LeadershipDashboard_EN (1)
- Cluster v non cluster coordination in Syria response. Mar 2013
- Shelter Cluster coordination-Haiti Shelter Sub Hub-case study
- Coordinating shelter in Haiti IFRC-SCT.
- Cluster v non cluster coordination in Syria response. R Luff. March 2013.

Contact lists/sheets

- Coordination_Teams_Overview_Myanmar Country-wide_MIMU_Jul2014
- South Sudan OCTOBER ICWG Contacts_2014
- IASC NGO Working Group list
- 20141031 UNDP Early Recovery tracking-1
- e-mail response from UNDP
- WASH cluster-sector_HRC_Contact List_MENA

Annex 3 – e- Survey

Section 1 – Background questions

1. Overview of the role

Are you	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
INGO co lead/coordinator at national level (currently or previously)	10		2
National NGO co lead/coordinator at national level (currently or previously)	1		1
UN cluster/sector (or IOM/RC) lead/coordinator at national level (currently or previously)		1	
Someone who has been both an NGO and UN/IOM/RC coordinator	2	2	
Other (perhaps you have been an NGO and UN coordinator)			

Which cluster/sector do you co lead	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
Camp coordination camp management			1
Early recovery or thematic working group			
Education			
Food security and agriculture	1		
Health			
Nutrition		1	
Protection (including child protection)	5		1
Shelter (inc NFIs)	2		
WASH	6	1	1

Type of formal/recognised humanitarian coordination mechanism	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
an official/activated cluster response	12	1	3
a deactivated cluster response	1	1	
A UNHCR sector/refugee response			
A govt led mechanism			
Other mechanism	1		

Section 2 – How do NGOs engage with cluster and sector co-ordination/ leadership roles at the national level (QUESTIONS FOR NGO CO LEADS ONLY)

2. About your role

Is your official co- coordination/leadership role; (Note some of you will be running your own agency programme work as well as holding a cluster/sector coordination role)	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
Part time – up to a third (33%) of your time dedicated to coordination	3	N/A	
Part time – one third to two thirds (33% -66%) of your time dedicated to coordination	2	N/A	
Part time – more than two thirds (66%) of your time dedicated to coordination	1	N/A	
Full time	6	N/A	3

What is your job/role title (note the term lead is supposed to be applicable for agency, but this may not always be the case)	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
co leader	5	N/A	
co chair	1	N/A	
co coordinator		N/A	3
co facilitator	1	N/A	
deputy coordinator	2	N/A	
Other (please specify)	3	N/A	

Are you managed by	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
Your NGO parent organisation	9	N/A	2
The cluster/sector lead agency	1	N/A	
Matrix managed by both	2	N/A	1

Is your funding source (for the time you spend on the co lead role)	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
From cluster/sector lead agency	3	N/A	
Your own NGO funds	9	N/A	3
From pooled funds		N/A	
Shared funding		N/A	

Tell us about your TOR	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
Don't have a TOR	3	N/A	
Have the same TOR as lead coordinator	6	N/A	1
Have the same TOR as lead coordinator but do different work	1	N/A	

Have a different TOR from lead coordinator	2	N/A	2
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Differences between your role and the lead coordinator	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
Different ToR. Mostly to fill a gap in Cluster Lead by following TWG, facilitating Action points and outcomes to be done by the cluster. Representing the cluster for meetings when the lead cannot attend	x		
As a Rapid Response Team member seconded by an INGO, my TOR is mostly developed at the country level with the lead agency focal person. In most situations it focuses on short-term deliverables since the RRT deployment is usually short, between 2 to 3 months in total.	x		
The ToR are roughly the same with regards to main responsibilities and tasks. We then divide them between us during regular planning meetings. In practice, I tend to have a more operational role, going on the field and doing more bilateral meetings, while the Cluster lead is more concentrated on strictly coordination and accountability (reporting) questions. I also spend a lot of time working on the phasing out and transition strategy. The situation of the Cluster where I work is particular, as the Cluster is about to close down in December, and already functioned with a reduced ("light") mandate over 2014.	x		
The TOR between the partners was not signed as there were different views on roles on different levels and therefore the roles and responsibilities were not spelled out and played accordingly. OCHA played a manipulative role which did not go along with the NGO community, also transparency was not optimal (transparency appears to be interpreted differently by the various actors like UN and some NGOs (dominance and manipulation played a role)			
I do most of the technical work along with everything else			
In terms of tasks and responsibility I have the same ToR of the UNICEF Coordinator, though an attachment to it states that I should report to the coordinator, namely that this person is meant to be my line manager. To this regard, I believe that there is somehow lack of full clarity agreement in the co-leadership arrangement between my INGO and the UN agency in charge. In practice it works that we informally agreed on how splitting tasks between the 2 of us, though in the last 2 months I have then been acting as only coordinator, for temporary (but still undetermined) absence of the UN			x

coordinator.			
The difference is in the pipeline management.			x
There is ToR for the role as well as an MoU with the cluster lead agency. There is a matrix of responsibilities between the two roles, with defined tasks, but when the coordinator is on R&R I step into the role. Currently there is no WASH Cluster Coordinator and I'm filling the responsibilities of both the coordinator and co-coordinator.			x

Key meetings you attend			
Survey A – NGO co leadership positions (world, except South Sudan)	regularly –	sometimes –	rarely or never –
Do you Attend HCTs	5	3	4
Sit on Inter Cluster/sector Coordination meeting	7	3	2
Do you participate in pooled fund allocation decisions	5	3	4
Have meetings about coordination with Cluster/sector Lead Agency representative	7	2	3
Have meetings about coordination with your NGO representative	6	6	
Survey C – NGO co leadership positions in South Sudan	regularly –	sometimes –	rarely or never –
Do you Attend HCTs			3
Sit on Inter Cluster/sector Coordination meeting	3		
Do you participate in pooled fund allocation decisions	2		1
Have meetings about coordination with Cluster/sector Lead Agency representative	1	1	1
Have meetings about coordination with your NGO representative	2		1

What is your agency motive for involvement	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
To influence policy, strategy, plans	8	N/A	1
To offer a balance to UN focus e.g. by representing non Government/ civil society views	6	N/A	3
To get more resources for NGOs (on implicit assumption that NGOs are more efficient, effective)	2	N/A	
In order to strengthen lead agency coordination performance	5	N/A	3
To provide additional capacity as there is insufficient lead agency coordination capacity	7	N/A	
Other	2	N/A	

3. Section 3 The impact of the national NGO co-leadership of cluster/sector

To what extent does the NGO co leadership role have an impact upon the following levels/ groups	none	a bit	some	a lot	very significantly
Survey A - NGO co leadership positions worldwide except South Sudan					
Global	2	3	2	1	1
HCT/Inter cluster coordination	1	1	4	3	
NGOs collectively at national level		1	1	3	4
Sub nationally	0	1	3	2	3
Survey B – Lead agency coordination positions					
Global				2	
HCT/Inter cluster coordination			1		1
NGOs collectively at national level				2	
Sub nationally				1	1
Survey C - NGO co leadership positions South Sudan					
Global	1		2		
HCT/Inter cluster coordination			1	2	
NGOs collectively at national level			1	1	1
Sub nationally			2		

To what extent does the co leadership role have an impact on these aspects of coordination	none –	a bit –	some –	a lot –	very significantly –
Survey A - NGO co leadership positions worldwide except South Sudan					
Policy		1	3	5	
Strategy			3	3	3
Resource allocation	1	3	3	2	
Programme quality			3	2	4
Survey B – Lead agency coordination positions					
Policy			1	1	
Strategy				2	
Resource allocation			1		1
Programme quality				1	1
Survey C - NGO co leadership positions South Sudan					
Policy			2	1	
Strategy			1	2	

To what extent does the co leadership role have an impact on these aspects of coordination	none –	a bit –	some –	a lot –	very significantly –
Resource allocation		1		1	1
Programme quality			1	2	

What impedes/limits the effectiveness of the co leadership role most; (please select up to four most important factors)	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
No TOR	1		
No clarity about expected added value and outcomes for an NGO co lead	6	2	1
Doing coordination job on part time basis	4	1	
Not having an MOU that sets out management, communications line and expectations of NGO and lead agency	4	1	
No funding for the position	4		
No support from Cluster Lead Agency rep, or HC	5		3
No authority and input to fund allocation decisions	1		
No support from the NGO co leader country representative	1		
Insufficient/no training orientation about the coordination role	2		1
Not having enough time or ability to connect with and travel to the sub national level	4	1	
Not being able to represent view and interests of the collective body of cluster sector agencies and having to follow lead agency line	3		3
Other	1		

What support help/could help the co leadership role to have more impact? (please select up to four most important factors)	Survey A	Survey B	Survey C
Clear(er) TOR	6		
Clarity and agreement about expected outcomes and added value for NGO co leadership	6	2	1
More time dedicated to the job (if in a part time role)	5	1	
More access to the Cluster Lead Agency rep and/or the HC	6		1
More access to the NGO manager	1		
Increased understanding of funding mechanisms and direct authority/influence in allocation decisions	3		1
Capacity building (training etc) on how to undertake coordination roles	4		1
More support in role through mentoring, connections with peers, global/regional support	3	1	3
Time and means to connect with and travel to sub national level coordination fora	4	2	

Other	1		1
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Any examples of how NGOs have had an impact on improving coordination or any other comments?

Survey A responses

- There is no official leverage to flag a deficient coordination. National WASH Cluster is not accountable to the global WASH cluster, with the result that no actions can be taken without any involvement of the appointed cluster lead institution
- Chairing cluster working groups. - More NGO membership in the SAG - both globally and nationally. - Having NGO representative in the HCT ensures the NGO voices are listened to at the strategic decision making level.
- More operational approach to discussions: NGOs tend to be more often and longer on the field than UN agencies. UN agencies mostly have an advocacy and or mobilization approach to a problem and its resolution. NGOs look more at the operational/planning aspects. Exit/transition strategy: NGOs seem to have more capacity to look at the wider picture when drafting phasing out from Clusters strategy, some that include more local non governmental actors (NGOs and State institutions not directly linked to Government), adding durability to the approach.
- 1. In the resuscitation of collapsed sub-national coordination mechanisms - NGOs because they are many and in a number of locations were able to contribute to support the required coordination. 2. NGOs lobbied for an ERF project on capacity strengthening of local NGOs which would not otherwise have happened. 3. NGOs lobbied for a quota system of Govt., UN, INGO, local NGOs in the cluster strategic advisory group for better representation of the diversity of voices. 4. Most of attendees in the forum were NGOs - they were primary drivers of coordination.
- Attending all meetings as an example, making trainings available to build technical capacity, not only attending meetings but contributing during the meetings, attending all the SAG meetings and work groups under the SAG. Answering questions in other fora about WASH. Being recognized as a major source of knowledge on WASH in the country. Problem is that HC/OCHA do not appreciate the possible positive role that NGOs can play, would say they need to be educated that UN has their role of advocacy and so on, but NGOs interact better with communities and UN has large overheads so not much of their funds get to the communities.
- Since I have more technical background than my UNHCR counterpart, the needs and gaps analysis of the services present on the ground and the capacity building of other NGOs has fallen more to me- However, the lead agency is also a donor so holds more sway on many of the cluster members. This creates a power imbalance.

Survey C responses

- South Sudan great example of NGO State Focal points - or sub-national coordination structures as well. There are NGO representation on the HCT, through the NGO Forum, through co-leads in the ICWG and at the sub-national level is important as well. NGO's feel that there is no favouritism, or double hatting with CLA.
- Lead agencies need to understand that co-lead agencies are not UN agencies, however it doesn't mean that co-coordinators are good for nothing. Cluster coordinators should understand that co-coordinator position must not be given on the basis of skin colour but competence. Cluster Coordinators must understand that skin colour doesn't determine level of competency and that they must not require their firing just after seeing their face. Clans and marginalization must be banned in inter cluster working group.
- A critical issue that sometimes we face (I say 'we' as in addition to mine, it affects also the clusters that have as a lead agency UNICEF) is the interference of the Agency Section (dedicated to programmes) into Cluster's decision-making process (especially now that the Agency Coordinator is absent and there is no one replacement). I also believe that for the way things are currently set (at least in the Country where I am co-coordinating) the extent to which the Co-coordinator can have an impact on decisions and leadership depends mostly on the personal attitude of the Coordinator and the Lead Agency. In my case I am pretty fortunate, as I am dealing with cooperative colleagues, but I also realise that it could be very easily happen the opposite and in that case it would be challenging affirming balance and equal 'power' between the UN lead Agency and the INGO co-lead.

Data log 3 – synthesis of key benefits, disadvantages, and enabling factors

Stated/perceived/potential benefit	Data source
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All stakeholders felt that the NGO co-facilitator role improved the pooled fund allocation process, adding a diversity of knowledge and perspectives. (DRC) • NGO co-facilitators felt that UN partners valued their contributions. (DRC) • The co-facilitator role enhanced the needs-basis and transparency of the project allocation process; improving decision making and transparency within the cluster. • NGO co-facilitators enabled changes (within cluster procedures, etc.) to take place more readily • Where a government participates in clusters, as in Ethiopia, the involvement of an NGO increases the human resources available to build the capacity of government counterparts to participate effectively • Where the UN cannot immediately assume its cluster responsibility, NGOs can 'fill the gap', particularly at the sub-national level (Zimbabwe). • NGO co-leadership can lead to improved transparency and needs-based decision making in the allocation of pooled funding (CHF, CERF, etc) (DRC). 	<p>The ICVA review ²¹ of co leadership at country level</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGO co leads can help engagement of national NGOs • Some NGOs consider a co-leadership role of clusters to be another expression of partnership 	<p>NGOs - Synthesis report NGOs and Humanitarian Reform. Oct 2009</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the value of NGO co-facilitation as a counterbalance to the UN perspective in cluster coordination, to ensure greater transparency and field-relevance in cluster decisions and management, and to help maintain space for the defence of humanitarian principles • capacity-building or substituting (during recruitment gaps) for the cluster lead, 	<p>DRC lessons_learnnt-leadership-protection_cluster-2012</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective division of co-leadership responsibilities between two capable organisations, each with comparative advantages. • Greater capacity and accountability to speak out. • Strengthening an already close partnership with UNICEF to generate. • Sending a clear message that humanitarianism works best when based on partnership between UN and non-UN actors. 	<p>SC Lessons_in_co cluster Leadership. SC. Feb 12 and SCI_internal</p>

²¹ NGO cluster co-lead review of country experiences final. ICVA. March 2010

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The opportunity to influence humanitarian policy decisions and strategic direction • Increased knowledge and expertise on education in emergency issues. • Greater organisational visibility and opportunities to champion education in emergencies • Being the go-to agency on NGO leadership for cluster coordination • Better identification of needs and gaps within the sector Increased access to funding for local organizations, • A cluster response that is more accountable to affected populations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funding opportunities that arise from co-leadership; gain a deep insight and a better understanding of the opportunities that arise; Co-leading gives us a default seat on the Humanitarian Country Team • influencing the strategic direction ; benefit from a significant amount of information which provides them with a holistic view of the sector; brings much knowledge; improved programme development 	review of cluster experience
NGOs could agree to take steps to help fix the weaknesses of clusters from the inside, including by holding both the CLAs and themselves to account	NGO Voice in the Humanitarian Response in Somalia - December 2012
Identifying innovations; institutionalising them in a common approach; learning lessons; and promoting lessons learned and best practices more widely to promote buy-in for the approach at other levels.	Good Practice in Humanitarian Assistance - DRC - March 2010
Promote co-lead agreements between UN agencies and NGOs (national and international) to enhance leadership acceptance among cluster members and improve continuity of cluster activities	IASC CLUSTER APPROACH EVALUATION, 2ND PHASE
The aim was to ensure better participation of NGOs in cluster coordination, better access for international and local NGOs to the Pooled Fund and burden-sharing for coordination tasks. At the same time, it has strengthened the cluster approach in areas where NGOs are active but UN agencies have no access	IASC CLUSTER APPROACH EVALUATION, 2ND PHASE DRC country study, APRIL 2010

When clusters share leadership between UN agencies, NGOs, IOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement ²² , partnerships, advocacy and information transfer tend to improve. Sharing leadership produces stronger engagement and better coordination.	IASC Cluster Coordination Reference Module Final. 2014
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening NGO participation; providing diversity in management, facilitation, technical and programming expertise and geographical access; promoting inclusive cluster priorities and approaches; and facilitating outreach and advocacy. • Improved access to information, strengthened profile and reputation, access to decision makers and contribution to a more effective humanitarian response 	NGO co cluster coordination manual. NRC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smaller NGOs can punch above their weight in these roles. • Appearing to be a team player and contributing to the collective effort • Positional power that is more likely to be recognised by the Government • Counterbalance to the UN system • Power sharing • More inclusiveness of NGOs perspective • Can form bridge between UN thinking and NGOs if there is a big gap • Technical expertise in some areas • Better sub national presence and access 	Key informant interviews

Known/perceived/potential disadvantages	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They wanted to maintain their capacity to engage in advocacy vis-à-vis the lead agency; • Because they did not have sufficient resources for covering Be position of a cluster coordinator; • Because responsibilities as co-facilitator were not clearly identified; (ICVA²³ notes there is no agreed definition or terminology for the co-leadership or co-management of clusters at the country level) • Because they feared domination by the UN partner 	2010 global cluster evaluation;
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The politicisation of humanitarian space, often with the tacit acceptance of the UN, is also cited as one of the biggest drivers towards establishing separate coordination bodies • NGOs find it difficult to participate in coordination mechanisms at the expense of their own operations. • Second, the cluster system does not cover all areas of humanitarian activity, and there remain many NGO-related issues that the cluster system does not address at all. 	Strength in Numbers Overview Report. ICVA.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comes at significant cost to the co-facilitating NGO's 	DRC

²² Subject to the mandates of the three different components of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.

²³ NGO cluster co-lead review of country experiences final. ICVA. March 2010.

operational capacity and cannot normally deliver the same boost to capacity building, strategic external coordination or outreach to a wider group of organisations	lessons_learned-leadership-protection_cluster-2012
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reputational risk 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of flexibility and independence • Leads to a very crowded and complex coordination environment. • The NGO co lead might be prone to prioritising their own agency interest over wider collective interests 	Key informant interviews
<p>The system is extremely time-consuming</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Neither NGOs wanted to co-facilitate clusters. Reasons for this reluctance included Haiti's still shaky political landscape, fear of exposure to public scrutiny and critique, and the NGOs' worry of decreasing their scope for advocacy vis-à-vis the United Nations • Co-facilitators are often pushed into this position without having the necessary capacities and capabilities. Furthermore, the role and the responsibilities of co-facilitators remain unclear, • Managing a cluster requires much staff time and resources 	IASC CLUSTER APPROACH EVALUATION, 2ND PHASE Chad Haiti , DRC, Uganda country studies, APRIL 2010
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 50% of Co-coordinators agree there is a tendency to confine their role to that of a secretariat and time constraints mean that priority is not given to analysis and strategic planning 	NGO co cluster coordination manual. NRC
Face conflicting responsibilities, such as drafting their own Consolidated Appeal (CAP) proposals, and at the same time being in charge of reviewing them.	SC Lessons_in_co cluster Leadership. SC. Feb 12

Enabling/critical factors that need attention to maximise chances of effective co leadership

Issues	Source
<p>Equally important, if not more important, than the title of the position is a mutually agreed Terms of Reference (ToR) for the NGO. This is one lesson learned from the review presented in this paper. As outlined above, the term 'lead' describes the agency while the term 'coordinator' describes the agent or person designated by the agency</p> <p>The Ethiopian context is characterised by strong overall government leadership. The government co-leads the clusters; as a result of this, NGOs are not regularly considered as coleads</p> <p>Enabling</p> <p>There is more often an NGO co-lead when the role is prioritised by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), OCHA or cluster lead agency (Afghanistan, DRC).</p>	<p>NGO cluster co-lead review of country experiences final. ICVA. March 2010.</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pooled funding mechanisms that explicitly allocate funding for NGO co-leads can drive the development of ToRs, recruitment and accountability for the agreed responsibilities of a co-lead (DRC). • ToRs are a good start, but they are not enough (DRC). Other than the factors already mentioned here, NGOs in DRC consulted prior to this review made further suggestions, which included the regular review of the performance of cluster management with the HC, and considering the initiation of meetings for NGOs and the HC only, to encourage frank discussion. • NGOs that have been able to take the time to consider the implications of the responsibility sufficiently, informed by knowledge of the parameters of the role, have provided sufficient training to relevant staff, both international and national, and have taken time to factor this training into internal planning processes. They are likely to provide effective cluster co-coordinators. <p>The NGO itself prioritises the work of the NGO co-coordinator and alleviates the co-coordinator of his/her agency-specific responsibilities so that the work of the agency and the cluster does not suffer (DRC, Zimbabwe). In addition to the issues mentioned above, national NGO participation was identified as a priority in the 2007 Cluster Evaluation; in particular to “<i>work with recipient states</i>”, “<i>make capacity building a focus of clusters’ operations in chronic and recurrent emergency countries</i>”, and facilitate “<i>transition/closeout</i>” of clusters.¹⁰ However, evidence from this review does not show that the participation of national NGOs, particularly in cluster co-leadership, has been prioritised</p> <p>Inhibiting</p> <p>Although national NGO counterparts have various strengths, many national NGOs are disadvantaged by their lack of familiarity and/or experience with the cluster approach. Without awareness raising or training, national NGOs have found it difficult to have a significant impact, particularly as co-leads, on cluster performance (Afghanistan).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sometimes there is confusion regarding the role of NGO co-leads when there is strong government leadership, either in sectoral task forces or the clusters themselves. It is helpful when the UN acts as a facilitator, explaining the value-added role of the NGO. This results in greater appreciation, collaboration and ultimately partnership between government, UN agencies and NGOs (Ethiopia). • As has been the case in Afghanistan, DRC and Zimbabwe, NGOs have to carefully consider their own capacity, availability of funding or the risk of high staff turnover when assuming co-leadership or even a co-facilitation role. • UN cluster coordinators should normally be dedicated full time to cluster work, although in reality this often does not happen. Depending on the ToR, availability of funding and skilled staff, the NGO lead agency must correspondingly allow for the NGO co-coordinator to contribute as agreed. However, this has resource 	
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<p>implications that can impact on direct delivery of programmes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Without funding or significant staff numbers (the two are often related), only a larger perhaps international NGO will be able to volunteer for the co-leadership role (Zimbabwe). Means and ways to facilitate local NGOs to participate must be actively pursued. 	
<p>There are a number of factors that come into play, including: the commitment of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and individual cluster coordinators in-country that encourage NGOs to assume a co-coordination role; the capacity and willingness of NGOs to take on such a role; and the availability of funding for such a role. NGO co-coordination is more likely to happen and to be effective where:</p> <p>The role is prioritised by the HC, OCHA or the cluster lead agency (Afghanistan, DRC).</p> <p>Pooled funding mechanisms or donors explicitly allocate funding for NGO co-coordinators.</p> <p>The NGO takes the time to consider the implications of the responsibility sufficiently, informed by knowledge of the parameters of the role, sufficient training of staff and time to factor this training into internal planning processes.</p> <p>The NGO is able to designate a staff member to the role, and alleviates him/her of agency-specific responsibilities so that the work of neither the agency nor the cluster suffers (DRC, Zimbabwe).</p> <p>Factors to consider in NGO cluster co-coordination</p> <p>Where national governments take a strong leadership role in sectoral task forces or clusters, there may be confusion as to the role of NGO co-coordinators. However, the UN can address this confusion by explaining the value added through the NGO's role, and by facilitating greater collaboration and ultimately partnership between government, UN agencies and NGOs (Ethiopia).</p> <p>NGOs have to consider their own capacity carefully, as well as availability of funding or the risk of high staff turnover when assuming a co-coordination role.</p> <p>Although national NGO counterparts have various strengths, many national NGOs lack familiarity and/or experience with the cluster approach. Without awareness-raising or training, national NGOs have found it difficult to have a significant impact, particularly as co-chairs, on cluster performance (Afghanistan).</p> <p>Without funding or significant staff numbers (which is often linked to funding), only a large (usually) INGO can volunteer to co-coordinate (Zimbabwe). NGOs rarely have Terms of Reference (ToRs) defining their roles and responsibilities as co-coordinators (Afghanistan, Zimbabwe). This contributes to confusion and may hinder NGOs in assuming a more strategic co-coordination role (Afghanistan).</p> <p>In the absence of a ToR or Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that delineates the period of time the role will last, and the</p>	<p>PARTICIPATION OF NGOS IN CLUSTER CO-LEADERSHIP AT COUNTRY LEVEL. MONTREUX DONORS' RETREAT. MARCH 2010</p>

<p>extent of the role's responsibilities, NGOs may be reluctant to take on the role of cluster coordination.</p> <p>Many NGO co-coordinators, particularly local NGOs or smaller INGOs, are not ready or able to take on the responsibility of becoming POLR. Therefore, they will be unwilling to put themselves forward as co-coordinators.</p>	
<p>humanitarian experience was valued, how that experience was gained was not valued as highly as other factors, such as being a strong negotiator, having the ability to engage government authorities, and making decisions and following through on them</p>	<p>Collective Responsibility NGO Coordination in Humanitarian Leadership - June 2013</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Though many reviews found coordination to have incentivised and increased participation in cluster meetings, one report observed that too much of a focus on pooled funding is perceived to undermine their primary coordination function in some contexts (Steets et al., 2010). The use of clusters in relation to the CERF, however, is reported as a positive trend (Steets et al., 2010) and to have improved the quality and inclusive nature of CAPs, Flash Appeals and CERF requests. • lighter structures focused on the delivery of results rather than process; annually assessed for relevance and only active where they add value 	<p>ALNAP SOHS 2012</p>
<p>Improve the governance of funding mechanisms to limit conflicts of interest and ensure direct access of international and local NGOs to funding and enhance the transparency of financial transactions linked to clusters</p>	<p>Phase 2 global cluster evaluation - URD_Synthesis_Report</p>
<p>insufficient integration of the project into the co-facilitating NGOs' programmes and strategies, and a failure by UNHCR to address operational blockages within its own provincial teams resourcing for the cluster lead and co-facilitation role, and with the degree of effective member and cluster lead/cluster lead agency buy-in.</p> <p>allowing scope for a rotation of NGO leadership over the years, as a means of burden-sharing and mutual accountability</p> <p>the trust necessary for effective collaboration – Competence , Openness: Integrity: Reciprocity:</p> <p>relatively uncontroversial sectoral subject</p> <p>If a shared work plan developed with the active participation of members set out the core activities of both the lead and the co-facilitator, each might have sufficient autonomy to be effective, while remaining mutually accountable</p>	<p>DRC lessons_learn_t-leadership-protection_cluster-2012</p>
<p>The remote management model and restricted access to field sites prompted by this insecurity have strained trust both within and between agencies:</p>	<p>NGO Voice in the Humanitarian</p>

	Response in Somalia - December 2012
They were also flexible enough to turn a bilateral project into a joint cluster undertaking	Good Practice in Humanitarian Assistance - DRC - March 2010
The concept stipulates that NGOs as cluster co-facilitators should be accountable to their peers, since accountability toward the Humanitarian Coordinator does not apply to organizations outside the UN system	IASC CLUSTER APPROACH EVALUATION , 2ND PHASE Haiti country study, APRIL 2010
Additionally, the engagement of co-facilitators has not been made transparent – for example, they are not mentioned in the Humanitarian Action Plan	IASC CLUSTER APPROACH EVALUATION , 2ND PHASE DRC country study, APRIL 2010
<p>Formal arrangements: MOUs with the Lead Agency and TORs for the Co-coordinator role are important to clarify roles, responsibilities and reporting lines, and to ensure both agencies are viewed as equal partners</p> <p>Challenges in coordination: According to a majority of survey respondents, insufficient resources and support for cluster/sector working group functions are the most challenging coordination issues faced. The need for additional funding and resources for coordination work was raised numerous times</p> <p>Entry and exit criteria</p> <p>Exchanging experiences: Co-coordinators highlight that exchange of experiences and best practice among clusters/sector working groups is particularly valuable</p>	NGO co cluster coordination manual. NRC
Appropriate training: Coordinators (both international and national staff) should receive sufficient training and have a sound understanding of the cluster structure and processes	SCI_HUM_G UI_ SCIRole InCoLeadership OfClusters_EN (4

Annex 4 - Mapping NGOs as co/deputy cluster leads 2010-2014

Country	Response	Cluster/sector or response time frame (from month/year to month/year)	Co/deputy lead time frame (from month/year to month/year)	Cluster/Sector lead agency	Cluster	Cluster/Sector and Role	Co or Deputy lead NGO
Asia Region							
Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security	2007 – on going		UNICEF	Education	Co lead	SC
Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security	2007 – on going	2008-2010	UNICEF	WASH	Deputy lead	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security	2007 – on going 2007 – on going		WHO	WASH	Deputy lead	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security			WHO	WASH	Deputy lead	Medair
Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security		2012	WFP/FAO	Food Security & Agriculture	Co lead	Afghan Aid
Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security		2013	WFP/FAO	Food Security & Agriculture	Co lead	Islamic Relief
Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security		2014	WFP/FAO	Food Security & Agriculture	Co lead	IRC

Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security		2014	UNHCR	Emergency Shelter and NFI	Coordinator	
Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security		2014	WFP/FAO	Food Security & Agriculture	Coordinator	
Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security		2014	WFP/FAO	Food Security & Agriculture	Coordinator	
Afghanistan	National-Conflict, Food Security		2014	WHO	WASH	Coordinator	
Bangladesh	Cyclone SIDR and Alia	2007 & 2009		UNICEF	Cluster	sub-national level CC co-chairing in Barisal and Khulna (after cyclone SIDR) and at Khulna and Bagerhat (after Cyclone AILA)	NGO Forum
Bangladesh	Cyclone SIDR and Alia	2007 & 2009		UNICEF	Cluster	WASH sub-national level CC co-chair	BRAC
Bangladesh		2014		UNICEF	Cluster	Co lead	ACF
Bangladesh		2014		UNICEF	Cluster	Coordinator	
Myanmar	National - multi hazard			UNICEF	Education	Co chair	SC
Myanmar	National - multi			WHO	Health	Co chair	Formerly Merlin

	hazard						
Pakistan	National - multi hazard			UNHCR	Protection	Coordinator or co lead	IRC
Pakistan	National - multi hazard			UNICEF	Education	Co lead	SC
Philippines	National - multi hazard			UNICEF	WASH	Acting Coordinator	OXFAM
Philippines	National - multi hazard			WFP	Nutrition	Focal Point	Action Against Hunger
Philippines	National - multi hazard			WFP	FSL	Co chair	SC
Philippines	National - multi hazard			WFP	FSL	Coordinator	
Philippines	National - multi hazard			UNICEF	WASH	Coordinator	
ME Region							
Iraq	Conflict			UNHCR	Shelter /NFI	Sub-National Cluster Coordinator (North)	
Iraq	Conflict			UNICEF	Education	Co-Coordinator	Save the Children
Iraq	Conflict			UNICEF	Child Protection	co lead	Save the Children
Iraq	Conflict			UNHCR	Shelter/NFI	Coordinator	
Iraq	Conflict			UNICEF	Education	Coordinator	
Iraq	Conflict			UNHCR	Protection	Coordinator	
OPT	Conflict			NRC	Shelter	National Coordinator	NRC as lead

						or	
OPT	Conflict			NRC	Shelter	Coordinat or	NRC as lead
Syria	Syria Conflict		Earlier 2014	WFP/FA O	Sector	working group co- chair	Goal
Syria	Syria Conflict		Earlier 2014	WFP/FA O	Sector	working group co- chair	Goal
Syria	Syria Conflict			UNICEF	WASH	WASH Sector / Cluster Coordinat or	
Turkey	Syria Conflict				WASH		
Turkey	Syria Conflict				WASH	WASH Sector Coordinat or	
Turkey	Syria Conflict			UNHCR	Shelter/NFI working group	Co lead	IRC
Turkey	Syria Conflict			UNHCR	Shelter/NFI working group	IM	IRC
Turkey	Syria Conflict			UNHCR	Child protection WG	Co lead	SC
Yemen	National - conflict, food security			UNICEF	Education	Coordinat or Yemen	SC
Yemen	National - conflict, food security			FAO	Food Security	Co- Coordinat or	ACF
Yemen	National - conflict, food security		2014	FAO	Food Security	Co- Coordinat or	ACF
Yemen	National - conflict, food security		2012- mid 2013	UNICEF	WASH	Deputy	Progres sio

Yemen	National - conflict, food security		2014	UNICEF	WASH	Ad hoc Deputy WASH CC	Oxfam
Yemen	National - conflict, food security		2014	FAO	Food Security	Coordinator	
Yemen	National - conflict, food security		2014	UNICEF	Education	Coordinator	
Africa Region							
Burkina Faso			2012	FAO/WFP	“Secteur alimentaire”	Co-lead	CRS
CAR	National - conflict			UNHCR	Shelter	Co-lead	ACTED
CAR	National - conflict				Health	Co-lead	SC
CAR	National - conflict				Child Protection	Co-lead	SC
CAR	National - conflict		2012	FAO/WFP	Cluster	Co-lead	Solidarites International
CAR	National - conflict		2014	FAO/WFP	Cluster	Co-lead	ACTED
Chad	Conflict			WHO	Health	Co-facilitateur	Medical Emergency Relief International
Chad	Conflict		2013	FAO/WFP	Food Security	Co lead	ACF
Chad	Conflict		2014	FAO/WFP	Food Security	Co lead	
DRC	Conflict		2012	WHO	Health	National co-co-facilitator	Alima Kinshasa
DRC	Conflict		2012	UNICEF	WASH	Outgoing co-	ASF Kinshasa

						facilitator	a
DRC	Conflict		2012	UNICEF	WASH	Head of mission, incoming co-facilitator	Solidari tés Kinshas a
DRC	Conflict		2012	UNICEF	WASH	National education cluster co-lead	Save the Childre n Kinshas a
DRC	Conflict		2012	WHO	Health	National co-co-facilitator	MDA Kinshas a
DRC	Conflict			UNICEF	Shelter	Co-lead	CRS
DRC	Conflict			UNICEF	Child Protection	co lead (overall + North Kivu & Kasai Oriental)	Save The Childre n
Ethiopia	National - multi hazard			UNICEF	WASH	Coordinat or	Plan Internat ional
Somalia	Conflict and food security			UNHCR	Protection	Deputy Coordinat or	Danish Refuge e Council
Somalia	Conflict and food security			UNICEF	WASH	Sub-Zonal coordinato r- Banadir, Lower and Middle shabelle/	Islamic relief
Somalia	Conflict and food security			UNICEF	WASH	co chair	Oxfam
Somalia	Conflict and food security		Earlier 2013	FAO/WF P	Food Security	co lead	WOCC AORG
Somalia	Conflict and food security		Later 2013	FAO/WF P	Food Security	co lead	SC
Somalia	Conflict and food security			UNICEF	Child Protection		World Vision Internat

							ional
Somalia	Conflict and food security			UNICEF	WASH	Coordinator	
Somalia	Protection Cluster			UNHCR	Protection		
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going	2012	FAO/WFP	Food Security	Co-lead	VSF Belgium & Agency for Change and Development
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		UNHCR	CCCM	Co-coordinator	ACTED
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		WFP/FAO	Food Security and Livelihoods	Co-coordinator	Mercy Corps
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		WHO	Health	Co-coordinator	IMC
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		UNHCR	Multi Sector (Refugees)	Coordinator	DRC
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		UNICEF	Nutrition	Co-coordinator	ACF-USA
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		UNHCR	Protection	Co-coordinator	NRC
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		UNICEF	Child Protection	Co-coordinator	Save the Children
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		IOM	NFI and Shelter	Co-coordinator	World Vision

South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going	2014	UNICEF	WASH	Co-coordinator	Medair
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security			UNICEF	Education	Co-coordinator	SC
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		IOM	CCCM	Coordinator	
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		UNICEF	Education	Coordinator	
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		WFP/FAO	Food	Coordinator	
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		WHO	Health	Coordinator	
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		UNICEF	Nutrition	Coordinator	
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going		UNHCR	Protection	Coordinator	
South Sudan	National - conflict, food security	2013- on going	2010-2013	UNICEF	WASH	Coordinator	
Sudan	National - conflict, food security			UNDP	Governance, Infrastructure and Economic Recovery Cluster (GEIR)	Co-Chair	CRS
Sudan	National - conflict, food			UNICEF	Child Protection	Co-lead	Plan International

	security						
Zimbabwe	Cholera	2007-2009		UNICEF	WASH	Co-lead	Oxfam (now works UNICEF)
Zimbabwe	Food Security	2014		UNICEF	Nutrition	Nutrition Co-Coordinator	A Self-help Assistance Programme
Zimbabwe	Food Security	2014		Welthungerhilfe	WASH	Coordinator	Welthungerhilfe
Zimbabwe	Food Security	2014		UNICEF	Child Protection	Child Protection sub cluster co lead	SC
Zimbabwe	Food Security	2014		UNICEF	Nutrition	Coordinator	
Latin American & Caribbean Region							
Haiti	Post Earthquake				Protection	Co lead	Oxfam
Haiti	Food Security		2014	FAO/WFP	Food Security	Food Security Co-lead	CNS
El Salvador	Preparedness				Shelter	Shelter cluster co lead	Habitat for humanity

Searched; Agh, Pakistan, Philippines, Indonesia, Yemen, Iraq, OPT, Syria, DRC, Chad, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Haiti, & Colombia.

Annex 5 – Benefits/disadvantages and conditions for effectiveness

This annex contains more detailed commentary about advantages, disadvantages, and conditions under which NGOs are likely to be more effective

Stated/perceived/potential benefit;

- *Additional resources for what is sometimes a large task*
 - This is seldom explicitly stated as a benefit and there are 2 aspects of this a) NGOs often partly or fully fund roles (subsidised coordination) b) NGOs may be able to mobilise people faster than UN agencies and so gap fill.
- *Improving transparency and fund allocations based upon need.*
 - There is belief that this is the case but it depends specifically on who is influential in fund allocation decision-making. Where project-vetting committees are set up, co-leadership roles are likely to be present and have influence both in project selection criteria and choice. However if this advantage is to be realised details and dynamics need to be scrutinised before signing up.
- *Strengthening of partnership in practice*
 - An NGO partner as a co-leader “in the room” can be anything from tokenism to true partnership. However the tone for partnership is likely to be set by the HC, HCT and LA. This is harder to predict in advance but could be made explicit within an MOU.
- *A counterbalance to the UN perspective in cluster coordination*
 - There is risk and some evidence that LAs may prevail upon their coordinators to represent the LA interests, rather than the wider collective, so in theory NGOs can provide this counterbalance. In practice much will depend upon circumstances and opportunity. If this is a key assumption, yet remains hard to predict it might imply a need for on going monitoring.
- *NGO co-leaders can help engagement of NGOs*
 - National NGO engagement in particular is known to be weak. It may require a lot more detailed thinking about how to realise this potential as many co-leadership roles might just be short term positions and not able to build links with national NGOs. NGO co-leadership roles could have a specific objective to this effect.
- *Ability to influence policy and strategy*
 - The positions of NGO co-leadership will place post holders at the centre of some strategic debates but influence may be variable/ unpredictable. Macro policy influence might be greatest in protection coordination roles, while strategy influence requires access to HC, HCT, ICCM, SAGs and SRPs

formulation process and this needs to be stipulated if it is an expected outcome.

- *Strengthening advocacy*
 - NGOs will be able to advocate with national Government on some issues that UN agencies cannot. An NGO co-leadership role may be a good conduit for this, even if not able to voice contradictory positions to the LA publicly. Critical will be ability to express an independent (of LA) opinion to LA rep/HCT/HC and/or have access to NGO forums to feed into.
- *Better identification of needs and gaps*
 - Given NGO presence is “on the ground” and NGOs often have more flexibility to access affected areas, there is clearly potential added value. However whether a single NGO co-leadership position can be a more effective conduit for a whole range of information will depend upon a number of factors and should not be seen as a given. Regular contact with and travel to sub national levels is therefore critical. Management agreement, budget support for travel, and security access are critical pre-requisites.
- *Technical ability and programme quality as a service delivery mechanism*
 - This has not come out explicitly in evaluations/reviews but did in key informant interviews. It is perhaps self evident that as NGOs are often service providers, their grasp on programme quality, constraints to delivery etc, is going to be greater. Thus an NGO co-leadership role will (if coming from a strong programme base) be much more conversant with these issues. Including a programme quality aspect in TOR would be an important measure to take.
- *Protection coordination can offer particular policy and strategic significance.*
 - Protection is inherently more complex, but its cross cutting nature means it is more relevant for most NGO country representatives. Perhaps protection as a cluster is more strategically significant than other clusters and warrants prioritisation.
- **Stated /perceived/ potential disadvantages;**
- *Politicisation of humanitarian space*
 - This is one of the biggest, if not the biggest concern. Closer proximity to the UN and by extension Govt is a primary reason why MSF and ICRC retain an observer status on clusters. NGO co-leadership positions will be compromised in some, but not all situations. Does it suggest a need for an opt-out or step aside clause, which could be included in MOUs.
- *Advocacy capacity compromised*
 - There are cases where advocating from the outside will be more effective than from the inside. However given the co-leadership role is but one NGO advocacy route, other avenues, e.g. through NGO forums can be used for

raising difficult issues. A co-leadership role should undertake internal advocacy, perhaps supported by their NGO representative, while external advocacy should be explicitly and clearly addressed elsewhere to avoid tensions.

- *Domination by CLA and a lack of any real authority, undertaking secretarial roles etc*
 - A numbers of enabling conditions need to be in place to mitigate this occurring, but there is quite a lot of anecdotal evidence to suggest this is often be the case. Given accountability invariably lies with the CLA and not the NGO co-leader, this is partially understandable. The key starting point is to set out and agree type of co-leadership role; i.e. complementary, supplementary, substitution (see above).
- *Sacrifice of NGO operational capacity*
 - NGOs often fund these posts and will need to put more senior personnel in these posts and so loose capacity to run their own programmes. In addition there is reportedly brain drain of NGO personnel into CLA roles. Given this is hard to control, it is suggested that NGOs have to decide whether prioritising staff for their own programmes and staff retention is more important than contributing to potential collective humanitarian performance improvement.
- *Oversized and cumbersome coordination mechanisms that end up administering themselves and not being strategic*
 - Getting mechanisms that are sized correctly and fit for purpose is as necessary for the LA, as for NGOs. This is an underlying issue raised by ECHO. It is critical to ask the question what is required, rather than assume NGO co-leadership is required. L3 deployments of key humanitarian staff are on no regrets basis, so clearly review points are required. LAs and NGOs could well try to develop some rules of thumb for determining required coordination cell capacity.
- *The NGO co-leader might be prone to prioritising their own agency interest over wider collective interests.*
 - This would indeed appear to be a risk, though active collusion of 2 agencies is less likely than just a lead agency.
- *Clusters and sectors tend to put interventions into silos and work against a holistic response.*
 - Undoubtedly a massive issue as identified by cluster response reviews. With current IASC system wide endorsement of the cluster approach, the functionality of HCT (which is variable) is critical and needs more attention.
- *Reputational risk is increased.*
 - Delineation of responsibility and communication of this is critical. It is of course the flip side of increased profile.

Conditions under which NGOs are more likely to be effective

The conditions under which co leads roles are most likely to be effective have been set down before, notably in the ICVA document²⁴. Some new aspects were identified during the course of this work, of which some were explicit, while others were implied. As before a systematic logging of these was prepared and is set out above, and now repeated below with commentary arising from analysis. There is some overlap with these conditions and the management of advantages /disadvantages set out above. It is proposed that NGOs use these as a list of pre conditions that should be in place before agreement is made to undertake national co-leadership roles.

- *Need for TOR with clarity about roles and division between lead and co-leadership.*
 - Clearly one of the most common and important points mentioned in numerous documents. Clarity about terminology should follow as part of this. Whilst not fully predictable, the specific skills set of each individual could be taken into account to allow lead and co-leadership positions to build on each other's skills. Of the e-survey respondents, 3 had no TOR at all, while 7 had the same TOR as the lead coordinator, with just 2 having different TOR.
- *Confirmation of whether an NGO co lead can provide sufficient added value under prevailing conditions. Clarity and expression of expected added value and outcomes from an NGO co- leadership position.*
 - The absence of this clarity was cited by 9 survey respondents as being one of the most significant impediments to their work being effective. Please see section 3.1 above. As stated the NRC guide is the only document to have set this down. Clarity about expected outcomes is therefore deemed essential.
- *Quantifying the size of the co-leadership role and allocating time accordingly (follows from TOR and expected outcomes)*
 - NGO co-leadership roles are often part time. Out of the survey respondents 9 indicated they were full time and 6 part time. Post holders often don't have enough time, are pulled in different directions, and may encounter conflicts of interests so time/budget requirements must be appraised and match the scale of the task.
- *MOU between CLA and NGO provider, which sets down key points such as limits of accountability, what each party expects, matrix management arrangements, lines of communication and entry/exit criteria. This understanding also needs to be extended to all, but in particular to key cluster members.*
 - There is often a lack of clarity around key issues so an MOU is important to underpin the TOR. This is clearly recognised by NRC as essential. With respect to management arrangements, the e-survey showed that of those respondents 11 were managed by the NGO provider, all of which using NGO funds, with just 3 posts funded by LA.

²⁴ NGO cluster co-lead review of country experiences final. ICVA. March 2010.

- *Relationship to and recognition by Govt coordination mechanisms*
 - The active participation of Government in leadership roles invariably means the role of the NGO co-leadership role needs careful definition and positioning in relation to Govt.
- *Funding for the post*
 - Both SC and NRC have high levels of institutional commitment for these posts so are able to combine global and national funding opportunities in a flexible way. Other NGOs cannot do this to the same extent/at all. This means that part time roles are often the way to partially side step this constraint. The issue of funding should also be used as an entry point with NGO country reps to ensure buy in. The protection cluster is reported as the cluster which donors are most likely to provide funding for NGO co-leaders.
- *Active support, engagement and meetings with HC, HCT, and CLA rep.*
 - This is a critical enabling factor, though outside NGOs direct influence. 8 survey respondents highlighted that where support from LA rep and/or HC is limited/absent their effectiveness is limited. Some level of regular, if only occasional meetings with the HC and CLA rep is considered critical should be stipulated in TOR/MOU.
- *Ownership of, support to and understanding of the co leader role by provider NGO. Achieving this for national NGOs is particularly challenging.*
 - The provider NGO in country representative should be part of the process of establishing and supporting the role.
- *Option to be influential and have active engagement in pooled funding mechanisms, though tempered by possibility to step away from perceived or actual conflicts of interests.*
 - While overall this is considered to be important to be able to take on, some country case studies, notably Somalia highlighted that it does have negative impacts. The key default position should be that the co-leadership role does have authority and can guide project selection criteria and prioritisation, while retaining an opt-out condition, probably as part of an MOU.
- *Proper selection & development/training. This needs to emphasis political, negotiating and facilitation skills as much as, if not more than technical skills if the role is to be more than a technical advisor. (This links back to expected outcomes.)*
 - There are a number of skills beyond technical that are required for the job. Many key informants stated that so much depends upon the individual. This “precondition” has the most significant resource investment implications and furthermore requires willingness to potentially loose key operational staff (see above).
- *On going support in role through mentoring, peer connections, remote global/regional cluster support.*

- The means for support of cluster coordinators are developed to different degrees across the various clusters, both from the global and often at regional levels. There is much to draw upon, though these need extending to incorporate senior NGO staff in the support process.
- *Ability and willingness to connect with and to access sub national programme location.*
 - As in section 3.3 outlined above.
- *Being able to represent view and interests of the collective body of cluster sector agencies and having to follow lead agency line.*
 - 6 survey participants highlighted that they felt unable to represent the views of the collective and this was a considerable limitation in their work. Needs highlighting in an MOU.



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