POOLED FUNDING MODELS: GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS
A COMPARATIVE STUDY

REPORT
NOVEMBER 2023

ICVA
A GLOBAL NGO NETWORK
FOR PRINCIPLED AND EFFECTIVE
HUMANITARIAN ACTION
# TABLE OF CONTENT

- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... - 2 -
- LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................ - 3 -
- INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... - 4 -
- METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS ..................................................................................... - 6 -
- I. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS .................................................................................................. - 3 -
  - Power balance in the decision-making bodies ....................................................................... - 3 -
  - Inclusiveness and representativeness ................................................................................... - 5 -
  - Accessibility for NGOs (particularly local partners) ............................................................ - 6 -
  - Use of resources ................................................................................................................... - 8 -
  - Decision-making processes .................................................................................................. - 11 -
  - New levels of governance ..................................................................................................... - 12 -
  - Key factors for success: facilitation and liaison ................................................................. - 14 -
  - Type of entity hosting the Fund Management Unit ............................................................... - 14 -
  - Composition of the committees in charge of reviewing projects ........................................ - 15 -
  - Timeliness .............................................................................................................................. - 17 -
  - Comparison of the Funds’ main characteristics .................................................................. - 17 -
- II. GOOD PRACTICES FOR POOLED FUND GOVERNANCE ............................................... - 18 -
  - Participation ........................................................................................................................... - 18 -
  - Projects review and selection processes ................................................................................ - 19 -
  - Quality ................................................................................................................................... - 19 -
  - Accessibility ............................................................................................................................. - 19 -
  - Localization .............................................................................................................................. - 19 -
  - Collaboration ............................................................................................................................ - 20 -
- III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SRF ........................................................................... - 21 -
  - #1 Adjust the board’s composition ....................................................................................... - 21 -
  - #2 Promote the link between countries and regional entities ............................................ - 21 -
  - #3 Triangulating information to ensure alignment and avoid overlaps .............................. - 22 -
  - #4 Reinforce integration within the wider humanitarian system ........................................ - 22 -
  - #5 Continue mitigating conflicts of interest ........................................................................ - 23 -
- REFLECTIONS ......................................................................................................................... - 25 -
- ANNEXES: COMPARISON OF THE FUNDS’ MAIN CHARACTERISTICS ............................. - 26 -
  - Annex 1: General Information ............................................................................................ - 27 -
  - Annex 2: Governance Structures ........................................................................................ - 29 -
  - Annex 3: Processes ................................................................................................................ - 33 -
  - Annex 4: Type of entity hosting the Fund Management Unit ............................................... - 37 -
- BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... - 39 -
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The study has been commissioned and funded by ICVA.

The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of ICVA.

Chloé Schmitt authored this paper. She would like to thank ICVA colleagues for their instrumental support in facilitating the research and all those who shared their time in interviews. This research benefited greatly from the time and thought devoted by the various stakeholders who contributed qualitative input through key informant interviews or data, despite very busy schedules.

Published in November 2023
LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFNS: Aid Fund for Northern Syria
CBPF: Country Based Pooled Fund
DRC: Danish Refugee Council
FCDO: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK)
FMA: Fund Management Agent
FMU: Fund Management Unit
HC/RC: Humanitarian Coordinator / Resident Coordinator (UN)
ICC: Inter Cluster Coordination
ICVA: International Council of Voluntary Agencies
INGO: International Non-Governmental Organization
LNGO: Local Non-Governmental Organization
M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization (including local, national and international NGOs)
NNGO: National Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PF: Pooled Fund
RHFWCA: Regional Humanitarian Fund for West and Central Africa
SCHF: Syria Cross Border Humanitarian Fund
SRF: Sahel Regional Fund
UN: United Nations
INTRODUCTION

Many donor governments, in line with their Grand Bargain commitments, place an emphasis on pooled funds as an opportunity to channel funds to local partners when direct funding is seen as too difficult. Pooled funding of all types – both through OCHA and other sources – is also highlighted as part of the solution to provide more flexible funding, reduce administrative burden of having diverse donors’ requirements and optimize management costs. The collective aspect of common funds is also seen as an asset for permitting the participation of all stakeholders and the definition of common priorities rooted in local realities.

This increased attention to pooled funding has led to the emergence of new models and approaches led by a variety of actors. While the range of pooled funding options has started to expand and overall funding to both new and original pooled fund mechanisms continue to grow, there are also several challenges to address. Through this consultancy, ICVA is seeking to assess the governance system of the NGO-hosted and NGO-led Sahel Regional Fund (SRF) and its added value against other new pooled funding models, develop forward-looking recommendations towards an independent governance system of the SRF, and compile good practices and lessons learnt from pooled funds.

The study focuses on the governance models. Despite the long provenance of the concept, there is no strong consensus around a single definition of governance yet. Based on the World Bank definition, « the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development »1, the study seeks to examine the entities, processes and practices that frame the exercise of power in the different Pooled funds.

The key attributes of good governance according to the Human Rights Council2 are transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, and responsiveness (to the needs of people in need)3. The true test of ‘good’ governance is the degree to which it delivers on the promise. In the terms of reference of this study, governance mainly concerns accessibility by NGOs (particularly local partners), inclusiveness and timeliness of allocation and disbursement.

The scope of the present study focuses on four main types of Funding mechanisms:

- The first UN OCHA Regionally hosted Pooled Fund (RhPF) piloted in West and Central Africa, launched in 2021. the RhPF keeps and respects the processes and frameworks of the original Country Based Pooled Funds mechanism (CBPF) that has evolved to include cost sharing and efficiency considerations and reinforce synergies and learning between country envelopes and country teams in the region.

---

1 World Bank (1992)  
2 The Human Rights Council is an intergovernmental body within the United Nations system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on them.  
3 Most of these attributes have been used as a reference to discuss the PFs governance with informants and to examine the funds documents: “transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation”. They are reflected in the report even if it isn’t structured around these. Regarding “responsiveness to the needs of the people”, the frame of this study didn’t allow to conduct an impact assessment to assess the responsiveness of each Fund.
A regional fund mechanism majority governed by NGOs and managed by an INGO at regional level (Dakar) created by FCDO and DRC specifically to address regional dimensions and cross-borders dynamics of the Sahel crisis, in complementarity of existing fundings. The SRF aspires to become a pooled fund. The first phase of the fund has been launched with FCDO support.

= A global pooled fund mechanism owned and managed by a network of NGOs: the global Start Fund, launched in 2014 with a very strict mission. It funds Start Network members to respond to small to medium scale crises with a focus on starting a new response to a new emergency or filling a clearly identified gap in humanitarian responses.

= A country-based pooled fund majority governed by NGOs and administered by a private company engaged by donors as a Fund Management Agent. The Aid Fund for Northern Syria (AFNS) was conceived by the broad humanitarian community working in Syria and created to address the specific and very complex context of access to Northern Syria. This model was developed as complementary to the Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF) to ensure continuity of humanitarian assistance in northern Syria, in view of the magnitude and complexity of the Syria crisis and the need for alternative ways to deliver humanitarian assistance inside the country.

Each of these pooled funds models has been created and tailored for specific contextual needs. Their specificities and innovative approaches have mostly been guided or imposed by the operational context. Moreover, the governance models for the different funds are dynamic and evolved to adapt and adjust to the contextual changes and lessons learnt. Therefore, a strict comparison is impossible and lacks significant meaning. If certain successful practices from other contexts can be inspiring, replicating one model in a different context would likely yield different results.

The comparative analysis produced here serves three purposes: first, it contributes to understanding the landscape of Pooled Funds governance models (part I), second, it sheds light on good practices observed in these Pooled Funds (part II). Third, forward looking recommendations towards an independent governance system of the SRF are proposed (part III).

---

4 The Start Network’s family of funds includes many different financial instruments: the best known Start Fund, which aims providing contingency funding for under-the-radar, small to medium-scale crises. The original global fund is now joined by national Start Funds, managed by national and local member organisations, in Bangladesh and Nepal. Like the global Start Fund, each national Start Fund is a rapid emergency fund that activates within 72 hours of a crisis. They are also owned by NGOs, in this case organisations that are based in a specific country. These member organisations are responsible for governance and decision making that is led by their local knowledge. In 2021, the Start Ready has been launched. This is a risk-pooling mechanism aimed at predicting crises worldwide. The Start Network is also working on other new forms of planned and pre-agreed funding, such as insurance. Many funds are now paid directly to local and national organisations and managed by them. This analysis will consider solely the Start Global fund governance model.

5 Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF) is a multi-donor Country Based Pooled Fund (CBPF) established in 2014 following UN Security Resolutions 2139 and 2165 in view of the magnitude and complexity of the Syria crisis and the need for alternative ways to deliver humanitarian assistance inside Syria.

6 These are the 3 objectives set in the terms of reference of the study. The search for greater independence is a general objective, and in no way an assumption about the low level of independence of the funds examined.
METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The study is based on a desk review of existing documentation, especially Pooled Funds and SRF’s strategies, governance documents and manuals, completed by recent literature on Pooled Funds. The teams of the different funds have been very cooperative and have shared key documents. Data presented in the report has been checked with the Funds teams.

The study has focused on key informants semi-structured interviews with diverse stakeholders: OCHA Country-based Pooled Funds staff, NGO-led Pooled Fund staff, donors at field and global levels, ICVA teams, UN agencies, Cluster staff, Pooled Fund committees and boards’ members, a range of national and international NGO staff at global, regional and field level with a mix of NGOs partners of the funds, and NGO participating to the Funds’ governance, NGOs not involved in the Funds.

Selection of key informants was conducted with the aim to balance the different categories of stakeholders and report all perspectives regarding the four funding mechanisms included in the study. The author interviewed the individuals in a confidential manner to ensure an open and frank discussion.

55 interviews have been conducted with 45 informants as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private company staff</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Syria actors</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West and Central Africa Regional actors</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West and Central Africa Country actors</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ/Global actors</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key informant interviews constituted the main source of data. The report specifies where findings are based on the perception of the informants.

The comparative analysis was challenging due to the methodological limitations of comparing funding mechanisms of a very different nature; AFNS, SRF, Start Fund and RHFWCA have different origins, were set up in very different contexts, with different geographical and programmatic scopes, different levels of decision-making and different objectives. The study focused on identifying the success factors and grey areas of the funding mechanisms examined. No model or good practice should be reproduced without first being contextualised.

The wide scope of the study allows a broad comparison but not a detailed analysis of all aspects of the Funds. Some points deserve further study with detailed data to allow an accurate comparison (e.g. cost effectiveness).
I. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The four funding mechanisms studied here cover very different realities: different backgrounds and contexts, different scales (regional versus country-based or cross-border) different humanitarian objectives in the responses (rapid response to small and medium crises for the Start Fund versus multiyear interventions for the SRF), different identities, different types of grants, different layers of collaborations and different life spans. Moreover, the SRF and AFNS are quite recent and there has not been enough time to assess how well their governance systems fulfil their promises, as they haven’t completed a full grant cycle yet.

Three tables present the main characteristics of each fund in terms of governance (Annex 1). The key distinctions between the funds are also the topics of discussion that came up in the interviews conducted. They are discussed hereafter.

Power balance in the decision-making bodies

Degree of donors’ participation (see Annex 1 for detailed information): all models analysed here have different practices on donors’ participation to decision-making bodies for allocations and project selection. It spans from a very light participation in the Start Fund model to an active role in the AFNS and SRF boards. The table below indicates the level of donor’s participation in the governance structures of each Fund. It is interesting to note that no donors are part of the Start Fund committee, nor of the project selection committees. Donors delegate the decision-making to the Start Network members. This model puts an emphasis on having decisions made independently by operational non-governmental actors presents in the field. As far as the RHFWCA is concerned, donors are represented as equally as UN agencies, L/NNGOs and INGOs in the advisory board. A notable difference with other PF boards, the RHFWCA Board provides advice and support to the HC/RC who ultimately has the final say. As a common practice, the HC/RC consults and seeks advice from the Advisory Board, and has the final say if Advisory Board members are in disagreement. Donors are represented in the AFNS board with the same number of seats as other constituencies. In the AFNS, contributing donors also compose the Partnership board that can be activated in case of board absence of consensus. Donors need the legal cover to prevent egregious decisions by the board that would violate their domestic laws, but their general belief is that they will never have to exercise this. All donors including the ones that don’t contribute can also participate widely as observers. The global Start Fund doesn’t have a board. The Start Fund governance body is only the Start Fund Committee (with delegated authority on the Start Fund programme from the Start Network Board). Donors are not members of the Start Network Board.

7 The global Start Fund doesn’t have a board. The Start Fund governance body is only the Start Fund Committee (with delegated authority on the Start Fund programme from the Start Network Board). Donors are not members of the Start Network Board.

8 In August 2023, 38 donors are observers in AFNS board. In fact, observers from all constituencies can attend a meeting. For the NGO constituencies this is limited to 2 from each constituency. For the donor constituency there is no limit, which allows potential donors to observe how AFNS is governed.
In the SRF model, the donor is on the board and has a veto power, which grants them significant influence in the absence of other donors. This should evolve if other donors join the SRF.

There are pros and cons regarding the participation of donors in PF decision-making processes. Even if donors do not hold the the majority of seats in the different PF boards examined here, most informants note that they exercise a strong influence in debates and decision-making processes. Some NGO participants may be less inclined to argue with a donor with whom they may otherwise be negotiating for a partnership or funding agreement.

The cons are that donors already have the ultimate “money power”, thus exercising significant influence. Those that would prefer donors note participate in PF decision-making processes want to ensure that funding allocations are based on needs, rather than media headlines or politics. Donors can always stop supporting a PF if they find it too risky or against their interests. Including them as active members in decision-making bodies may introduce the potential for political agendas to influence strategic decisions and limit flexibility in PF management, especially when their numbers are limited. In practice, the donors often have varying opinions, and no single donor has a particularly dominant or persuasive voice. Donors do not operate as a single entity, and neither do members from other constituencies. A PF aims not merely to be the sum of diverse donor constraints, but rather to establish a fund that is not susceptible to short-term shifts in donors’ priorities. Some recommend giving an observer role to donors, allowing their participation while guaranteeing independence of the board in decision-making.

On the contrary, most of donors seek involvement in decision-making as ultimately, they bear the risks and are accountable to their citizens. Providing funding without a say in the decisions can be seen as akin to issuing a blank cheque. Another argument in favor of donors’ participation to decision-making bodies is to enable collaboration between NGOs (L/NGOs and INGOS) and donors. There are very few platforms where both implementing partners and donors are represented. Participating enables donors to gain a deeper understanding of operational environments and constraints. Furthermore, it provides NGOs (L/NGOS and INGOS) with the opportunity to advocate for increased flexibility from donors and gain a more comprehensive grasp of donors’ capacity for risk-taking and constraints. Donor participation can also aid in mitigating conflicts of interest within board decisions. Unlike the majority of board members, donors do not compete for PF funds.

Donors participating to the review committee: the SRF model stands out as the sole approach where the donor’s technical experts actively engage in the project review committee. Further details regarding the composition of these review committees will be covered in subsequent sections of the report.

Added value and concern to have PFs governed by NGOs in majority: Based on the interviews conducted as part of this study, NGOs may feel unrepresented in CBPFs governed by the HC/RC, making it challenging for them to exert influence over decisions. This can lead to a reduced participation in the CBPF advisory board. A significant benefit of having a predominantly NGO-led PF (L/NNGOs and INGOs) lies in their ability to provide valuable expertise and offer practical assessments of issues such as access limitation and target selection. Operational NGOs have a deeper and finer understanding of
operational contexts, enabling them to identify priorities and operational hurdles, and thereby contribute to informed decision-making. It is widely agreed, that having actors familiar with the context at the discussion table provides invaluable insights. In such models, it is almost unavoidable that conflicts of interest will arise because those applying for funding and those making decisions often belong to the same constituency or even from the same organization. While it is inherent that board members can seek funding and be selected, it does create a perception of an unfair advantage. One significant inconvenient highlighted by key informants when it comes to having PFs governed by NGOs in majority is the constant “fight for money with INGOs”, especially in very competitive environments with low levels of funding, such as Northern Syria or the Sahel region. Based on key informant interviews, some donors are concerned that NGOs could influence the strategy to preserve their own interest, such as steering away from prioritizing areas where they are in negotiation for a bilateral agreement with a donor. Therefore, it is crucial to establish clear and strong measures to mitigate this risk. Donor representation on the board is seen as an effective way to mitigate that risk.

Inclusiveness and representativity

Equal representation of national and international NGOs on the boards is not a subject of contention in three out of the four Pooled Funds studied. The SRF should promptly make adjustments to achieve a balanced distribution of seats (3 NGOs and 4 INGOs so far). National organizations do participate to the governance systems of the different PFs, but they never constitute a majority. When funding allocations are specifically targeting national NGOs, and emphasise advancing the localization agenda, some stakeholders view having a slight majority of NNGOs in decision-making bodies as the logical next step. Notwithstanding, it is widely believed that PF benefit from the expertise and perspectives of both international and national NGOs.

The selection of the board members varies according to the different funds. The global Start Fund allows the participation of all the Start Network members to the Start Fund Committee through a vote and a rotation system. In the AFNS and RHFWCA models, all board members (donors, NGO and INGO) are elected by their own constituencies.

SRF board members have been appointed through a selection process done by the donor and the hosting INGO with two distinct calls for application: one for INGO and one for NGOs. The option of having one single call for application was not chosen to ensure NNGOs will access the board while keeping complex criteria for INGOs. The rigor of the process and its solidarity have been underlined and never contested in the numerous interviews conducted.

One key criterion for the selection of NNGOs to participate in the SRF board is that the applicant must formally represent other national NGOs. Representatives of national NGOs to the SRF board must justify their election or nomination by the country NGO forums or regional networks. This criterion has been set up to overcome the difficulty to select national NGOs amongst the numerous humanitarian actors in the countries covered by the SRF. On the contrary, the coordination between INGOs at the regional level was at an embryonic stage when the SRF was designed, making difficult to organise a selection by their peers.
The regional positioning being central for the SRF, INGO board members were selected based on their regional added-value and their footprint in the different countries covered by the SRF. Yet, having board members representing their constituency is an important factor that can increase legitimacy and accountability of the board as a whole. It increases the transparency of the board’s decision-making process and fosters trust in and perceived integrity of the board. Additionally, it may also enable a broader dissemination of information about the fund’s strategic decisions and facilitate a broader consultation. Individuals selected by their constituency serve as evidence to the board’s neutrality.

### Accessibility for NGOs (particularly local partners)

In the three PF, AFNS, the RHFWCA and the Start Fund NNGOs and INGOs have equal access to funding. They can apply as prime or sub-grantees. Equal sharing of overhead is encouraged but not mandatory, unlike the SRF where it is required. The SRF has launched its first allocation for INGOs only due to concerns about financial risks in the pilot phase. It mandates the INGOs to partner with national organizations and share overheads equally. The SRF considers the possibility of launching future proposal calls exclusively for national and local NGOs.

Among the national stakeholders interviewed, there is a significant divergence of views concerning the relevance of having dedicated proposal calls as opposed to having access to the same calls as INGOs and competing alongside them. An open call for proposals accessible to all would be fair as NNGOs with adequate oversight functions can meet PF requirements (as in the RHWCA). On the contrary, implementing reserved envelopes or specific criteria for NNGOs is seen as potentially slowing the progress and development of NNGOs. Being in a competitive market is the best way to increase capacities and abilities to access more quality funding. NNGOs should budget relevant senior human resources to develop their systems and business. As an example, the RHFWCA allows applicants some flexibility, permitting up to 25% of the budget for staff costs. While advancing the localization agenda is a priority for all PFs, the quality of humanitarian responses remains paramount. Parallel initiatives to promote localization are developed by the different Funds under study with promising initial results. Some stakeholders argue for the need to establish criteria tailored to NNGOs and dedicated funding allocations. Nevertheless, the ability for national organizations to access direct funding and apply independently is crucial and aligns with the Grand Bargain commitments.

Some NNGOs exhibit hesitancy towards INGOs due to the competitive nature of funding. In contrast, they express greater trust in securing funding from UN agencies, as historically, UN funding has been more readily accessible to NNGOs.

---

9 With AFNS first allocation, only one INGO did not share equally, due to their own internal regulations. The less confrontational ‘encouragement’ approach seems to have been quite successful in this context. The consultant doesn’t have access to similar data for RHFWCA at the time of publishing the report.

10 Yet access to quality funding covering support and capacity building costs have been and remain a challenge with UN funds.
Under the **RHFWCA**, the list of eligible organisations is defined by the clusters. The compilation of potential NGOs for the eligibility process is subject to discussion and approval in close collaboration with the clusters. The initial list draws from NGOs that participated in the country’s Humanitarian Program Cycle. However, this close collaboration with the clusters is occasionally perceived as risk to transparency and accountability. Some actors do not fully trust the Cluster Lead to identify the most appropriate NGOs to be considered for eligibility. Several actors note that lessons learned from the first allocations and comments provided by national NGOs have been taken into consideration. During the last allocations, the national NGO platforms were consulted on the list of potential NGOs to be considered for eligibility and NGOs were supported in the eligibility process to facilitate their access to funding, through numerous meetings and online support. The list of eligible organisations is the final result of the eligibility assessment which includes pre-screening with the clusters, registration, due diligence and capacity assessment conducted by OCHA.

**RHFWCA** and **AFNS** have a due diligence process and a capacity assessment amongst other processes for determining eligibility. The due diligence process consists in vetting checks for applicant organizations. The capacity assessment is a different process that allows the assignment of a capacity rating to participants. The risk level determined during the eligibility assessment will then define the operational modalities and the management regime applicable to each eligible organization (**RHFWCA**) or determine the maximum grant amount (**AFNS**). Both PFs provide guidance on capacity-strengthening and a timebound capacity-building plan is required, either at the proposal stage (**RHFWCA**) or negotiated between the Fund Management Agent and the applicant at partnership agreement stage (**AFNS**).

The **AFNS** seems to be the most advanced when it comes to access to funding for local NGOs. It allows organizations to progress through different tiers, with members gaining access to varying levels of funding and services based on their tier placement, determined by a capacity assessment. **AFNS** has six tiers, with the lowest tier eligible for grants up to $0.5m and the highest having the potential to receive up to $5m. There is a clear and transparent mechanism for NGOs to progress or regress through these tiers based on their grant implementation performance. This system incentivizes good performance. The **Start Network** has also developed a tiered due diligence framework to enable the inclusion of more local organizations as members. Members gain access to varying portfolios of **Start Network** products and services depending on the tier in which they are placed during assessment.

Pooled Funds are often the only way that local organizations can access funding. However, the actual funding received directly by national organizations through PFs varies significantly. The volume of funding directly and indirectly allocated to NGOs represents 72% of the **AFNS**'s total donor contributions to date, 23% of the **RHFWCA**'s total donor contributions in 2022, 20% of the **SRF** total donor’s contributions thus far, and 6% of the **Start Fund** total donors’ contributions in 2022. For details, please refer to the tables below.

11 In the **AFNS** for example, organizations with a capacity assessment score (CAS) > 50% are selected. Based on the CAS, the applicant will be assigned a capacity rating and receive advice from the FMA on any capacity-building needs. If applicable, a timebound capacity-building plan shall be included in the framework agreement with the IP. The Capacity Rating is used to determine grant value ceilings.

12 Please refer to **AFNS** handbook for more details.
## Use of resources

### Table 1: share of allocations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pooled Fund</th>
<th>Funds directly allocated to National or Local NGOs (USD)</th>
<th>Funds allocated to National and Local NGOs through INGOs (USD)</th>
<th>Funds allocated to Red Cross/Red Crescent movement (USD)</th>
<th>Funds allocated to INGOs (USD)</th>
<th>Total allocated to Implementing Partners (USD)</th>
<th>Total donors contributions (USD)</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SRF</strong></td>
<td>Amount 0</td>
<td>7'946'287</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27'545'443</td>
<td>35'491'730</td>
<td>39'503'942</td>
<td>The numbers here are from beginning of June 2022 to end of March 2026, so more than 3 years of operations (multi year projects). Data converted from GBP (exchange rate : 1GBP=1.27 USD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total donors contributions 0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total allocations 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RHFWCA</strong></td>
<td>Amount 7'600'000</td>
<td>5'000'000</td>
<td>600'000</td>
<td>25'300'000</td>
<td>38'500'000</td>
<td>54'300'000</td>
<td>From 2022 report: total donors contribution in 2022 were 31.7 M. The $54.3 million mentioned here are the 2022 contributions + the carry over of 2021 contributions ($22.6 million) as indicated in the RHWCA 2022 Annual Report p.11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total donors contributions 14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total allocations 20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFNS</strong></td>
<td>Amount 42'100'000</td>
<td>3'900'000</td>
<td>1'500'000</td>
<td>11'000'000</td>
<td>58'500'000</td>
<td>64'000'000</td>
<td>These figures are for the first two allocations. So they represent the total commitments made to date. The funds will be disbursed mostly for 12 month grants, with the first one starting in mid-February 2023 and the last ending somewhere around the end of August 2024. But there will probably be more allocations launched in the next few months. So it’s not possible to tie down exact figures to exact timeframes (at least until the first set of annual accounts is done). This is an estimate to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total donors contributions 66%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total allocations 72%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Start Fund</strong></td>
<td>Amount 1'382'742</td>
<td>602'283</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19'938'531</td>
<td>21'923'556</td>
<td>34'284'907</td>
<td>Data converted from GBP (exchange rate : 1GBP=1.27 USD). Amount awarded through SF crisis disbursement line from April 2022 to March 2023. Source: Start Fund finance reports. From April 2022 - March 2023, Start Network local/national NGO members only operate in 7 countries, whereas the global SF had operations in 43 countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total donors contributions 4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total allocations 6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Management Costs

Disclaimer: The origins and characteristics of the PFs differ significantly from one another. It is important to note that conducting a comparative cost analysis among these PFs is not feasible within the present scope of work. Such an analysis would require an in-depth financial examination based on each Fund’s budgets, which is beyond the current project's focus.

Readers should consider the following:
- Operational costs vary greatly depending on location and timeframe, differing from one context to another.
- Costs’ categories and calculation methods vary among the PFs.
- The valuation of existing or internal resources is not always consistent across Funds.
- Management costs are higher during the first months of a new mechanism.
- The number of staff and seniority within the Fund Management Units vary.
- Investments in monitoring and evaluation may vary and budgeted differently. For example, 3% of the total SRF’s management costs (over a 3-year period) are M&E and audit costs, whereas audit costs represent an estimate 0,5% of the RHFWCA’s annual management costs.
- Threshold effects and economies of scale play a significant role in cost variation across these Funds.

Therefore, the below cost breakdown is intended to provide approximate figures and offer a sense of scale.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pooled Fund</th>
<th>Fund management cost* in USD</th>
<th>Reserve in USD</th>
<th>Total donors contributions in USD</th>
<th>Number of FMUs’ staff</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Estimation for the year 2023. These figures are based on forecast of expenses for 2023, based on August 2023 figures. Data converted from GBP (exchange rate : 1GBP=1.27 USD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>839'996</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>12'245'376</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total donors contributions</td>
<td>6.86%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total allocations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| RHFWCA            |                             |               |                                   |                       | 11. From 2022 report: total donors contribution in 2022 were 31.7 M (without the 2021’s carry over.) According to RHFWCA 2022 Annual Report (page 16), the 6.2% of management cost include:
- 2% of 2022 donors contributions that are overheads (this will rise to 3% from 2023).
- 3.7% of 2022 donors contributions that are direct cost of the FMU (approx. 10 |
|                   | 1'965'900                    | -             | 31'700'000                       | 100%                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|                   | % of total donors contributions | 6.2%         | 0%                               | 100%                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|                   | % of total allocations      |               |                                   |                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| AFNS              |                             |               |                                   |                       | 20. These figures are for the first two allocations. So they represent the total commitments made to date. The funds will be disbursed mostly for 12 month grants, with the first one starting in mid February and the last ending somewhere around the end of August 2023. But there will probably be more allocations launched in the next few months. So it’s not possible to tie down exact figures to exact timeframes (at least until the first set of annual accounts is done). this is an estimate to date |
|                   | 5'440'000                    | 60'000        | 64'000'000                       | 100%                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|                   | % of total donors contributions | 8.5%         | 0%                               | 100%                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|                   | % of total allocations      |               |                                   |                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Global Start      |                             |               |                                   |                       | 15. Data converted from GBP (exchange rate : 1GBP=1.27 USD). Amount awarded through SF crisis disbursement line from April 2022 to March 2023. Source : Start Fund finance reports.                                    |
| Fund             | 7'421'725                    | 0             | 34'284'907                       | 100%                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|                   | % of total donors contributions | 21.7%        | 0%                               | 100%                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|                   | % of total allocations      |               |                                   |                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |

*that includes direct management cost of the FMU + overhead of the Fund management agent or hosting organization + MEAL or audit costs of the Fund
Decision-making processes

The decision-making processes employed by the boards (or committee in the case of the Start Fund) vary significantly across the different models. Although all the models examined here emphasise the importance of reaching consensus, some consider the need for a vote almost as a shortcoming of the model (AFNS). On the other hand, certain models have a formal voting system in place with a two third majority to validate key documents or decisions (SRF). Notably, during the AFNS’s first year, no Board decision has required a vote; all decisions were reached unanimous.

The pursuit of consensus aims to identify compromised solutions acceptable to all parties involved. It promotes transparency in discussions and a commitment to collectively address challenges. In recognition of the high diversity of NGOs around the table, the Start Fund Committee uses majority vote in decision-making processes. The RHFWCA also employs a consensus-based approach to foster opened discussions and facilitate the exchange of viewpoints among members.

Decision-making processes have been identified with a focus on risk management. New funds, such as AFNS and SRF, can be considered as risky by donors. Maintaining the option to have the final say is important for donors’ capitals, especially during the early stages of these mechanisms and in sensitive contexts. Additionally, for the entity managing the fund, which shoulders a substantial portion of the risks, this is also a concern. To overcome this challenge while still fostering collective consensus decision-making, both funds have identified alternative processes as last resort in case of major risks or obstacles. It is worth noting these processes have not been used thus far.

In the first mandate of the SRF board, both the donor and INGO representative were granted a veto power. However, it has never been used so exercised thus far. Instead, the board has placed a greater emphasis on pursuing consensus and fostering frank discussions regarding risks.

In the Northern Syria context, where the use of a veto holds significant political sensitivity, AFNS members were determined to avoid unilateral veto powers that might result in arbitrary decisions and impede the pursuit of effective solutions. To address this concern, the AFNS has established a Partnership Board, consisting of representatives from the donors contributing funds to the AFNS. The primary purpose of the Partnership Board is to assist the board in reaching consensus decisions on the rare occasions when reaching consensus proves challenging. This approach helps alleviate concerns from donors, as they are not obligated to accept decisions from the board. It also provides the opportunity for another collective body to offer can guidance to the board in its decision-making process.

The Partnership Board convenes on an ad hoc basis, only when either a Steering Board decision is made through a vote, or any of the following triggers a request for the Partnership Board to convene:

a. any member of the Steering Board;
b. the Independent Chair of the Steering Board;
d. any three members of the Partnership Board together; or, the Fund Management Agent (FMA).

Ultimately, in both models, donors have a possibility to influence a decision from the board. The main difference lies in the fact that the Partnership Board functions as a collective body entrusted with the responsibility of offering guidance to the Steering Board in reaching a consensus decision. This setup prevents a single donor from unilaterally blocking a decision, thus promoting collective accountability. Moreover, the recourse to the Partnership Board to resolve an issue is available to all board members as well as the FMA.

**New levels of governance**

The four Funds are governed at different levels: decentralized decision-making in the **Start Fund**, with operational actors at field level taking the lead; a country-level governance for the **AFNS**; a regional participation/component in the **RHFWCA**'s country-based governance; and a full regional governance in the **SRF**.

While prioritising “as local as possible” decision-making is highly relevant due to its grounded nature, the regional approach has distinct advantages in some contexts, such as the Sahel region.

The **regional component of the RHFWCA’s governance** is the participation of the head of OCHA ROWCA in the advisory boards of countries within the region that have allocated funding envelopes. Additionally, the ROWCA contributes to context analysis, priority identification, funding advocacy and knowledge sharing. The OCHA Head of Regional Office brings not only the analysis, priorities, and learning but also conveys the perspectives and insights of regional actors and bodies to enrich the discussion at the country-level.

Within the current UN system, regional-level decision-making capacity is not formally acknowledged, and as a result decision-making for the **RHFWCA** continues to be conducted at the level of each country-level HC/RC, with support and guidance from the Advisory Board. The funding envelopes launched thus far have been focused on individual countries, with the majority of priority analysis also coming from the country level. "There is a common perception that the “regional” element of the RhPF [RHFWCA] has not been fully realised yet."13

The **RHFWCA** is widely appreciated at the country level, especially among national NGOs interviewed. The primary recognized added value of the **RHFWCA** according to informant interviewed are:

- **Expedited application launch**: the RHFWCA facilitates faster progress in launching applications compared to individual CBPFs.
- **High-level expertise**: it brings high level capacities to manage processes, and high level of expertise and experience of the FMU.
- **Promotes intercountry collaboration**: RHFWCA encourages intercountry discussions and experience sharing to improve processes.

---

Strong collaboration: there is a strong collaboration between each OCHA Country Office and the Regional Office.
Enhanced efficiency: the fund’s structure enhances the efficiency of fund through the pooling of resources.
Inclusive access: it allows direct access to funding for NNGOs, and its processes are inclusive.

The distinctiveness of the SRF governance model lies in the fact that it involves regional level management (similar to the RHFWCA) and oversight by an INGO (akin to the Global Fund), but also in its unique decision-making. The SRF’s regional approach intends to influence a humanitarian response “which is currently too defined by national borders, short-term, insufficiently inclusive and impacted by lack of consideration of humanitarian principles, with questionable value for money.”14. The SRF’s essence is deeply rooted in upholding humanitarian principles. It has been created to safeguard the humanitarian space in a context where boundaries between humanitarian, politics and stabilisation have become increasingly blurred. The SRF’s proposition is to complement existing funding mechanisms and advocacy efforts, which are often confined within national borders level, by addressing cross-border and regional dynamics of the crisis.

The main added values of the SRF’s regional approach according to key informants include:
- Enhanced understanding of cross-border dynamics: the SRF’s approach offers a better understanding of local dynamics that transcend borders, as population movements and conflicts do.
- Crisis response coordination: it possesses a unique capacity to coordinate responses to crises impacting multiple countries, especially those long lasting multicounty/regional crises.
- Complementary to country programs: the regional perspective complements country offices’ programs. Regional INGO offices in Dakar ensure the daily management and oversight of their country offices, contributing contextualized expertise to the discussions.
- Reduced earmarking, increased flexibility: a regional funding envelope in line with the Grand Bargain commitments reduces the degree of earmarking and enhanced funding flexibility. The flexibility enables adaptation to conflict and displacement dynamics, and evolving contexts, permitting the allocation of more resources to one country over another when necessary.
- Fosters cross-border collaboration: the regional approach promotes cross-border collaboration and a better understanding of cross-border dynamics among field actors.
- Potential for joint advocacy: it has the potential to support a joint regional NGO advocacy agenda to influence practices, policies and humanitarian reform across the region.

Some of the actors interviewed question the relevancy to multiply the different funding mechanisms and tools, rather than pushing for innovation within pre-existing mechanisms. Others argue that piloting new approaches and testing different governance systems will contribute to improve the response and that different instruments are complementary.

14 SRF Strategic Framework
However, there is unanimous consensus that fostering collaboration and coordination between multiple funding mechanisms operating in the same areas is of high importance.

**Key factors for success: facilitation and liaison**

In the SRF board, there is a distinctive arrangement where the Chair is an INGO vested with a specific decision-making authority. This authority allows the Chair to break ties in all SRF board votes, including those related to conflicts of interest, thus serving as a mechanism to overcome potential deadlocks. It is worth noting that having a Chair with a specific power of decision is common to the SRF and the RHFWCA (where the HC/RC chairs the advisory board), setting them apart from other NGOs-led PFs. In contrast, the Start Fund Committee follows a different structure, where the Chair does not possess tie-breaking authority on funding allocation decisions. Any member organisation, whether local or international NGO, can put forth nominations for the role of chairperson, with the current incumbent being a representative from an INGO member. As far as the AFNS is concerned, the Chair of the board is independent and has no voting power.

According to most key informants, it is widely acknowledged that having a Chair is crucial to reinforce the values outlined in the Charter and foster an environment conducive to consensus-building. This role serves as a vital link within the entire system, encompassing responsibilities such as external representation and coordination with other funding mechanisms or regional entities. In this context, the Chair should be perceived as impartial as possible. Having an independent Chair, one without voting power and from an organisation ineligible to submit proposals, helps mitigate any potential misconceptions regarding their independence and neutrality. For instance, in the AFNS model, the role of the independent Chair is considered a key driver of success in achieving consensus and preventing conflicts of interest.

**Type of entity hosting the Fund Management Unit**

In the RHFWCA, the PF management is overseen by OCHA, similar to all CBPFs. The fund management unit operates at the regional level and is hosted at OCHA Regional Office. The Start Fund is managed by Save the Children UK, which also established the Start Network as a private charity in 2019. Currently, the management of funds is in the process of transitioning from Save the Children UK to the Start Network Charity. Save the Children UK still retains the role of grant custodian for the global Start Fund. The SRF FMU is hosted by DRC. Conversely, the AFNS’s Fund management agent is a consortium comprising Proximity International, Crown Agents, MetricsLed, COAR, and ASI, with ASI being the consortium lead.

In a model where the FMA is an INGO, one key concern is the potential for a conflict of interest within the hosting organization. This concern is viewed differently depending on the size and organisational structure of the hosting entity. In large INGOs with federal models, it is perceived as relatively easier to establish a clear separation between the FMA role and the implementing part of the organization. However, in smaller structures, there is a
perception that it could be challenging to prevent the person responsible for managing the funds from influencing colleagues in the application process.

The SRF model has placed a strong emphasis on accountability and has been particularly concerned about the potential for conflict of interest when hosting INGOs are involved. Therefore, in the SRF, the FMA, DRC, is deliberately deemed ineligible for funding, which is also the case when private companies act as the FMA. This specificity is unique to the SRF. In contrast, the global Start Fund, does not impose this separation. The rationale behind this difference is that decisions are collectively made by the network rather than being determined by the entity fulfilling the grant custodian role.

**Composition of the committees in charge of reviewing projects**

The higher risk of conflict of interest primarily exists at the project selection stage. Among the different funds examined here, there are variations in the extent of participation and the level of decision-making authority, from regional to country levels.

The Start Fund has established a partnership with ACAPS, an external information service provider to triangulate crisis information and data. ACAPS prepares briefing notes on alerts raised by Start Network members, and these briefing notes are subsequently shared with the decision-makers responsible for allocating funds. Start Fund projects are selected through ad hoc project selection committees at the country or local level. These committees consist of Start Network members, local partners, cluster members who did not submit funding applications, and a Start Fund staff member (who does not possess decision-making authority) overseeing the process. Depending on the context, this may include national and international NGOs depending on each context. Proposals are anonymised and the selection criteria are clearly defined (see details in the table). The accountability for this process is therefore internal to the Start Network members. In addition, collaboration and coordination with other actors, clusters, and donors to avoid overlaps and define priorities fall under the responsibility of applicants and are integrated into the selection criteria.

The SRF has set up a review committee composed primarily of the hosting INGO’s staff, including DRC’s regional technical advisors as well as the contributing donor’s regional experts and consultants. The Chair of this committee is the FMU MEAL manager, with oversight from the Fund Director. Proposals undergo a regional-level review, using a score system, and are collectively assessed by a team of specialised reviewers. The review committee also verifies the alignment with sectors and geographic priorities outlined in the HRP and operational presence based on available 3W. However, a challenge arises from the fact that rapid changes in the context are not captured by the annual HRP, and the 3W often remains declarative, and not consistently updated. As such, it may not accurately reflect the actual operational capacity of applicants and their detailed on the ground presence. This presents a challenge, particularly given that the SRF Charter emphasises the principle of scaling up operations to avoid fostering competition among NGOs and to enhance budget cost effectiveness.
Both the Start Fund and SRF models lack a real-time triangulation of information or data. Detailed collaboration and coordination with other actors, clusters, and donors to avoid overlaps occur at the allocation decision stage. At the project selection stage, this responsibility is placed on the applicants and integrated into it the selection criteria. On the other hand, the RHFWCA and AFNS are more opened to external contributions.

The RHFWCA’s projects review is done by (multi) cluster strategic review committees with a balance participation of INGO, NNGOs and UN workers. The score card is disseminated to all actors. Participation of national NGOs is effective in the RHFWCA and the Start Fund project selection meetings.

The AFNS FMA sets up a Strategic and Technical Review Committee on ad hoc basis for each allocation, composed of experts from the community of practice engaged in humanitarian response in northern Syria (FMA technical staffs, consultants, and clusters representatives). Similar to the RHFWCA model, the AFNS includes clusters leads and co-leads in the review process, with their numbers matching AFNS technical staff. Furthermore, the AFNS coordinates with the UN Syrian Cross border Humanitarian Fund to avoid overlap and prioritise responses to identified gaps. This coordination is perceived as a significant asset by most people informants.

Beyond inclusiveness considerations, diversity in the project selection committee is seen as a means to enhance transparency and independence. It mitigates the risk of a single or couple of actors disproportionately influencing the evaluation process. Furthermore, it helps counteract any bias that might arise from the specific programmatic culture and technical positioning of each organisation.

In both the RHFWCA and Start Fund, the review of projects is mostly based on the participation and commitment of the clusters or Start Network members and local partners who volunteer to take on these roles. This approach places significant reliance on individuals, some of whom may struggle to invest enough time to rigorously review the projects or to check the actual needs and coordination at the local level to prevent redundancies, for instance. One inconvenient of having collective decision-making structure is the potential for reduced accountability, as responsibility is widely shared among multiple parties.

In the SRF and AFNS, projects selection undergoes a final approval process by the board. In the case of the SRF, project details are anonymized at the time they reach the board, and the board provides comments on the notations. On the opposite, in the AFNS, the names of the applicants and recommendations from the review committee are shared with the board, with a clear understanding of the confidential nature of this information. The board does not delve into or discuss the granular details of the scoring. The AFNS places a strong emphasis on the highest transparency possible to foster trust in the system. In contract, in the Start Fund, the Start Fund Committee is not involved in the validation of the final project list. The responsibility rests solely with the project selection committee.

In the RHFWCA, as in CBPFs in general, the final authority and confirmation of selected projects rests with the HC/RC. These funding decisions can be made at the discretion of the HC/RC, without a recommendation from the advisory board, for circumstances which require
an immediate response, as outlined in the Operational Manual. CBPFs also serve as a means also a mean to empower the HC/RC by granting them authority to take action. But the preeminent decision-making power vested in a single individual is criticised for being non-democratic and posing the risk of succumbing to political pressures. Of course, this impact of this depends on how the HC/RC wields this authority, but the concentration of power in one individual is a matter of concern.

**Timeliness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SRF</th>
<th>RHFWCA</th>
<th>AFNS</th>
<th>GLOBAL START FUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time from submission deadline to contract signature (for standard allocations)</td>
<td>60 days</td>
<td>41.5 days</td>
<td>88 days</td>
<td>48 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time from proposal signature to first payment</td>
<td>1.7 days</td>
<td>4.8 days</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Medium score of the 2 allocations in BIA and the allocation in Niger 2022</td>
<td></td>
<td>Implementing organisations are awarded funds within 72h of a crisis alert being raised. 24h between proposals submission and proposal selection. First payment is launched 72h after the alert. Awarded organisations can start spending/harddate their spending to the project start date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comparison of the Funds’ main characteristics**

*Please refer to the Annexes*
II. GOOD PRACTICES FOR POOLED FUND GOVERNANCE

Best practices identified across the four PF mechanisms are compiled below.

It is important to note that the impact of these practices has not been formally evaluated. These practices have been drawn from a combination of literature reviews and interviews conducted, relying on the insights and experiences of humanitarian professionals. While some of these practices may be highly relevant in their specific contexts, their impact might vary when applied in different settings.

Participation

Establishing decision-making structures that closely reflect the realities on the ground, involving humanitarian actors operating in all affected areas, provides a better understanding of real-time priorities, access capabilities, and preferences of the affected populations.

= Encouraging frequent rotation of board members is recommended to introduce fresh perspectives, reduce the perception of conflicts of interest, and enhance transparency.

= Ensuring that the boards or strategic committees of PFs are inclusive and exhibit a balanced composition, encompassing both local and international representative as well as women participation, can be achieved by having them selected by their peers. This enhances their representativeness, legitimacy, and fosters more extensive information dissemination and consultations.

= Collective decision-making bodies offer a means for influencing and participating, particularly when multiple members from each consistency are involved. The diversity of perspectives helps in developing consensus both within and between the constituencies.

= Prioritising collective mechanisms for raising concerns or halting risky processes is important. While donors may need legal mechanisms to prevent decisions by the board that would violate their laws, individual or organisational veto powers may not be the best solution, even if never used, as it gives a possibility to one entity to block the opinion of a majority. Finding means of collective redress that all participants can activate is crucial for the good PF governance.

= Building a strong culture of consensus within the decision-making bodies of the funds, emphasising a deep sense of humanitarian imperative and sense of collective responsibility.

= Creating a dedicated culture around the fund; providing regular training to board members and individuals involved in project reviews is important to ensure the adoption of the values and objectives of the funds, promoting their participation as humanitarian workers rather than representatives of specific organisations.
Projects review and selection processes

Establishing highly transparent and well-defined project selection processes, accompanied by clear justifications for project choices, in order to prevent suspicions and frustration. Adapting the framework and processes to accommodate different situations to prevent exceptions that might erode confidence in the Fund.

= Ensuring that members serving on the review committees, applicants, and board members are distinct from each other to uphold the independence of the review committee independence.

= Allocating ample resources for project review and selection. Review committees composed of a variety of profiles and backgrounds are considered more legitimate and offer a more comprehensive understanding of needs, potential overlaps and experiences related to tailored approaches that can have a greater impact. Individuals involved in project review and selection should have sufficient time to consult and consider external factors such as overlaps and cross-sector integration. The related workload should be recognized, and review teams should be sized accordingly.

Quality

Preserving quality: PFs are sometimes seen as effective mechanisms to access funding and implementing projects, but are perceived to be limited in their ability to ensure comprehensive monitoring monitoring and evaluation. PF should maintain a robust M&E framework, incorporating external M&E at the local level, even in hard-to-reach areas, by entities with direct access and in-depth knowledge of specific regions and local dynamics. The pooling of expertise found in PFs should be leveraged to identify improved methods to integrate insights obtained through M&E in subsequent project phases and allocations, as well as sharing these findings with other stakeholders.

= Involving individuals familiar with the context in the decision-making process, including the definition of priorities, experience with operational challenges, collaborative problem-solving, and the exploration of innovative approaches.

Accessibility

Broadly sharing information about the funds and allocation processes widely at all steps through diverse communication channels, such as websites, newsletter, cascaded emails, and providing information during the participation to country or regional working groups and for a, as well as through meetings with representatives of various constituencies.

Localization

Promoting equal participation in the governance of the Funds.
Facilitating access to funding for NNGOs by prioritising a tiered due diligence model, instead of a binary ‘pass/fail’ approach. Efforts should focus on harmonizing tools and requirements.

= Implementing capacity building plans is considered a good practice, provided that sufficient time and budget are allocated for their execution and the budget commitment is upheld even during budget reviews.

= Accompanying allocations with parallel initiatives aimed at advancing the localization agenda. For instance, the RHFWCA has dedicated an envelope for national NGOs capacity strengthening in 2023, in collaboration with the HOPE project. Similarly, the AFNS’ FMA accompany also national actors with continuous capacity strengthening and support when necessary.

**Collaboration**

Incorporating consultations with a diverse array of key stakeholders to inform the strategic positioning of PF allocations, encompassing geographic priorities and addressing unmet acute needs.

= One of the primary objectives of PFs is to optimise the use resources by aligning around common priorities, avoiding duplication, and maximizing impact. Nevertheless, no PF can consolidate all donor contributions for a specific area or topic. Therefore, coordination with other donor’s contributions is key. As PF boards assume a donor role, they share the responsibility to coordinate with other mechanisms and donors. Any new Pooled Fund, as a donor, should make a concerted effort to coordinate with existing Pooled Funds mechanisms in the same areas and with other donors to avoid duplication and make the most of the funds allocated. PF management teams actively engage in donor meetings to foster that coordination and collaboration. This coordination should extend across all levels, including local, national, and regional, with clear guidance on the local areas and topics prioritized by each.

= Developing “complementarity papers” to establish a framework for how the Funds can collaborate with one another and define principles or action for collaboration.

---

15 In the RHFWCA, consortia leads can allocate up to 3% of the total budget to capacity building of their sub-partners.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SRF

The specificity of the SRF governance model lies in its unique combination of regional-level fund management (similar to the RHFWCA), a role played by an INGO (similar to the global Start Fund), and decision-making at regional level. Therefore, several key areas for recommendations emerge, encompassing board composition, the interplay between countries and regional entities, the anchoring within the wider humanitarian system, and the implications of having an INGO operational in the region acting as FMA.

#1 Adjust the board’s composition

The following adjustments could be considered to increase the legitimacy of and trust in the board.

The practice of INGO board members selected by their peers is a practice that could offer insights for formulating the SRF’s board rotation modalities. The regional focus of the SRF introduces complexity, as not all organizations are located in Dakar or actively participate in regiofor afara. It might be worth exploring ways for international board members to be appointed by their peers, potentially through country INGO forum or relevant regional groups. The number of NNGOs board members should be adjusted to achieve equal representation. This is especially important as the the SRF considers expanding to become a true Pooler Fund and potentially refining its focus on localization. The observer role could be adjusted for greater coherence. Having observers serve as non-permanent members could enhance participation and transparency. For instance, potential donors could be invited on ad hoc basis. The SRF’s actual expectations for the Observer role is akin to the role of Chair of the board. The SRF should explore the possibility and relevance of appointing an independent chair who will facilitate discussions, invite relevant observers, and liaise with other regional mechanisms and representations. In the event that the SRF transforms into a multi-donor fund, careful consideration should be given to adjusting the supplementary powers that donors and hosting INGO have on the board (such as veto power). It is essential to ensure that risks are effectively mitigated upstream in the donors-DRC-IPs channels, drawing inspiration from how the AFNS Fund Management Agent handles this. The idea of establishing a collective last resort mechanism could also be interesting to ensure risk control and provide a more balanced power structure.

#2 Promote the link between countries and regional entities.

The regional dimension of the SRF hold inherent value, but also presents unique challenges that should be acknowledged and addressed.

- The regional governance can create a perception of remote control, potentially leading to a lack of acceptance and coordination concerns with individual countries. Therefore, it is key to highlight the complementarity of the SRF with country-level strategies and activities, and ensure that countries are well-informed about the
specific actions of the SRF and how they can synergise and complement country-level initiatives.

= It is important that individuals with the best knowledge of local realities have the opportunity to influence SRF allocations, ensuring the SRF remains closely connected to the affected population. The process of revising the allocation strategy rests with the board, which provides board members with the opportunity to consult their country offices. The planning and timeline should structured to guarantee effective consultation.

= The SRF offers high-quality, multi-year funding to invest in local capacity and strengthen the resilience of systems, among other objectives. This funding must be flexible enough over a 3-year span to adapt to a constantly changing context.

= Despite ongoing efforts, the SRF and its current activities are not yet widely recognised among most actors interviewed at the country level, except for those actively involved. There is a challenge in making the information accessible to INGOs and NGOs that lack a presence in Dakar. This situation may lead to the perception that a lot of information flows exclusively through Dakar-based networks, potentially excluding national organisations and INGOs not present in Dakar. To address this it is important to consider wider distribution of the newsletter and continuous effort to pass information and updates to NGOs through various channels.

#3 Triangulating information to ensure alignment and avoid overlaps

Considering the dynamic nature of regions like the Sahel, the SRF should connect between regional strategies and field-level concerns. HRPs and 3W reports may not consistently offer accurate, real-time updates or capture all local initiatives, especially those tied to recover or development programs. Updates on new funding sources may lack frequency, consistency, and competeness. Triangulating information is crucial to assess how new projects align with existing actions, ensuring they scale up efforts without causing overlaps, in adherence to the Charter's commitment.

#4 Reinforce integration within the wider humanitarian system

The unique governance system of the SRF (regional and governed by NGOs) makes it complementary to diverse humanitarian funding mechanisms in the region. Therefore, the SRF must engage collaboratively with other constituencies and anchor itself into the wider system. This is essential to contribute to needs prioritization, prevent overlaps, and foster a culture of learning.

The SRF should embark on a reflection to determine when and where collaboration would be most relevant. Allocation priorities could be defined in wider consultation with other actors within the humanitarian system. The process of defining the allocation strategy could be adjusted to include consultations with key informants at the country level to validate geographic and gap priorities. It is key to identify the relevant entities to consult, such as OCHA, ICC, clusters, NGO fora, nexus working groups, or other relevant groups of organizations. Many informants stressed the importance of conducting consultations at
country-level about SRF allocation priorities. In addition, project selection could also benefit from drawing upon the insights of other actors, ensuring geographic coverage and avoiding duplication.

#5 Continue mitigating conflicts of interest

The SRF model has prioritised accountability and placed an emphasis on mitigating the risk of conflict of interest from the hosting organization. As a result, a feature of the SRF is that the FMA is deemed ineligible for funding. While this approach underscores the commitment for impartiality and integrity, it may raise concerns for the fund’s long-term sustainability, depending on the SRF ambitions and evolutions. In a context characterised by low levels of fundings, particularly if the SRF were to become a key donor in the region, it could become challenging for an INGO operating in the area to forgo access to such financial resources.

Four possible configurations have been identified to mitigate the risk of conflict of interest when a PF is hosted by an operational INGO. These could offer insight for the SRF in case of future evolutions in its governance system.

1. **The current SRF framework**
   In this approach, the hosting NGO serves as a grant custodian and fund manager for the Fund without seeking funding for its own projects from the PF. As is currently the case, interest for innovation and quality funding takes precedence over access to finance. This model is sustainable if the SRF maintains a niche role, complementing funding from top donors in the region. Additionally, the hosting INGO could receive direct funding from SRF donors through alternative sources or budget lines.

2. **Entrust the management of the fund to humanitarian actors not interested in this type of funding**
   Under this configuration, the Fund’s management is delegated to humanitarian actors who do not directly implement programs in the region targeted by the SRF. The stability of the organisation’s financial management and capacity to provide support services for a FMU are critical factors in this model.

3. **Outsourcing fund management to a private company**

4. **Implement adjustments allowing the hosting INGO to apply for PF funding**
   To mitigate the risk of conflict of interest for the hosting INGO, potential adjustments could be made in two key stages: project selection and monitoring and evaluation role of the Fund Management Agent. In addition, one could consider placing the FMA within a department or division of the host organisation that is not directly responsible for operations in the region (e.g. finance function or as part of an HQ unit).

One solution to reduce the risk of conflict of interest for the hosting agency when it is an NGO is to enhance the independency of the review committee toward the FMA and the board. As far as the SRF is concerned, this involved broadening the composition of the current SRF review committee to allow the bidding NGO to recuse itself during the
examination of its proposal, similar to the practices of the RHFWCA or Start Fund. This adjustment would promote greater inclusivity and transparency.

Another possibility to explore is to compose a review committee entirely independent from both the hosting INGO and other applicant INGOs, incorporating experts from donors and consultants, for example. The consultant system has been perceived as quite effective for the AFNS. Furthermore, there should be consideration for the inclusion of some national NGOs. The main barrier for participation may be that in these all models an applicant organization cannot hold project selection responsibilities.

The involvement of country clusters in the technical project review process is often mentioned as a good practice. While this approach, using a mixed review committee, as seen in the AFNS model, could be considered for SRF, the regional dimension of the SRF adds a layer of complexity. Regional working groups are not operational and could be distant from local realities, while country clusters are framed around a sectoral approach that can be challenging to reconcile with the SRF programmatic requirements.

In such scenario, the role of monitoring and evaluation should also be reviewed, given the sensitivity of having the same organization both implement a project and conduct its monitoring and evaluation, potentially raising concerns of mismanagement or project quality. Considering a third party operational in the area for monitoring and evaluation could be an avenue to follow with caution. The selected third party should be able to integrate the regional dimension of the SRF and ensure that the hosting NGO takes ownership of the results to inform the grant oversight and the fund development.

Another area to enhance the fund’s independence is to create some distance between the FMU and the hosting INGO representative on the board. While establishing an independent legal entity for the FMU may not be a feasible option due to time, cost, and support structure requirements, the prospect of excluding the hosting INGO representative may not be practical. A light hosting agreement between the SRF and DRC for managing the FMA could not be an option because the fund director is accountable to the grant custodian structure for grant management and financial risk, i.e. DRC. A line management structure detached from the regional office and aligned with a relevant department at HQ could be explored as a means to increase independence.
REFLECTIONS

The governance models and practices of the four funds examined vary according to their nature and history. Despite its limitations, this comparative analysis highlights several good practices and suggests avenues of reflection for the SRF.

The creation of new models of Pooled Funds governed in majority by NGOs may have caused reluctancies and tensions within the humanitarian landscape. It is imperative for these new initiatives to diligently communicate their objectives and collaborate with existing funding instruments. Failure to do so may lead to the perception of being competitors rather than collaborators. In very complex and competitive environments, they have at times been perceived as posing a challenge to the roles of UN entities. However, they could also be perceived as complementary mechanisms with the potential to support undertakings that might remain unfunded by alternative funding mechanisms (geographical areas, multi-country interventions, multiyear programs, etc). The diverse funding mechanisms should foster exchange and collaboration, facilitating an environment where stakeholders can learn from different experiences. This, in turn, will contribute to improving the quality of the various funding mechanisms.

This report offers several insightful takeaways. A noteworthy consensus is the fertile space for collaboration and innovation that in these Funds’ governance bodies cultivate. They provide a platform for collective accountability, cooperation, collaborative efforts, knowledge sharing, and learning. Such places are scarce, gathering NGOs, INGOs and donors in pursuit of common objective.

The true test of 'good' governance lies in its ability to deliver on its promises. Governance, in isolation, cannot single-handedly increase the quality of funding and the role of local actors in the humanitarian response. The governance of Funds raises important questions around accountability, particularly in the event of an incident. The next challenge may be to innovate and devise more effective means of sharing high levels of risk in such complex contexts.
ANNEXES: Comparison of the Funds’ main characteristics

Disclaimer: the following tables summarise key elements of each fund as of August 2023. They are not exhaustive. For more details, please refer to the official documentation of each Fund.
## ANNEX 1: GENERAL INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RHFWCA</th>
<th>SRF</th>
<th>AFNS</th>
<th>GLOBAL START FUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of creation</strong></td>
<td>Launched in 2021 as a pilot</td>
<td>Launched in 2022</td>
<td>Established in October 2022</td>
<td>Launched in 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission</strong></td>
<td>Seeks to bring the benefits of pooled funding to new and underserved locations in West and Central Africa, with a focus on Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, and Niger. Supports the humanitarian response in each country, prioritizing urgent needs while promoting regional coordination and synergies.</td>
<td>Vision: A safer and more dignified future for all conflict and displacement affected populations in the hotspots of most humanitarian need in the Sahel. Mission: To provide protection and humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, by providing funds for immediate and longer-term needs, strengthening local capacities, supporting local and international organizations and paving the way for testing solutions.</td>
<td>The Aid Fund for Northern Syria (AFNS) brings together donor countries, multilateral agencies, nongovernmental organisations and the private sector in a collaborative engagement with a collective vision to maintain the continuity of flexible multilayer humanitarian assistance to Northern Syria in a dynamic context and in harmony with the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). The aim of the Fund is to provide complementary, predictable, timely, and consistent resources to partners through expanding the delivery of humanitarian assistance to support life-saving and early recovery activities, focusing on the most urgent needs and filling critical gaps left by other response instruments.</td>
<td>Global Start Fund provides rapid response funding to under-fund, small to medium-scale crises, filling a critical gap in the humanitarian aid system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographical scope</strong></td>
<td>West and Central Africa: decision to open an allocation for one of the countries is made by UNNY. So far, 8 FNRs, 31 SRFs, 67 AFNS, and 50 Global have been approved.</td>
<td>Target under-resourced, hard-to-reach and conflict affected rural areas as well as locations where the conflict is ongoing and displaced people (often urban and peri-urban areas) in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad. Hotspots include Upstate Gourma (UG), Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and Sudan region in South-western Niger (SNWR). Cross-border and regional dynamics are always at the centre of the analysis and strategy for decision-making (pursues country-level vision).</td>
<td>North Syria: Works with the cluster coordination mechanisms and the UN.</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial volume</strong></td>
<td>48.5 million USD allocations in 2022</td>
<td>39 million USD allocations in 2023 (to date)</td>
<td>64 million USD allocations in 2023 (to date)</td>
<td>24.42 million USD (84.7 million disbursed) in 2021 and 2022, with additional updates (annual report available at <a href="https://www.foundationnetwork.org/learning-centre/annual-reports/annex-sources/syd2022">https://www.foundationnetwork.org/learning-centre/annual-reports/annex-sources/syd2022</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raising of funds</strong></td>
<td>Resource mobilisation is country-based (no possible transfer from one country to another), with earmarked per country.</td>
<td>No earmarked but only for Sahel region.</td>
<td>No earmarked but only for North Syria</td>
<td>Not earmarked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donors</strong></td>
<td>The governments of the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, France, Norway, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Republic Of Korea, Iceland, and UN Foundation/In/Partnership Office.</td>
<td>The government of the United Kingdom.</td>
<td>The government of the United Kingdom.</td>
<td>Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FCO, Germany, Foreign Office, Inter America Foundation, Kenya, Overseas Aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of response</strong></td>
<td>Country-based. Priorities aligned on HCRP and cluster priorities. Embodied in the country coordination system set up by the humanitarian system reform.</td>
<td>Standards allocations. Multi-country and/or cross border responses are prioritised. 4 sectors targeted by SRF (food security, nutrition, health, and protection).</td>
<td>Regular and special allocations. Scale up and sustain the emergency response to the populations in the northwest of Syria, based on priorities identified in the HRP and by clusters.</td>
<td>This Start Fund focuses on three types of humanitarian needs: - underfunded small to medium-size crises - forecasts of impending crises - spikes in chronic humanitarian crises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Projects duration</strong></td>
<td>12 months (at least five for Reserve Allocations)</td>
<td>Multiyear project (maximum 35 months)</td>
<td>12 months. Currently, the maximum duration for a no-cost extended project is 18 months.</td>
<td>Funding is disbursed within 72 hours after members take a collective decision. This makes the Start Fund one of the fastest humanitarian assistance financing mechanisms in the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Projects’ envelopes</strong></td>
<td>Depending on allocation decisions. No restrictions.</td>
<td>No restrictions but an indication: 32.5 million USD for 3 multi-country consortia.</td>
<td>5 million USD at the maximum single Multiplier grant value (annualised). The grant value limits are determined for each implementing partner based on its capacity-performance ratio, which is determined by its capacity-performance ratio.</td>
<td>The maximum amount that can be requested by any member in their proposal is £500,000. If the proposal is for a consortium project, this amount can be applied to each member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Model</td>
<td>RHFWCA</td>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>AFNS</td>
<td>GLOBAL START FUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National NGO participation in decision-making</td>
<td>National NGOs are represented on the advisory board and can be part of the strategic or technical review committees as cluster participants.</td>
<td>National NGO are represented at the steering board. They don't participate in the review process for the first round of allocation. There is no opportunity to call on the expertise of INGOs in the NCP.</td>
<td>National NGO are represented at the steering board. They don't participate in the review process, unless they are formal Co-Leads of a Cluster.</td>
<td>National NGOs are represented in the Start Fund Committee and the Start Network Board. They are part of the allocation rotas and project selection committees if they are present in the alert country and not submitting projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to quality funding for local actors</td>
<td>Funds directly accessible to UN agencies, NGO and INGO. NGOs can apply in stand alone and/or as partner of an INGO. So far all allocations have been reserved to INGOs. NGOs are obliged to partner with a national or local organization to be eligible. Equal share of overhead encouraged but not mandatory.</td>
<td>Funds directly accessible to INGO if under the obligation to partner with NGO. Equal share of overhead and share of support costs are mandatory.</td>
<td>Funds directly accessible to NGO and INGO. NGOs can apply in stand alone and/or as partner of an INGO. INGO can also apply as partner of a Local NGO. Equal share of overhead encouraged but not mandatory.</td>
<td>Funds directly accessible to NGO and INGO that are members of the Start network (60 members initially).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managed by</td>
<td>It is managed by the OCHA Regional Office for West and Central Africa (ROWCA). The Regional Fund's secretariat is located in Dakar, Senegal.</td>
<td>Managed by an INGO (DRC). The SRG host (DRC) cannot apply to any call for proposal from the SRF.</td>
<td>Managed by a private actor (Adam Smith International). A consortium of five organisations led by Adam Smith International Limited (ASI) has been contracted to perform the functions of the FMA following a competitive tender process. Consortium members are Adam Smith International (Lead), Crown Agents, MetroLed, Proximity International, and COAN.</td>
<td>The global Start Fund is hosted by Save the Children UK as grantee of the funding. The staff who manages the daily operations including grant management is hosted by SCUK. The funding allocation decisions are made by the Start Fund Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making authority</td>
<td>IC (supported by an advisory board)</td>
<td>SRF board</td>
<td>Steering Board</td>
<td>The Start Fund Committee. The Start Network also has two national funds in Bangladesh and Nepal. The national Start Funds follow the same alert cycle process but with separate governance bodies composed of member organisations in the respective countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX 2: GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOARD</th>
<th>RHFWCA</th>
<th>SRF</th>
<th>AFNS</th>
<th>GLOBAL START FUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Board Members</strong></td>
<td>NGO (international + national) majority</td>
<td>NGO (international + national) majority</td>
<td>NGO (international + national) majority</td>
<td>NGO (international + national) majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decisions</strong></td>
<td>Decisions of the Board shall be reached by consensus of the members (without participation of observers). In the event of disagreement, the Chair reviews the different positions, and the final decision and responsibility remains with the Chair.</td>
<td>Search for consensus; all Board members are expected to participate in decision making and share the power through sharing their views, analyzing, debating and reaching agreements through voting process.</td>
<td>Decisions require a minimum presence quorum (simple majority or 2/3 of members present and non-present) to have a voting right. The Chair is to receive a tie-break power and SRF Board votes required to adapt decisions as without potential deadlock.</td>
<td>The Board makes decisions by consensus, but consensus need not reflect unanimity. A dissenting member may choose to submit an objection to be recorded in the meeting minutes, while clarifying whether the statement is purely for the record or intended to precipitate action. Alternatively, a dissenting member may choose to abstain. The Chair indicates the consensus vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-making System</strong></td>
<td>At the exceptions of the observers, who do not have voting rights, all members (permanent and non-permanent) have a voting right. The Chair is to receive a tie-break power and SRF Board votes required to adapt decisions as without potential deadlock.</td>
<td>At the exceptions of the observers, who do not have voting rights, all members (permanent and non-permanent) have a voting right. The Chair is to receive a tie-break power and SRF Board votes required to adapt decisions as without potential deadlock.</td>
<td>At the exceptions of the observers, who do not have voting rights, all members (permanent and non-permanent) have a voting right. The Chair is to receive a tie-break power and SRF Board votes required to adapt decisions as without potential deadlock.</td>
<td>All members of the Start Fund are contacted (voted online) on the relevancy of the issue. The votes are reviewed by the CoP deciding the action to be taken in case of a tie.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Board</strong></th>
<th><strong>RHFWCA</strong></th>
<th><strong>SRF</strong></th>
<th><strong>AFNS</strong></th>
<th><strong>GLOBAL START FUND</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chair</strong></td>
<td>The Chair is responsible for the strategic direction of the Board, including the establishment and monitoring of an effective policy and a strategic plan. The Chair is also responsible for overseeing the performance of the Board.</td>
<td>The Chair is responsible for ensuring the effective implementation of the strategy and performance of the Board.</td>
<td>The Chair is responsible for ensuring the effective implementation of the strategy and performance of the Board.</td>
<td>The Chair is responsible for overseeing the performance of the Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duties</strong></td>
<td>- Ensure the effective implementation of the strategy and performance of the Board.</td>
<td>- Ensure the effective implementation of the strategy and performance of the Board.</td>
<td>- Ensure the effective implementation of the strategy and performance of the Board.</td>
<td>- Ensure the effective implementation of the strategy and performance of the Board.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

- **FRC:** Financial, reputational, programmatic, or safeguarding risk.
- **IRFC:** Information Risk Framework Committee.
- **ICG:** Internal Creditor Group.
- **SRF:** Sahel Risk Fund.
- **RF:** Risk Framework.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>FMA</strong></th>
<th><strong>RHFWCA</strong></th>
<th><strong>SRF</strong></th>
<th><strong>AFNS</strong></th>
<th><strong>GLOBAL START FUND</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition and reporting lines</strong></td>
<td>- Between 9 and 11 people in 2022, based in OCHA Regional Office in Dakar. The unit is headed by the Fund Manager, who reports to the OCHA Head of RONCA.</td>
<td>- A Humanitarian Fund Director, who reports to OCHA Regional Executive Director and has dotted lines with the Chair of the Board. The selection of the SRF Fund Director is done by OCHA, with a participation of FCDO. Performance management of the SRF manager will be assessed by the direct management. Feedbacks collected from all SRF board members will inform the performance appraisal. In case of low performance, the board could make recommendations to FCDO.</td>
<td>- The FNA is composed of 4 functional units: the Grants and Partnership Unit (4 people); the Strategy and Quality Unit (4 people); the Operations and Finance Unit (7 people); and the M&amp;E Unit (4 people). The units are supervised by the Fund Director, who reports to Adam Smith International.</td>
<td>- The Start Fund team is composed of 14 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roles and responsibilities of the fund management agent</strong></td>
<td>- The Regional Humanitarian Financing Unit (RHFU), based at OCHA RONCA, is responsible for the daily management of all programmatic and financial aspects of the Fund and its CEIs on behalf of the RC/HCs. The RHFU coordinates and engages OCHA Country Offices for strategic and participatory management, and with the CBPF Section at Headquarters for technical and policy guidance.</td>
<td>- The Fund Management Unit is responsible for: Developing SRF strategy, the frameworks, and calls for proposals; Administrative screening of concept notes and proposals, including their eligibility criteria; Independent evaluation of projects proposed to SRF; Verifying due diligence of consorts; The FMA checks the due diligence process agreed by the lead partner within its consortium during the lead consortium approval.</td>
<td>- The FMA is responsible for all secretariat and trustee functions. It provides advisory and operational support to the Board of Trustees, the Independent Chair, and the SRF Manager, and is responsible for managing donor funds in line with the FNA’s policy and procedural framework adopted by the Board. The FMA is responsible and accountable for: Preparing and executing high-quality Allocation Strategies; Selecting, monitoring, and, where appropriate, supporting the capacity-building efforts of qualified implementing partners; Monitoring implementation of projects, verifying that the results reported by UGs are in line with their technical and financial proposals and ensuring that best practices are applied, with particular focus on accountability to affected populations (API).</td>
<td>- The Start Fund team supports the performance of the Start Fund and facilitates the start process and grant-making procedures on behalf of the Start Network members. The Start Fund team is employed by SCDRC to fulfill the organization’s role as Grant Funder on the Start Network. The Start Fund uses SCDRC’s financial management systems to receive, hold, and disburse funds to awarded Start Network members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## REVIEW COMMITTEE

### RHFWCA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role and responsibilities of the review committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Funding allocate through three types of project review. There are 2 different committees: the Strategic and Technical Review Committee. Both are established at country level for each country. Each cluster coordinates the review process by identifying members based on technical expertise and commitment. The process includes:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SRF</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| According to the thematic teams, the SRF will set up for each funding scheme an evaluation committee composed of relevant experts such as:
- FCO representatives (from new donors)
- IRC regional program directors according to the expertise available (protection, economic recovery, etc.)
- External consultants from each entity
| **AFNS** |
| The Project Evaluation Committee (PEC) is accountable to the SRF and is composed of:
- A technical panel with representation from each SRF and IRC entities.
- External experts (medical experts) are selected by the PEC.
- The SRF is responsible for ensuring that the experts are engaged in the process.
| **GLOBAL START FUND** |
| The role and responsibilities of the Project Evaluation Committee include:
- Establishing the evaluation criteria.
- Reviewing and approving the SRF evaluation criteria.
- Recommending a list of projects for funding.
- Providing technical advice to the SRF.
| **GLOBAL START FUND** |
| The selection of the project is based on the following criteria:
- Thematic relevance
- Technical feasibility
- Financial sustainability
- Impact on welfare
<p>|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DONORS</th>
<th>RHPWCA</th>
<th>SRF</th>
<th>APNS</th>
<th>GLOBAL START FUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>Donors present at country level are represented through 2 donors nominated by the advisory board (Strategic committee)</td>
<td>The donor is represented on the board and has a vote.</td>
<td>Donors represent at the board equally with NGOs and NINGOs. The Partnership Board comprises representatives of the donors contributing funds to APNL. Membership shall be open to all contributing donors. The primary purpose of the Partnership Board is to ensure consensus and, to the greatest extent possible, unanimity in the decisions of the Steering Board. The Partnership Board is in place solely to assist the board in reaching consensus decisions on rare occasions when reaching consensus is not straightforward. The Partnership Board convenes on an ad hoc basis only when either: a. the Steering Board decides a matter through a vote or any of the following roles for the Partnership Board to convene: a) any member of the Steering Board; b) the independent Chair of the Steering Board; c) any three members of the Partnership Board together; or, d) the Fund Management Agent. (1996). The Chair of the Partnership Board shall be selected from its membership and shall serve for a term of one year.</td>
<td>Donors are not part of the Start Fund Committee that makes allocations’ decisions. Donors are not part of the Start Fund board but receive automatic information on each new allotment and each allocation. &quot;Donors are not part of the Start Fund Committee... allocations.&quot; All Start Fund donors constitute the Start Fund Council to review their investment in the Fund. Start Fund team attend the council. It is the opportunity for donors to raise concerns and dialogue. The council has direct governance oversight over the risk management of the Start Fund. It reviews and endorses Start Fund policy on an annual basis. The Start Fund Council comprises the donors to the Start Fund as well as representatives from the Start Fund Committee, the Board of Trustees, strategic partners and Start Fund team. This body has direct oversight of the risk management and performance of the Start Fund.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# ANNEX 3: PROCESSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RHF/ALCA</th>
<th>SRF</th>
<th>APNS</th>
<th>GLOBAL START FUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision on allocation and strategic priorities</strong></td>
<td>The IC, supported by the advisory board, approves the use of and defining the strategic focus and amount of fundallocations.</td>
<td>Done by the Board at regional level</td>
<td>Done by the Board, after consultation with NGO members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eligible implementing partners</strong></td>
<td>Done by region’s office based on a list of NGOs established by the cluster on country and target regions. The implementing partners could be NGOs.</td>
<td>NGOs only</td>
<td>NGOs and APNS members of the Start network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eligibility process</strong></td>
<td>Donors should review the list of NGOs and APNS members of the Start network for all regions.</td>
<td>NGOs only</td>
<td>NGOs and APNS members of the Start network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## RHF/ALCA
- **Decision on allocation and strategic priorities**: The IC, supported by the advisory board, approves the use of and defining the strategic focus and amount of fund allocations.

## Eligible implementing partners
- Donors should review the list of NGOs established by the cluster on country and target regions. The implementing partners could be NGOs.

## Eligibility process
- **Eligibility**: Donors should review the list of NGOs and APNS members of the Start network for all regions.

## SRF
- **Decision on allocation and strategic priorities**: Done by the Board at regional level.

## APNS
- **Decision on allocation and strategic priorities**: Done by the Board, after consultation with NGO members.

## Global Start Fund
- **Decision on allocation and strategic priorities**: NGOs and APNS members of the Start network.
### RFWCA

**Project selection process**

- Strategic Review—a first screening of project proposals to determine the allocation strategy as determined by the RCHC and the advisory board. This review is done by the Strategic Review Committee.
- A list of projects, vetted by the Strategic Review committee, is submitted to RFWCA for consideration and approval to the RCHC. Only those proposals will be technically reviewed.
- Technical and Financial Review—which assesses the technical soundness and viability of the projects prior to final approval. This is done jointly by the Technical Review Committee and the Financial Review Committee.

**Technical and Financial Review**

- The Technical Review Committee evaluates projects.
- The Financial Review Committee assesses the financial viability of projects.
- A strategic decision is made to accept or reject the projects.

### SRF

- The SRF board reviews the technical and financial aspects of the projects.
- The board votes on the final list of projects that will be approved.
- The projects are then submitted to the RCHC for final approval.

### AFNS

- The AFNS board reviews the projects submitted by the SRF board.
- The board votes on the final list of projects that will be approved.
- The projects are then submitted to the RCHC for final approval.

### GLOBAL START FUND

- The Global Start Fund board reviews the projects submitted by the SRF and AFNS boards.
- The board votes on the final list of projects that will be approved.
- The projects are then submitted to the RCHC for final approval.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for funding projects</th>
<th>RHF/CA</th>
<th>SRF</th>
<th>AFNS</th>
<th>GLOBAL START FUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic relevance: This aspect reflects the alignment of the proposal to the priority areas, activities, target population, and geographical area identified in the allocation strategy paper and the demonstrated operational capacity and physical access to the affected population of the application organization.</td>
<td>• Methodology and project design: clear description of the strategy, design, and approach that will lead to the expected results and intended impact. Innovation and promise for sustainability.</td>
<td>• Sector expertise and experience: required specific skills, sector specialists, knowledge, and human resources.</td>
<td>• Demonstrates recent experience in integrated quality programming and delivery in at least one of the priority areas (this can be national and/or in partnership with key national NGOs).</td>
<td>• The project meets immediate life-saving needs and protects livelihoods and/or is filling gaps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Programmatic relevance: technical aspect of the project, i.e., the identification of needs including disaggregation of priority areas (PA), the articulation of the PA, gender and age marker scores, the risk analysis and the mitigation measures, the conflict sensitivity and protection analysis, the cash-based programming approach, and the environmental risk, if any.</td>
<td>• Local experience and presence: ongoing programme in the area of operation, local knowledge and access to trust from local communities, existing NM/CAP capacity in the project area, competent mechanisms.</td>
<td>• Demonstrates recent experience in integrated quality programming and delivery in at least one of the priority areas (this can be national and/or in partnership with key national NGOs).</td>
<td>• The intervention is based on an assessment and identifies and meets priority needs of the affected communities, including the most vulnerable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cost-effectiveness of budget related to direct, staff and other personnel cost and start-up costs.</td>
<td>• Co-financing and other sources: contribution to programme development and implementation. Support of local stakeholders and communities.</td>
<td>• Capacity to deliver in all sub-priority areas under the selected priority area through effective partnership, will be considered a plus.</td>
<td>• The intervention is technically sound and based on relevant standards (e.g., SPRING, Oxfam, etc.) and/or for locally agreed cluster guidelines and follows a due diligence approach.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Management and monitoring: the suggested monitoring activities include standard and mandatory and indicators, clear reference and actions to ensure accountability of affected populations, accessible and equitable feedback and complaint mechanisms and inclusive information sharing, communication, and participation with the affected population; information on PRSP/SPG policies.</td>
<td>• Engagement and coordination: participation in the national or sub-national coordination mechanism, including active coordination with other stakeholders on the ground.</td>
<td>• Supporting HNO’s aspiration to increase the proportion of its allocations going to Syrian NGOs directly (including strong encouragement of partnership between MN/CAP and SNGOs with larger portfolios and SNGOs with smaller, specialized portfolios, especially women-led organizations).</td>
<td>2. Value for Money:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engagement with coordination participation in the national or sub-national coordination mechanism, including active coordination with other stakeholders on the ground.</td>
<td>• Cost-effectiveness: sound proportion of administrative and personnel costs in relation to project deliverables. Logistical capacity relevant for the delivery of the programme. Evidence and documented contributions of resources to the project in order to ensure a sustainably self-financing resource.</td>
<td>• Clear demonstration of the advantages of existing partnerships with smaller, specialized Syrian NGOs, CSOs, WOs, etc. (including effective capacity building).</td>
<td>• The proposal evidence reasonable value for money, considering proposal cost, quality, and reliability of the items and activities proposed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engagement strategy: national/local NGOs/CBOs and local actors are involved in the design of the activity’s clear identification of synergy with other initiatives beyond humanitarian action. Clear strategy to integrate sustainable and inclusive solutions in the design of the action.</td>
<td>• Engagement strategy: national/local NGOs/CBOs and local actors are involved in the design of the activity’s clear identification of synergy with other initiatives beyond humanitarian action. Clear strategy to integrate sustainable and inclusive solutions in the design of the action.</td>
<td>• Engagement strategy: national/local NGOs/CBOs and local actors are involved in the design of the activity’s clear identification of synergy with other initiatives beyond humanitarian action. Clear strategy to integrate sustainable and inclusive solutions in the design of the action.</td>
<td>• Procurement of relief items is appropriate to the context.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(It can vary according to the allocation.)</td>
<td>• Active Cluster membership in relevant cluster and family of Cluster modality for both Lead applicants as well as sub-partners.</td>
<td>• Appropriate split between the implementation and operations budget, considering local context and capacity.</td>
<td>• Appropriate split between the implementation and operations budget, considering local context and capacity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Clarity of the proposal:</td>
<td>• The proposal demonstrates a locally led approach.</td>
<td>3. Effectiveness</td>
<td>3. Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The project clearly demonstrates a clearly articulated project objective.</td>
<td>• Capacity to implement the project and presence in the affected area</td>
<td>4. Accountability</td>
<td>4. Accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The proposal describes how information will be shared with communities, highlighting what types of information will be used, and different ways of information sharing.</td>
<td>• The project demonstrates appropriate integration and coordination in the short and longer term.</td>
<td>• The proposal describes how feedback and complaints mechanisms are both pro-active and reactive, seeking and accessible to vulnerable groups. Additional Criteria</td>
<td>• The proposal demonstrates appropriate integration and coordination in the short and longer term.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The proposal describes opportunities throughout the project lifecycle for communities, including local and national partners, to actively participate and take part in decision-making.</td>
<td>• The project demonstrates a locally led approach.</td>
<td>• The project demonstrates appropriate integration and coordination in the short and longer term.</td>
<td>• The project demonstrates appropriate integration and coordination in the short and longer term.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The proposal describes how feedback and complaints mechanisms are both pro-active and reactive, seeking and accessible to vulnerable groups. Additional Criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHWCA</td>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>AFNS</td>
<td>GLOBAL START FUND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| A monitoring plan (below) is developed for each funding arrangement. It is informed by the partner level risk, project duration and amount, location of the project and different types of monitoring tools. | For each partner, the SRM will conduct monitoring visits and activities, including programme and financial monitoring, to support corrective action and programme adaptations and to reduce the number of red flags and potential conflicts of interest. | The AFNS engages in its own monitoring activities to verify AFNIs' progress and performance against agreed targets, through the following mechanisms: | **Global Startup Fund**
| - Field monitoring: visits by the SRM's Field Officers. They gather relevant information on the implementation situation from a range of project locations to inform their assessment and planning exercises. They also verify the progress and quality of the implementation of selected project activities. | - Quarterly monitoring visits of the RHWCA to the consortia, combining programme and financial monitoring, to support corrective action and programme adaptations and to reduce the number of red flags and potential conflicts of interest. | - Field monitoring: visits by the Global Startups Grant team. They conduct site visits of selected projects to assess progress, identify challenges, and provide support. The visits are conducted to ensure compliance and adherence to project guidelines. | StartFund's accountability is based on members internal procedures including reporting, risk assessments, and due diligence; an independent auditor partner (exists primarily) to prevent the misappropriation or misappropriation of the funds by the Global Startups Grant team. |
| - Financial Spot Check (FSC) conducted to assess the soundness of the financial records and the accuracy of the financial records of the project. A financial spot check should be conducted based on the risk level of the project and the operational strategy of the fund. | Monitoring visits will include field visits from the SRM and/or a technical expert, to assess the implementation and standard procees in the field. | Notes on the monitoring visits, the SRF has a mechanism to assess the validation process of quarterly financial report and project audit (mid-term and final) | Members are expected to report: |
| The RHWCA Coordinating Unit is the main point of contact for the SRM's Field Officers. | The SRM will conduct one evaluation of each project and an external mid-term evaluation every six months in each project. | The AFNS is a donor policy of the Global Startups Grant team. A donor policy of the Global Startups Grant team. | Incidents or concerns related to fraud, financial mismanagement, non-compliance with project requirements, or any other issues affecting the fund or the StartFund programme must be reported to the StartFund Programme Coordinator. |

**Stakeholder Action Plan**

- All stakeholders with insufficiently addressed concerns or complaints regarding processes or decisions will be contacted in writing and their feedback will be documented. The Global Startups Grant team will share the shared with the board any concerns and actions taken.

**Complaint Mechanisms and Appeals Process**

- The Global Startups Grant team has a formal complaint mechanism, which is accessible at start@startprogrammes.org. Complaints will be compiled, reviewed, and raised by the Global Startups Grant team, which will then take a decision on necessary actions. The RHWCA will be informed of the board any concerns and actions taken.

- The Global Startups Grant team has a formal complaint mechanism, which is accessible at start@startprogrammes.org. Complaints will be compiled, reviewed, and raised by the Global Startups Grant team, which will then take a decision on necessary actions. The RHWCA will be informed of the board any concerns and actions taken.

- The SRM has set up a Grievance Committee that will receive complaints on what action to be taken with regards to grievances, complaints, concerns and potential conflicts of interest related to the functioning of the SRF and its activities. The Grievance Committee will be composed of permanent members of the SRF and will be chaired by the SRM. The Grievance Committee will report its findings to the SRF and to the project teams on a regular basis. The Grievance Committee will ensure that the complaints are handled in a timely and efficient manner.

- The Global Startups Grant team has a formal complaint mechanism, which is accessible at start@startprogrammes.org. Complaints will be compiled, reviewed, and raised by the Global Startups Grant team, which will then take a decision on necessary actions. The RHWCA will be informed of the board any concerns and actions taken.

- The Global Startups Grant team has a formal complaint mechanism, which is accessible at start@startprogrammes.org. Complaints will be compiled, reviewed, and raised by the Global Startups Grant team, which will then take a decision on necessary actions. The RHWCA will be informed of the board any concerns and actions taken.

- The Global Startups Grant team has a formal complaint mechanism, which is accessible at start@startprogrammes.org. Complaints will be compiled, reviewed, and raised by the Global Startups Grant team, which will then take a decision on necessary actions. The RHWCA will be informed of the board any concerns and actions taken.

- The Global Startups Grant team has a formal complaint mechanism, which is accessible at start@startprogrammes.org. Complaints will be compiled, reviewed, and raised by the Global Startups Grant team, which will then take a decision on necessary actions. The RHWCA will be informed of the board any concerns and actions taken.
ANNEX 4: TYPE OF ENTITY HOSTING THE FUND MANAGEMENT UNIT

The tables presented below summarize the pros and cons as perceived by informants for two distinct models: one where an INGO acts as the Fund management agent and one where a private company takes on this role. It is crucial to note that these insights are based on perceptions, and their accuracy has not been confirmed by data, as it would require a dedicated study for validation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private company acts as Fund Management Agent</th>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private companies have capacity to absorb high volumes of funding, more than an INGO can do.</td>
<td>Not accountable to humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence), even if aligned with universal principles on human rights, labour, environment and anticorruption (ASI is a participant to UN Global Compact for example)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= More resources invested in risk management.</td>
<td>= Public development aid funds contribute to remunerate private shareholders or employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= Larger risk appetite.</td>
<td>= Not protected by humanitarian mandate and international laws. That could be an important risk in contexts where access is particularly challenging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= Highly professional and skilled workforce.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= A private actor as FMA brings a better performance (&quot;this is on a different level than with INGOs&quot;) according to several interlocutors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= More frequent and higher quality reporting compared to the UN and INGOs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= A wider range of experiences in terms of innovative approaches.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= Rely more on applicants' own systems/processes wherever possible - allowing them to run projects their own way provided they meet certain minimum standards.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 ASI is a company owned and operated by its employees. As such, any benefits accruing from shareholdings are just a different form of 'salary'. This allows the company to manage its financial sustainability by linking pay to performance of the company as a whole, rather than committing to a large wage bill that is not sustainable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INGO acts as Fund Management Agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pros</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian mandate and principled action: there is more trust toward an INGO guided by humanitarian principles to be transparent in case of aid deviation or lack of quality in the implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise and operational presence of INGOs allows a strong M&amp;E component. The M&amp;E done by an INGO will be supported by their level of access and acceptance, especially to conduct field visits. The INGO knows good practices and the level of quality that can be expected in a specific context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An INGO operational is aware of operational challenges and at a better place to assess mitigation measure and innovations implemented through the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest for the hosting organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight for funding between NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activism: everybody has an opinion; it makes it more complicated to progress and innovate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


SRF. (November 2022). Conflict of Interest Matrix.

SRF. (2023). Donor’s briefing.


SRF. (May 2023). MOU on SRF Governance for boards members.


SRF. (February 2023). Risk management framework


https://start-network.app.box.com/s/i3pknq4do2de8n9p45wbxau56afpnki

https://startnetwork.org/learn-change/resources/library/start-fund-faq

Start Network. (June 2020). *Start Fund handbook.*
https://startnetwork.org/learn-change/resources/library/start-fund-handbook-0

Start Network. (2023). *Start Fund training material and resources.*
https://startnetwork.org/learn-change/training/start-fund-training

Start Network. (December 2021). *Recovering costs more equitably: an important step in rebalancing power.*

https://startnetwork.org/learn-change/resources/library/start-network-strategy-2021-2023

https://startnetwork.org/learn-change/resources/library/start-fund-value-and-uniqueness

Start Network. (June 2022). *Start Ready handbook.*
https://start-network.app.box.com/s/qvtj8xdc7bbz0qkfxxrh9vy65jit0a82

Start Network. (February 2022). *What is Start Fund Nepal?*
https://startnetwork.org/node/28024


UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office. (2022). *Background Paper—UN Inter-Agency Pooled Funds.*

UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office. *Inter-agency Pooled Funds: Key concepts and definitions.*
http://mptf.undp.org/

UN OCHA. (2022e). *Country-Based Pooled Funds Global Guidelines.*

UN OCHA. (2022a). *Country-Based Pooled Funds in Review 2022.*


Regional Hubs

Africa
Nairobi, Kenya
Dakar, Senegal

Asia-Pacific
Bangkok, Thailand
Islamabad, Pakistan

MENA
Amman, Jordan

Latin America
Guadalajara, Mexico
(PPSJBGP)

Geneva Office
Humanitarian Hub, La Voie-Creuse 16, 1202 Geneva
secretariat@icvanetwork.org
www.icvanetwork.org