

NGOs AND THE HUMANITARIAN REFORM PROJECT II (NHRP II)

**The Humanitarian reform in the Libyan Crisis
Case study**

Disclaimer

The opinion expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the members of the DRC-led consortium for the project funded by ECHO “NGOs and the Humanitarian Reform Project II” (NHRP II).

The evaluation was conducted by an external consultant on behalf of an INGO involved in the humanitarian coordination and operations in Libya and member of the HCT, which could impair the impartiality of the study.

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Contents

Acronyms	4
1. Executive Summary	5
2. Introduction	8
3. Context of the humanitarian response in Libya	8
4. Humanitarian coordination, main Libyan actors	9
5. Findings	11
5.1. The global coordination effort in Libya	11
5.2. The cluster system in Libya	15
6. Conclusion	20
7. Recommendations	21

Acronyms

ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development
DO	Designated Official
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Coordination Team
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IMC	International Medical Committee
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JMACT	Joint Mine Action Coordination Team
LCHR	Libyan Committee for Humanitarian Relief
LRCS	Libyan Red Crescent Society
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organization
LibAid	Libyan Humanitarian Relief Agency
MSF	MédecinsSansFrontières
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organization
NTC	National Transitional Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid
TCN	Third-Country National
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHAS	UN Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

1. Executive summary

The Libyan crisis

Humanitarian priorities and coordination during the Libya crisis evolved in the course of 2011 in reaction to the complex dynamics of the conflict.

Starting with the civil uprising in Benghazi in mid-February 2011, the Libyan crisis immediately took on a regional dimension, reflected in the Regional Flash Appeal launched in March 2011: the initial priority for humanitarian action was given to helping those migrants and TCNs crossing (or stopped at) Libya's borders in vast numbers and organising their evacuation from Libya. This priority issue was successfully managed by IOM/UNHCR (mainly from March to June and in cooperation with Libyan organisations and the international community), thus to a large extent mitigating the gravity of the crisis.

The next humanitarian priority was on those Libyan citizens that chose to cross the Tunisian and Egyptian borders, rapidly followed by a focus on the population affected by the civil war within Libya's borders. International humanitarian organisations that were operational in Libya from March to August did so almost exclusively in the areas and "pockets" controlled by the NTC¹: the eastern part of Libya (with operational agencies based in Benghazi), the Nafusa Mountains, stretching southwest of Tripoli up to the border with Tunisia, and the city of Misrata, under siege from February until August. Communication between these areas was extremely difficult: Misrata could be reached only by sea and the Nafusa Mountains were accessible only from Tunisia. Several coordination centres therefore had to be established, firstly in Cairo, then Benghazi and Zarzis in Tunisia. UN agencies were not present in Misrata until September 2011 and the coordination in the city was undertaken by INGOs with direct support by donors. The operations of international organisations during this period mainly focused on support to IDPs and medical relief.

After the fall of Tripoli at the end of August the entire country quickly became accessible to humanitarian organisations. From September, Tripoli became the centre of the coordination system. Humanitarian needs also changed in nature, with protection of those accused of supporting Gaddafi's regime becoming a priority issue.

NTC committees were involved in the coordination and cluster meetings in Libya from the very beginning. The mobilisation of Libyan society (and Libyan Diaspora) in areas controlled by the NTC and its capacity, through numerous local CSOs, to provide humanitarian aid and social services was extremely high. This has certainly helped mitigate the impact of the crisis in Libya, which remained a "low intensity humanitarian crisis": geographically localised around conflict areas and front lines and causing relatively limited movements of population, with IDP needs mainly taken care of by host communities.

Findings and recommendations

Overall, the general humanitarian reform coordination structures (including the HCT, HC and the clusters) succeeded in ensuring a degree of cohesion of humanitarian actors and operations, in initiating valuable partnerships, in avoiding overlaps and in defining common approaches and standards. However, a number of shortcomings and lessons learnt were identified in the course of the study:

- The role of the HCT was mainly symbolic and its effective participation in decision-making almost non-existent.
- The role of the respective coordination centres established in Libya and in neighbouring countries was not clearly defined and communication between these centres was difficult.
- Inter-cluster and inter-agency coordination was insufficient and could have been more effective.
- Communication on security issues and constraints between UN and non-UN actors was inadequate.
- A better geographic coverage of the humanitarian coordination could have been ensured before September (Misrata particularly remained an unsolved issue) and should have been more effective after September (e.g. in Sirte and Beni Walid).
- The preparation of the revision for the flash appeal and the preparation of the 90 days plan (or CHAP) were considered by most interviewed stakeholders as ineffective processes.
- Contingency planning was not fully accurate; priorities were not always clearly defined; needs assessments could have been more consistent and systematic.
- Key Libyan organisations (e.g. LRCS) and authorities (NTC committees) were included in the coordination framework. However mechanisms for cooperating with and supporting Libyan CSOs and coalitions of CSOs that appeared after February could have been better defined.
- In the context of Libya, an Early Recovery approach would have been useful and should have been initiated.
- Key humanitarian actors and donors such as Arab states from Persian Gulf did not participate in the coordination set-up, undermining the effectiveness of coordination and the coherence of the humanitarian response.

The Libyan crisis serves as a good case study on the difficulty in establishing an efficient coordination system and operational framework in a country where there is no previous UN set-up. The use of surge staff by most cluster lead agencies resulted in a very high turn-over, which affected the coherency and continuity of strategies and operations.

¹ With exception of ICRC, IOM and MSF, all of which had a presence in Tripoli

A number of key recommendations relating to the humanitarian reform can be derived from the Libya crisis:

Recommendation 1

There is a need to ensure regular and meaningful communication and interactions between the HC and the clusters at both central level and at field-based operational hubs.

Recommendation 2

The role of the HCT and HCT members needs to be better clarified, formalized and strengthened:

- The role of the HCT (advisory role or decision-making) and its participation in decision-making mechanisms should be clarified.
- It is very important to ensure that HCT meetings are well prepared (agenda and support documents) and followed up.
- INGO members of the HCT should improve and increase their participation in meetings.

Recommendation 3

Communication on security issues between UN and non-UN actors should be enhanced. The principles of the Saving Life Together (SLT) framework must be better explained and applied.

Recommendation 4

Humanitarian reform structures should ensure that all key actors and donors (Arab States from Persian Gulf, Islamic associations, etc.) are involved in the coordination set-up. Communication should be established and mechanisms should be defined for a better inclusion of these key players.

Recommendation 5

When clusters are deployed in different locations and, even more, when they are deployed in different countries, there is a need to clearly define their respective role (in the strategic decision making, in liaising with national authorities) and geographic coverage. It is also essential to ensure good communication and coordination between the centres.

Recommendation 6

The functioning and quality of participation by humanitarian actors in cluster meetings must be improved and regularly monitored.

- The role of cluster coordinators should be clarified and result-oriented ToRs should be made for them.
- Cluster coordinators must be wholly dedicated to the coordination task and must have the necessary skills (facilitation and mobilization skills). Excessive turnover of cluster coordinators should be avoided.
- The specific agenda and fund raising policy of cluster lead agencies should not interfere with the coordination of the cluster. The roles - within the Lead agency - of the Head of office and of the cluster coordinator need to be clarified and differentiated.
- INGOs should improve their participation in the clusters by preparing and briefing their staff on the objectives and methods of the cluster system. Crash courses on the spot (e.g. organized or by OCHA, a lead agency or an IASC member), involving key national NGOs and counterparts could also be usefully delivered.
- Cluster meetings should not be limited to informative platforms. Key issues for action must be included in the agenda and discussed collectively.

Recommendation 7

Extensive efforts should be made to ensure an optimal inter-cluster coordination in view of:

- Improving the content and the timeliness of the preparation and revision of the flash appeal and CHAP.
- Accelerating the preparation and improving the relevance of contingency plans; better defining humanitarian priorities.
- Facilitating the discussions and decision-making of the HCT/HC by providing synthetic analysis and data.

Recommendation 8

A needs-assessment strategy and standardized methods for collecting and processing information should be defined at the beginning of the humanitarian deployment (inter-cluster coordination) and within each cluster.

Recommendation 9

In a middle-income country context like Libya, an Early Recovery approach must be initiated at the very beginning of the humanitarian intervention.

Recommendation 10

In a context such as that of Libya, there is a need to improve cooperation with local actors and to address cross-cutting issues.

A framework needs to be defined for encouraging and improving partnerships and cooperation between international and national actors, particularly in the context of the Middle East and North Africa, where CSOs play a key role in the political transition and where a strict humanitarian approach -responding to the needs without taking into account the local reaction capacities- is arguably not relevant. Supporting the participation of national stakeholders in the coordination system should be a cross-cutting issue for all clusters.

- Capacity building of local stakeholders should be included in humanitarian strategies and planning from the beginning of the humanitarian intervention.
- Mechanisms for establishing operational partnerships with national CSOs, including funding mechanisms, need to be identified.
- Where possible humanitarian organisations should have staff, with the necessary the skills, dedicated to cooperating with local organisations, providing them with capacity building and technical support

In a context such as that of Libya, strengthening dialogue and cooperation with local organisations is a key way to address cross cutting issues (which are often hardly taken into account within a strict humanitarian approach).

Recommendation 11

The decision-making procedures for de-activating the clusters should be clarified and made more transparent. Strong capacity building and (long term) technical support should be delivered those the national bodies taking over the coordination tasks.

2. Introduction

The mission was conducted by an external evaluator on behalf of ACTED and within the framework of the DRC-led consortium established for the implementation of the ECHO-funded project: “NGOs and the Humanitarian Reform Project II” (NHRP II).

The main objective of the assessment was to identify the achievements of and the main constraints faced by the Humanitarian Reform Processes and structures that were deployed in 2011 as a response to the Libyan Crisis.

The Terms of Reference of the mission were structured as follows:

- Review and assess the role of the HCT since the outset of the crisis.
- Review and assess the deployment and the role of the cluster system in the region and in Libya, including: their effectiveness in promoting coordination and information sharing, the level and quality of the participation of various actors (NGOs, UN, inter-cluster and transitional authorities); the communication between various levels and locations of the cluster system.
- Review and assess the role of other coordination structures that were established during the emergency.
- Review and assess the effectiveness of the flash appeal preparation process, including: the extent on which it reflected needs assessments; the level of participation of various agencies in it.
- Identify specific lessons learnt and best practices with regards to Humanitarian Reform and Coordination in Libya.
- Review and assess the phase-out of the Humanitarian reform structures.

The mission took place in Libya from 25 November to 18 December 2011. About 45 humanitarian and institutional actors were interviewed in Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi. In addition, a number of Skype discussions were organised with key stakeholders who were not longer in Libya at the time of the mission. These actors included: UN agencies, INGOs, Red Cross organisations, national NGOs, coalitions of national NGOs and representatives of the NTC or NTC affiliated organisations.

At the time of the mission, the humanitarian cycle in Libya was almost completed; the clusters were practically de-activated; the HCT was acting as a general coordination meeting, and OCHA was in the process of closing its representations in Tripoli and Benghazi. It was therefore an ex post exercise rather than an evaluation of an on-going process. Most of the international actors present in Libya at the time of the mission, particularly the UN agencies, arrived after August or were previously based outside Libya. Many key international actors present in Libya from February to August had left the country. A few of them were contacted by Skype but the information collected for the initial period may not be comprehensive.

3. Context of the humanitarian response in Libya

The structure and tempo of the humanitarian coordination were determined by factors relatively specific to the Libyan context.

Deployment took place over a short period of time. An informal Libyan Crisis Network supported by OCHA was established immediately after the civil uprising which started February 17th in Benghazi²; a Humanitarian Coordinator based in Cairo was appointed at the beginning of March; the first meeting of the HCT was held end of March; the cluster system was officially activated on April 12th. The phasing out was envisaged soon after the fall of Tripoli, end of August, and became effective with the departure of OCHA end of December. All together the humanitarian coordination was operational during less than a 10-month period including the activation and phasing out processes.

When speaking about humanitarian coordination in Libya, **two very different periods are to be considered:**

1. From February to September, the centre of the UN led coordination was outside of Libya (first in Cairo and from May in Zarzis, Tunisia) with an in-country field presence of the large majority of agencies in Eastern Libya (Benghazi). Humanitarian actors had only access to a limited part of the Libyan Territory and population.
2. In September, after the fall of Tripoli, the coordination moved to Tripoli. After the last fighting in Sirte and BeniWalid (October), humanitarian agencies had access to all of Libya.

At least from February to August The Libyan crisis had **a regional dimension**. Neighbouring countries were affected by the movement of people, Libyan families, migrants and TNCs and had to be included in the coordination framework.

From March to September, the humanitarian coordination covered a fragmented and limited territory within Libya. International humanitarian activities before the fall of Tripoli at the end of August and the last battles in Sirte and Beni Walid in October were concentrated in areas and pockets controlled by the NTC and anti Gaddafi forces³; whilst the areas controlled by the regime, most of the country, were not accessible. De facto, the humanitarian coordination before September covered only three areas, which differed from each other contextually and had limited inter-area communication. They were:

- The eastern part of Libya, from the Egyptian border all the way to Ajdabiya: in this area international organisations, all based in Benghazi, had relative freedom of movement.
- The Nafusa Mountains in the western part of Libya, stretching southwest of Tripoli all the way to the Tunisian Border.
- The town of Misrata under siege from March until August and accessible only by boat.

This fragmentation of the territory accessible to the humanitarian agencies had a direct impact on the coordination and cohesion of the humanitarian response.

² Situation report 1, OCHA, February 28th 2012.

³ With exception of IOM which was operating in Tripoli for the evacuation of TCNs and of the ICRC and MSF which had a presence in Tripoli.

From March to October, **the evolution of the humanitarian situation and needs**, linked to the volatility of the front lines, **was rapid and to a large extent unpredictable**. Contingency plans were therefore difficult to define, and even more so to follow.


Humanitarian coordination was evolving **in a complex and ambiguous political and military environment**; this limited the manoeuvrability of the UN system both in terms of security (NATO intervention was conducted under a UN resolution) and in terms of diplomatic constraints (Gaddafi's regime was still representing Libya in the UN). It had an impact on the coordination and, to a certain extent, on the cohesion between UN agencies and other organisations not subject to the same security and diplomatic constraints.

It was a low intensity crisis, with some stakeholders questioning whether it was a humanitarian crisis at all. The most problematic issue appeared, from the outset of the conflict, to be the plight of migrants and Third Country Nationals (TCNs), which could have developed tragically. The successful evacuation of TCNs by IOM/UNHCR (IOM provided transport assistance to 210 000 TCNs, primarily from February to June; in total 706 000 migrants crossed the Libyan borders from February to September⁴), also assisted by local and international organisations, was an extremely important intervention which largely mitigated the impact of the crisis. As a consequence, and also due to the relative scarcity of funding available, only a few INGOs were deployed in the country. In comparison with other humanitarian crisis, humanitarian coordination in Libya was of low scale. Major INGOs did not deploy in Libya, which had an impact on the level and quality of the participation of INGOs in the HCT and in the clusters.

Another factor which contributed to mitigating the impact of the crisis was **the extensive mobilisation and level of organisation of Libyan society** in the areas controlled by the NTC. Some pre-existing Libyan organisations (particularly the Libyan Red Crescent Society and the Libyan Boy scouts),

numerous CSOs created after February 2011 and community-based organisations at street or neighbourhood levels -supported by the business community- succeeded in providing efficient daily assistance not only to IDPs but also to vulnerable families (chronic poverty was barely targeted by international humanitarian organisations). The Libyan Diaspora also played an important role in the aid system, at least during the first months of the conflict, by providing human and financial resources and by ensuring efficient international networking and advocacy. Finally, committees established by the NTC or affiliated to the NTC played a key role in coordinating activities and channelling the resources of local actors. This coordination of local actors and resources was for example reported to be very well organised and efficient in Misrata during the siege. Bridges between international and local actors have of course been built; nevertheless local actors have been only marginally and sporadically integrated into the coordination and the cluster system. The coordination led by the UN agencies only focused on a part, and certainly a minor part, of the global response to humanitarian needs. International aid only complemented the larger efforts of the Libyan society. Neither the successes of the humanitarian coordination nor its deficiencies have had any decisive impact on the situation in the field⁵.

The last specific aspect of this crisis is that **Libya was a terra incognita for most international organisations**, which could not rely on previous experience or existing networks. A fortiori, Libyan organisations were also not used to cooperating or establishing partnerships with international organisations. For most Libyan activists, their involvement in humanitarian aid was their first associative experience, a "new and strange experience" as stated by a volunteer of the Libyan Red Crescent Society.



Map of Libya

4. Humanitarian coordination, main Libyan actors

Several committees established by the NTC from February/March (based in Benghazi until September and later in Tripoli) were actively involved in humanitarian coordination, including co-chairing of some cluster meetings and working groups (Committee for Health, Committee for Social Affairs, Committee for Education, Committee for Culture and Civil Society Organisations, etc.).

In Misrata the main interlocutor of the humanitarian organisations was the Misrata Relief Committee acting under the umbrella of the local transitional council.


The Libyan Committee for Humanitarian Relief (LCHR) was established early 2011 in Benghazi by the NTC to coordinate the relief operations and particularly the support provided to IDPs. LCHR became soon a key interlocutor for international humanitarian organisations, co-chairing the protection cluster in Benghazi and being actively involved in the Food Security cluster.

In August, the LCHR merged with the previously existing Libyan International relief agency and became LIBAID. LIBAID became after August a central element of the phasing out strategy. Supported by most agencies (e.g. OCHA, WFP and UNHCR), LIBAID took over the general coordination of relief activities, co-chairing the HCT and the General Coordination Meetings.

⁴ Humanitarian Emergency Response to the Libyan Crisis, IOM, September 2011.

⁵ With exception of the evacuation of the TCNs where international organisations had a key and leading role.

Chronology of the Humanitarian coordination



5. Findings of the study

5.1. The global coordination effort in Libya

Rapid establishment of the humanitarian coordination; response of OCHA at the start of the crisis

The establishment of a humanitarian coordination set-up for Libya rapidly followed the civilian unrest in Eastern Libya and the massive and sudden border crossing of migrants and TCNs mainly at the Egyptian and Tunisian borders. An informal coordination network (the Libyan Crisis Network) was established almost immediately after the start of the crisis and by the end of February 2011 OCHA staff were deployed in Egypt and Tunisia. The first OCHA Situation Report was issued on February 28th and the inter-agency website for Libya was activated at the beginning of March⁶. The regional Flash Appeal was launched on March 7th. The Humanitarian Coordinator for Libya was appointed on March 8th and the HCT was formed very soon after his arrival in Cairo (the first HCT meeting was held on March 28th) and from the outset comprised INGOs operating in Egypt and at the Libyan-Egyptian border. The cluster system was officially activated on April 12th. One month after the beginning of the civil uprising in Benghazi the coordination system was fully established and the main communication and information tools were in place.

Location of the coordination centre before September

The physical location of the HCT and of the central coordination of the cluster system before September is a controversial issue among humanitarian stakeholders.

The HC and HCT were first located in Cairo where most of the agencies had their regional offices and from where it was possible to coordinate the humanitarian activities at the Libyan-Egyptian border (Saloum).

Very soon (March), the situation in Eastern Libya stabilized and most INGOs as well as donors relocated to Benghazi, a city that was under the full control of the NTC, and started operating in eastern Libya. An INGO coordination system was rapidly established. In April, UN agencies established a presence in Benghazi and initiated the cluster meetings. For one month Benghazi, in liaison with Cairo, was the de facto focal point of the humanitarian coordination. An attempt to open a UN representation in Tripoli in April was aborted after an attack on the UN compound.

In mid-May, OCHA decided to relocate to Zarzis in Tunisia, followed by the HC. Most UN agencies sent representatives to Zarzis but Cairo remained a sub coordination centre.

From May to September, HCT meetings were held in Zarzis, which became the centre of the UN-led coordination. The decision to keep the coordination centre out of Libya was justified by security reasons and, certainly even more, by the necessity for the UN to keep a neutral and impartial profile. The move to Zarzis gave the possibility to have a better coverage of the situation in Tunisia (camps for TCNs and Libyan families) and to coordinate the actions in the Nafusa Mountains from the Tunisian border. Tunisia also offered a better access to Tripoli than Egypt. Nevertheless, the period from May to September was marked by certain confusion and a decrease in the cohesion of the coordination system.

- Most INGOs operating in Eastern Libya and Misrata and UN agencies with a small dedicated team could not afford a permanent representation in Zarzis, which affected the efficiency of the cluster meetings as well as the representativeness of the HCT (out of the four INGOs members of the HCT, only IMC kept a permanent junior representation in Zarzis).
- A communication system was established in order to allow phone conferences (for clusters and HCT) between the three coordination points (Zarzis, Benghazi and Cairo) but the quality of transmissions, particularly between Benghazi and Zarzis, was bad and did not allow interactive exchanges.
- The question of leadership between Benghazi and Zarzis was not clearly discussed and defined. For the UN, Zarzis became the central coordination and decision centre whereas Benghazi was only a local focal point. On the contrary, for most INGOs as well as donors, Benghazi was the main centre for the humanitarian operations in Libya and; in operational terms, the legitimacy of Zarzis was restricted to the coordination of the activities in Tunisia and the Nafusa Mountains.
- This impression of a double-centred coordination, shared by many humanitarian actors, was reinforced by differences in the analysis and the understanding of the situation. This is partly due to the fact that Zarzis and Benghazi did not cooperate in the same way and at the same level with Libyan stakeholders. The NTC committees and affiliated organisations (e.g. LCHR/LIBAID) played a key role in humanitarian coordination in Benghazi; whereas the participation of NTC representatives in the meetings held in Zarzis was sporadic and had a diplomatic rather than operational dimension. A recurrent comment by humanitarian actors interviewed in the course of the study was that the coordination in Zarzis was removed from the field operations and therefore had a biased perception of the situation.

UNDSS and the security issue

The security rules and UNDSS policy during the Libyan crisis are another controversial issue, particularly when it comes to the absence of the UN in Misrata during the siege. Many observers also mention that high security restrictions limited the response capacity of the UN agencies in Benghazi and Eastern Libya, where the situation was relatively stable and secure. Restriction of movements and an insufficient number of armoured vehicles reportedly also had a negative impact on UN activities in Tripoli and in the main humanitarian spots in Libya (e.g. Sirte) after August. Controversies on security rules are indeed recurrent when it comes to the relation between UN and INGOs, the later being by nature more flexible. In the political and military context of Libya after February, and particularly after NATO started the air strikes under UN resolutions, UN security measures had to be high. However, a few aspects could have been considered:

- The Designated Officer (DO) for Libya, the most senior person in the UNDSS Warden System, was the UN RC in Cairo. The decision to

⁶ <http://northafrica.humanitarianresponse.info/>

relocate the Humanitarian Coordinator to Zarzis resulted in additional difficulties in communicating, in harmonizing situation analyses and in adapting in a timely manner to the changing situation on the ground. This two-headed system, in which the capacity of the Zarzis-based HC to fully influence safety decisions was limited (because of lack of proximity), contributed to reduced flexibility and of responsiveness.

- Security policy and security intelligence were not shared with INGOs, which contributed to fuelling misunderstandings and a certain level of distrust between humanitarian actors. The lack of security information being shared with INGOs was raised in a HCT meeting and pointed out by many INGOs. It was contradictory to the Saving Life Together (SLT) framework and was seen by many INGOs as a significant shortcoming in the coordination system.
- Security constraints faced by different kinds of humanitarian actors are largely predictable. In the Libyan context the security constraints faced by UN agencies, including OCHA, could have been better explained and discussed in the HCT and cluster meetings, to enable a good understanding by all humanitarian actors. Security is also a field where UN agencies and INGOs are complementary. A global and pragmatic strategy, taking into account the UN security constraints and the INGOs relative flexibility, could have been framed by the HCT⁷ and jointly implemented. It appears that this was not effectively discussed in the HCT meetings, resulting in a loss of coherence and consistency of the overall strategy.

INGOs in the global coordination system

In March 2011, the INGOs present in Egypt designated four representatives in the HCT. The participation of INGOs in HCT meetings was effective at the beginning of the crisis but decreased when INGOs started operating in Eastern Libya, and even more so when the HC and HCT moved to Zarzis. Most INGO members could neither afford to keep a permanent presence in Zarzis, nor did not see the necessity of doing it. From May to September, INGO participation in HCT meetings was therefore sporadic and weak. INGOs participated from Benghazi through phone conferences but the quality of the transmissions did not allow for meaningful discussions and interactive debates.

A general observation is that the participation of INGOs in the HCT meetings, at least before the HCT moved to Tripoli in September, was mainly ensured by relatively junior staff that had only a limited overview of the activities and strategies of their organisations. It should also be mentioned that the INGO members of the HCT did not act as representatives of the whole INGO community. INGOs that were not members of the HCT were usually not consulted before HCT meetings and the outputs of the meetings as well as their minutes were not systematically shared with the other organisations.

Compared to other humanitarian contexts, a limited number of INGOs were operating in Libya and some of them left as soon as the situation stabilized or the level of emergency decreased. Particularly, some of the major global INGOs that are relatively independent financially and usually involved in various clusters had no or only a limited presence in Libya. The majority of INGOs actually operating in Libya were highly dependent on UN funding which limited their freedom of movement and independence and therefore their ability to influence the debates and the decisions of the HCT. The competition for funding certainly also contributed to weakening the cohesion of INGOs vis-à-vis the UN-led coordination system.

INGOs could certainly have played a more effective role in the overall Libya humanitarian coordination. It would have required more cohesion among

themselves, an investment in Human Resources and a clarification of their relations with the UN agencies (when sitting in the HCT the organisations must decide “if they are INGOs or contractors”).

The general coordination after September and the phasing out

Soon after the fall of Tripoli (end of August) the HC, HCT and clusters moved from Zarzis to Tripoli, which logically became the central location for humanitarian coordination. In a short period of time, the political context as well as the humanitarian needs drastically changed. As all Libyan territory became accessible to Humanitarian organisations, the emergency response moved to new sites such as Sirte and Beni Walid, which had been heavily affected by the fighting. The crisis also changed in nature, with protection issues related to minorities and communities accused of supporting Gaddafi regime becoming central. At the same time the response capacity of local organisations decreased (local financial resources were becoming scarce; so were human resources, as these organisations are strictly based on volunteering). Several INGOs underlined that the international humanitarian presence was paradoxically more justified and had a better response capacity after August than it had had before. However, in parallel to this perceived increased need, humanitarian funding was drying up (at the end of 2011, most INGOs were working with remnants of budgets allocated before September) and the coordination system was phasing out.

The decision to phase out was taken very soon after the establishment of the humanitarian coordination in Tripoli. The HCT meeting was merged with the General Coordination Meeting, meaning that the HCT became an information platform and stopped being a formal body for decision making and strategic orientations. These HCT/General Coordination meetings in Tripoli were co-chaired by LIBAID as part of OCHA's hand over strategy. The clusters were deactivated end of December and replaced by working groups. OCHA offices in Benghazi and Tripoli closed at the end of December.

This short time period, from the establishment of the coordination in Tripoli in September to the phasing out of OCHA end of December, was marked by a level of confusion and contradictory moves.

The need to respond rapidly to the remaining emergency situations (e.g. in Sirte) was contradictory to the will of most UN agencies to plan for long term deployment in Libya and to start post conflict operations. The UN system and INGOs (as well as some key donors) had to a certain extent different perspectives during the period: INGOs and some donors were still focused on the short term and “residual” humanitarian needs, whilst large sections of the UN system were already oriented towards long term operations and planning. This divergence impacted the humanitarian response and led to different appreciations of the decision to phase out. Several INGOs and donors considered that this phasing out was premature in the volatile political context of Libya and that a strong humanitarian coordination was still needed, particularly in the protection sector.

The fact that LIBAID started co-chairing the HCT/General Coordination meetings was welcomed by most international stakeholders. However, most of them (including LIBAID managers themselves) also pointed out that LIBAID did not yet have the necessary capacity to effectively take over the coordination of humanitarian activities and that the support and capacity building provided was insufficient.

The phasing out was unilaterally decided by the UN. The modalities of the phasing out were not discussed and prepared within the framework of the HCT.

⁷ See Minutes of HCT meeting June 14th, Zarzis.

Information and communication

The information tools developed by OCHA were useful and appreciated by all humanitarian stakeholders: the contact list was regularly updated, the website was used by almost all actors as a major source of information, the mapping services, the media monitoring (although some agencies regretted that only international media were covered by the monitoring), the Situation Reports issued two or three times a week. These tools had a positive impact on the humanitarian dynamics inside and outside the country and have undoubtedly been a factor of cohesion among humanitarian stakeholders.

Donor countries in the coordination system

Donors, particularly ECHO and DFID and to a lesser extent the SDC and OFDA (in Benghazi), actively participated in the coordination mechanisms that were established in Benghazi from March, in Misrata from June and in Tripoli after August. The involvement of donors in strategic discussions was considered by several stakeholders as unusually strong in Libya.

- Participation in cluster meetings and general coordination meetings
- Participation in INGO coordination meetings
- Financial support to INGO coordination mechanisms in Misrata (from June) and Sirte after August (ECHO)
- Direct participation in the coordination of the relief activities in Sirte (ECHO)
- Advocacy, within HCT and cluster meetings, for a more efficient and rapid humanitarian response to the needs, particularly after September (ECHO)

This involvement was globally appreciated by humanitarian organisations, particularly INGOs. However, several stakeholders –including donors themselves–, pointed out that the strong involvement of donors in the coordination system was to an extent reflective of the shortcomings of the humanitarian reform coordination structures, the lack of decision making at HCT level, and the lack of contingency planning by UN agencies and INGOs after the fall of Tripoli. The advocacy role taken by ECHO in the HCT and general coordination meetings after August - for a faster response and UN presence in Sirte and Beni Walid in particular, and for a UN presence in Misrata - was also counterbalancing the relative passivity of INGOs within the HCT or their unwillingness to confront UN agencies.

Some stakeholders consider that the strong presence of donors in coordination and cluster meetings also had negative effects. For some, the participation in Benghazi meetings by donors representing countries directly involved in the military operations put in question the neutrality of the coordination system. Moreover, this participation risked to impair the functioning of the meetings and turn them into an arena for lobbying and fund raising. It is to be mentioned that some local organisations participating in coordination meetings were particularly disturbed by this aspect of the coordination and clusters meetings.

The Libyan crisis also highlighted the fact that several major stakeholders and donors (e.g. the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, some Islamic organisations, and Diaspora-driven initiatives) do not participate in the humanitarian reform coordination structures, acting outside of their framework. This weakened the capacity of the system to define and implement a global and coherent response to the crisis, affecting its credibility and legitimacy.

Inter-INGO coordination mechanisms

The coordination mechanisms setup by INGOs (notably with support by ECHO), parallel to or outside of the UN-led coordination system, are worth paying specific attention to.

The town of Misrata, under siege from February and subjected to near daily shelling until mid-August, was accessible to international organisations, but only by sea. Medical INGOs (IMC, MSF France and Belgium, Emergency) were the first INGOs operating in Misrata followed by a few non-medical INGOs (i.e. ACTED, CESVI, DCA, Mercy Corps, TSF, Save the Children and demining organisation members of the JMACT) and ICRC. IOM had no permanent international presence but successfully organised the evacuation of TCNs from Misrata. For security reasons UN agencies could not deploy in Misrata but organised rapid assessments (with high movement limitations which reduced their effectiveness) and carried out food and NFI distributions through INGO partners present in Misrata. From July to November, in response to calls from operational agencies in Misrata, WFP operated a boat connecting Benghazi and Misrata, which largely contributed to facilitating the humanitarian response in Misrata before September.

In order to facilitate the deployment and coordination of international organisations in Misrata a consortium of three INGOs, with support by ECHO, opened in June a Humanitarian Hub aiming at facilitating humanitarian activities and strengthening coordination and cohesion amongst international stakeholders. From June to November, the Hub provided a large range of services: office space and accommodation for INGOs, internet connection and a VHF radio system, mapping services for the use of international as well as local organisations. The Hub provided all logistical support for the WFP boat on the Misrata side (bookings, relation with the port authorities, reception of passengers and goods, etc.) as well as extensive assistance to the assessment missions organised by the UN and INGOs in Misrata. In terms of coordination and communication, the Hub organised weekly inter-agency coordination meetings, widely disseminated a daily security report and – at least at the beginning– Situation Reports reflecting needs and activities per sector. A few meetings were also organised in Benghazi in order to share information on the situation in Misrata and to link the Misrata inter-agency coordination with the clusters in Benghazi. Finally, the Hub was in daily contact with local authorities and particularly with the Misrata Relief Committee which appointed a liaison officer permanently located in the Hub. In October, on the request of ECHO, the Humanitarian Hub of Misrata established a branch in Sirte in order to provide similar services but on a smaller scale. ECHO also encouraged the establishment of a Humanitarian Hub in Nafusa Mountains. However, INGOs operating in Nafusa Mountain were not convinced by the need to set up a coordination center for the few organisations operating there and were reluctant to take over what they considered to be OCHA's responsibility.

The Humanitarian Hub and Inter-agency coordination in Misrata was globally a successful initiative recognized and appreciated by international organisations as well as local authorities. It increased humanitarian access (facilitating the arrival of various new INGO actors), promoted better awareness of the humanitarian problematic in Misrata, facilitated synergies and joint action among locally-present actors, ensured a high visibility of international presence in Misrata and allowing UN agencies to operate in Misrata without being physically present. However, it also had a number of weaknesses:

- For the Lead INGO, running the Hub and the inter-agency coordination was a significant workload that required a lot of follow up from its

senior coordination. Further dedicated resources would have been useful to realise the full potential of the inter-agency coordination (e.g. regular and comprehensive Situation Reports on Misrata would have been valuable for the whole coordination system and contingency planning, but only two could be released).

- The fact that an individual organisation ran the Hub and the related coordination generated tensions among INGOs. Leadership in the INGO community is a sensitive issue which needs to be carefully addressed.
- INGO leading the coordination in a war affected area is not the best option. Since INGOs are working directly with the population, negotiating at the same time with authorities is therefore complicated, generates tensions and induces a high exposure of the INGOs. A UN led coordination is more legitimate.

The level of inclusion of the Misrata inter-agency coordination in the global coordination system is subject to debate. For the INGOs and donors, the inter-agency coordination had to be established because the UN cluster leads and OCHA were not able to perform their coordination mandate. From this point of view, the Misrata coordination was a tool led by INGOs and certainly not an element of the global coordination. For some actors, the Misrata inter-agency coordination is representative of the limits of the UN-led coordination system.

For OCHA (which opened a part time representation in Misrata only in November), the INGOs participating in the Misrata coordination were, at least for some of them, members of the HCT and also representing the HCT on the ground. The Misrata coordination can therefore be considered as an extension of the global coordination system. The main issue is not who is leading the coordination, what is important is that the work is done.

In any case, this debate illustrates the shortcomings – in term of strategic decision making- of the HCT in the Libyan crisis. The issue of Misrata and how to link the coordination efforts in Misrata to the global coordination and cluster system was never seriously raised within the HCT, neither by INGOs nor by OCHA. More than the respective roles and responsibility of INGOs and OCHA, the poor role played by the HCT as a leading body of the coordination system and as a forum where issues can be raised and solved is again put into question.

Room for improvement

The Libya crisis shows that there is a need to empower the HCT, enabling it to be a truly strategic decision making body. In Libya, the HCT was largely regarded as scarcely more than a weak information platform; particularly after its move to Zarzis and even more so when it was established in Tripoli (and merged with the general coordination meeting). The minutes of the HCT meetings do not reflect in-depth discussions and joint decisions on crucial issues (e.g. the location of the central coordination and the communication with the other areas, the preparation of the humanitarian deployment in Tripoli and in the areas previously not accessible to international organisations, the preparation and content of the CHAP, the phasing out process, etc.). They also show a relatively unbalanced coverage of the different intervention areas (before September: Eastern Libya, Misrata, and Nafusa Mountains). Three aspects at least could be improved:

- Consistency of the INGO representation in the HCT. The effective participation of INGOs in the HCT requires additional human resources that not all INGOs were able to provide. The challenge is to ensure the regularity of the INGO participation as well as the quality of this participation.

- More effective and systematic inter-agency and inter-cluster-coordination is a condition for improving the quality of the debates and for enabling the HCT to make decisions based on relevant and synthesised information.
- The HCT should undoubtedly remain a formal coordination body until the deactivation of the clusters. The fusion in Tripoli of the HTC and the general coordination meeting de facto led to disabling the HCT as a formal decision-making body. In this situation the phasing out strategy, for example, could not be jointly discussed, planned and agreed upon.

Better communication between the different coordination centres (Cairo, Zarzis, Benghazi and later Tripoli but also Misrata where the UN had no presence before September) and clear definition of their respective geographic coverage and leadership should have been clarified by OCHA, clusters and endorsed by the HCT.

INGO members of the HCT need to better liaise with those INGOs not members of the HCT and with key national NGOs, acting, as much as possible, as representatives of the NGO community. Several stakeholders mentioned the lack of inter-INGO consultation as a primary reason for the weakness of the HCT. Key points of the agenda should be discussed prior to the meetings. Outputs of the meetings should be shared by the members with other organisations.

Security constraints should be openly discussed and if possible anticipated by the HC and the HCT and taken into account when defining joint (UN/ INGO) intervention strategies. When UN agencies and particularly OCHA cannot - for security reasons as was the case in Misrata- deploy in a given area, clear mechanisms for linking the existing NGO coordination system with the global coordination and the clusters need to be defined. Technical (e.g. communication system) and financial support to the INGO coordination systems, in areas where OCHA is not present, could also be envisaged. Interviewed donors were particularly concerned by this issue. As shown in Misrata, their role was enhanced where OCHA and the clusters are not supporting humanitarian coordination.

It is important also to ensure the set-up of a system for sharing security information with INGOs participating in the humanitarian reform coordination system. It is certainly a pre-condition for establishing a trust building approach. Security assessments need to take into account the findings and recommendations of the HCT and ground actors. The role of the HC in defining and endorsing security rules could also be clarified.

The involvement of national authorities in humanitarian coordination was a necessary step of the phasing out strategy. However more coaching and capacity building should have been provided to national authorities. LIBAID started co-chairing the HCT/General Coordination meeting in Tripoli without being fully prepared or receiving regular assistance (it should be noted that the capacity of OCHA to support LIBAID was hampered by the restriction of movement of its staff). This shortcoming affected the credibility of LIBAID as well as the efficiency of the meetings it chaired.

Regular interventions by the HC on the ground are important for the cohesion of the coordination system and for defining and reviewing humanitarian priorities. The meetings organised by the HC in Benghazi and in Misrata were appreciated by all humanitarian actors but also considered as too scarce by most of them.

Lastly, the lack of participation in the coordination effort by important donors and stakeholders such as Arabic States from the Persian Gulf and some Islamic and Diaspora-driven organisations undermined the representativeness of the system and its capacity to effectively coordinate and lead humanitarian action.

⁷ See Minutes of HCT meeting June 14th, Zarzis.

5.2. The cluster system in Libya

Activation of the cluster system

Working groups led by UN agencies started meeting in Egypt from February, with meeting outputs appearing in OCHA Situation Reports from the very beginning. The sectoral coordination structure for the Libyan crisis was therefore rapidly – almost immediately- established and the activation of the cluster system in April⁸ was only formalising and framing an already established dynamic. Initially, 7 clusters were envisaged:

- Food Security led by WFP /FAO
- Water, Sanitation and Hygiene led by UNICEF
- Health/Nutrition led by WHO
- Logistics led by WFP
- Protection/ Child Protection led by UNHCR
- Shelter/ Non-Food Items led by UNHCR
- Telecommunications led by WFP

The WASH cluster was activated at an early stage but had a marginal activity (the supply of potable water was the only issue to be followed which did not require a specific coordination set-up). It was de-activated by UNICEF in September. The cluster system in Libya consisted therefore of 5 key clusters, indeed to a certain extent only 4 considering that the Telecommunications cluster- having a very focused and technical mandate- was not directly involved in the planning and coordination of ground operations.

The Shelter/NFI cluster was activated but had a very limited attendance (UNHCR and up to two INGOs involved in shelter assessments). It therefore stopped organising meetings relatively soon, with shelter issues (essentially related to assessments) being discussed on a bilateral basis between the few organisations concerned. The management of NFI issues was transferred to the Protection cluster.

Deployment of the Cluster system

Cluster meetings began in Cairo and were initiated in Benghazi in April. When OCHA and the HC moved to Tunisia in May, Zarzis became a “centre” for the cluster system. Benghazi had –more or less- a status of field representation in Libya and Cairo remained a resource centre for most clusters (e.g. Food Security, Logistics, Telecommunications)

Most humanitarian stakeholders present in Libya before September underlined the lack of clarity and coherency of the responsibilities and geographic coverage of the different coordination centres (Cairo, Benghazi and Zarzis), an unclear “chain of command” and poor communication, particularly between Benghazi and Zarzis. This relative confusion was accentuated by the fact that the clusters had different understandings of the role of each centre. For the Protection cluster, Zarzis was the decision making centre and Benghazi a field representation. For the Health cluster, the two centres were working in parallel and were relatively autonomous, with Zarzis covering operations in Tunisia and the Nafusa Mountains and Benghazi covering Eastern Libya. UNMAS, lead of the sub-cluster for demining, opened a logistics hub in Malta but had a limited presence in Zarzis. For UNMAS, Benghazi was the main operational centre before September.

A key issue is certainly that the NTC committees or affiliated organisations such as LIBAID as well as a few Libyan NGOs and non-state actors were actively participating in the cluster meetings and co-chairing the cluster and sub cluster meetings - Protection, Health, Education, Demining, Gender based violence- in Benghazi, whilst in the cluster meetings in Zarzis there was far less interaction with Libyan stakeholders. This led to diverging analyses of the situation and to a certain level of misunderstanding between the coordination centres.

The few INGOs operating in the Nafusa Mountains considered Zarzis as a coordination centre for Western Libya whilst the INGOs operating in Benghazi and Misrata did not understand the role of Zarzis and, with the exception of IMC, rarely participated in the meetings in Zarzis.

According to several actors from UN agencies as well as from INGOs and donors, a good and regular communication and coordination system was not established between the different centres.

This confusion or lack of clarity affected the efficiency and coherence of the humanitarian response and, to a certain extent, the relevance of the information spread from Zarzis by the global clusters and by OCHA. It also generated frustrations and a certain level of misunderstanding between the teams located in Libya and those operating in the neighbouring countries.

In September, soon after the fall of Tripoli, all lead agencies moved to Tripoli and activated cluster meetings in the Libyan capital. Zarzis ceased to be a coordination centre, with Benghazi remaining a coordination hub for eastern Libya. Several stakeholders and donors in particular, underlined the relative unpreparedness of the clusters and lead agencies to the new context. The experience of the teams located in Benghazi in cooperating with the NTC committees and their knowledge of the Libyan political and administrative set-up was for many not sufficiently taken into account (Tripoli was largely managed by the teams previously located in Zarzis). Cluster lead agencies and INGOs were slow in assessing and understanding the new nature of the crisis and thus responding to the immediate needs in new humanitarian hotspots (e.g. Beni Walid, Sirte). Lead agencies and INGOs also had difficulties in establishing distinctions in prioritisation between long term issues and short term humanitarian needs. Contingency plans were either not defined or were implemented too late. The restriction of movement of the UN teams in the country and even in Tripoli also hampered the deployment of the coordination system and relations with Libyan authorities.

Functioning of the clusters

Cluster and general coordination meetings were regularly organised; minutes were considered a good source of information, were shared amongst participants and were also available on clusters’ websites. The competence of the cluster leads and chair persons has rarely been questioned. The system definitely contributed to strengthening the cohesion of the international humanitarian community. Coordination meetings were also considered to be invaluable tools for briefing new comers. The globally and structured effect of the cluster system and coordination meetings is recognised by all participants.

⁸ Message from Valerie Amos dated April 7th.

A common point raised by INGOs (and even more so by national NGOs) is that clusters were good informative platforms but poor coordination bodies. There is of course a need for improving the role of the clusters in contingency planning and in coordinating ground operations. Yet expectations are maybe too high, clusters are a valuable tool but are not the ultimate solution and cannot replace individual initiatives. On the other hand, many stakeholders underestimate the achievements of the clusters (e.g. in food security and NFI sectors; in organising logistical support to ground operations).

The functioning of most clusters was affected by a high staff turnover amongst lead agencies (but also amongst many INGOs participating in the cluster meetings), particularly in Benghazi from April to September. "Each meeting was a first meeting" hampering the planning and coordination of operations.

Most UN agencies did not appoint specific staff for coordination tasks, particularly in Benghazi. Some of the cluster leads found it very difficult to coordinate cluster and at the same time work on other issues. The efficiency, attendance and dynamism of the cluster depend a lot on the personality but also on the availability of the cluster lead. The function is time consuming and hardly compatible with other tasks. Various INGOs also consider that the confusion between the coordination tasks of the Lead agency and its own activities (including fund raising) leads to a conflict of interest and to unbalanced relations with the cluster's members.

Cluster meetings were well attended by INGOs but several cluster leads have pointed out the unpreparedness of INGO representatives who often had no previous experience with clusters and did not understand the aim and working method of the clusters. The lack of experience of the participants contributed to preventing the clusters from becoming anything more than an information platform.

The cluster system put a significant amount of pressure on humanitarian organisations. Some INGOs felt that coordination became more important than field operations and found it hard to mobilize senior human resources for the regular follow-up of (and effective participation in) the meetings.

All stakeholders highlighted the fact that the clusters, due to the restriction of movement for UN staff, were highly dependent on INGOs and LNGOs (e.g. LIBAID, the LRCS, the Libyan Boy Scouts) for field assessments and collecting field information as well as for ground operations. This interdependence of the lead clusters and the INGOs and LNGOs had a tangible but still limited impact on the management of the clusters:

- Libyan stakeholders (i.e. LIBAID and NTC committees) were co-chairing several clusters in Benghazi and, after August, in Tripoli.
- MERLIN was co-chairing the Health cluster in Zarzis.
- Save the Children UK had a leading role in several working groups and sub-clusters under the Protection Cluster (Education, Children Protection).
- The sub-cluster for de-mining, led by UNMAS, established through JMACT a fully integrated and efficient management system.

Most INGOs operating in Libya were implementing partners of the UN agencies and their presence in Libya was partly or heavily dependent on UN funding. This dependence is viewed by several observers and participants as a conflict of interest undermining an effective participation by INGOs in the debates and decision making. It also generated a competition between INGOs that affected the objectivity of the debates.

Geographic coverage

As already previously mentioned, the geographic coverage of the clusters before September was limited to the Nafusa Mountains at the Tunisian border, the eastern part of Libya (all agencies and INGOs being based in Benghazi) and the town of Misrata under siege, where UN agencies were not present but instead worked through INGO partners, LRCS and the Relief committee.

The few organisations operating in Tripoli before its fall (i.e. MSF, ICRC) were not directly involved in the cluster set-up. A few UN inter-agency missions in Tripoli, led by the HC, kept contact with the Libyan government (the mission reports were found to be very useful and informative by the organisations working in the NTC controlled areas) but did not succeed in establishing a permanent representation. Very few initiatives for connecting ex-rebels and Gaddafi's controlled areas can be mentioned. WFP, through LRCS tried to organise food distributions in cities controlled by the regime; WHO signed an agreement with the government for the purchasing –with Libyan governmental funding- and distribution of medical supply in the hospitals located in NTC controlled areas. This led to an ambiguous situation. The HC and general coordination level were still seeking a national balanced coverage whilst the clusters in Benghazi were resolutely engaged in supportive cooperation with the NTC committees. The lack of a clear global strategy and of political guidance at local level led the clusters in Benghazi to developing their own strategies, independently from and sometimes in contradiction with the global coordination operating out of Zarzis.

Provider of last resort

Most stakeholders in Libya were sceptical about the principle of last resort provider and considered it not to be applicable without significant financial resources that can be rapidly mobilized and also rapidly sub-contracted to INGO or national NGO implementing partners. To a larger extent, the role of provider of last resort was taken over by some donors (bilateral agreements with implementing partners) rather than by the clusters and cluster leads.

Participation of Libyan Stakeholders in the cluster system

The question of the relations between national authorities, national NGOs and the international humanitarian coordination system was an important issue in Libya.

Libyan organisations (including those driven by the Diaspora) and community based associations were by some distance the most effective providers and organisers of humanitarian aid and social services during the crisis. According to most observers, the international humanitarian deployment had a secondary role and was mainly complementary to the efforts of Libyan society.

This was the case in emergency situations such as Misrata under siege, where the local Relief Committee successfully organised food and NFI distributions to about 50 000 people from March to August. Significantly, the Head of the Misrata Relief Committee considered the cooperation established –in the field of food and NFI distributions- with international organisations before September (INGOs and inter-INGO coordination bodies, ICRC, WFP via INGOs operating in Misrata...) as "important" but also extremely time consuming for negligible outputs.

This was also the case throughout the territory controlled by the NTC in eastern Libya. International organisations focused on TCNs and IDPs (also supported by the host communities), whilst endemic poverty and vulnerability issues, aggravated by the conflict, were covered exclusively by community-based organisations and Libyan charities largely created

after February 2011. The activities of these organisations had a crucial role in mitigating the impact of the conflict.

In light of the role played by Libyan stakeholders in the response to the needs, their inclusion in the coordination and cluster system was insufficient.

NTC committees and NTC affiliated organisations (i.e. LIBAID) participated in and co-chaired most of the cluster meetings in Benghazi and even more so in Tripoli after August. This participation had a positive impact on the quality and efficiency of the discussions and strategic decisions taken by the clusters. The other Libyan organisations actively participating in the meetings were the few key implementing partners of the international agencies, particularly the LRCS. Most other Libyan organisations, including the existing coalitions of Libyan NGOs, did not feel concerned by the clusters and, when they tried to participate, felt treated as minor actors.

This difficulty to include Libyan organisations or to coordinate with them is seen by several international actors as a failure or a weakness of the coordination system established during the crisis. At the same time it should be considered that these new organisations lacked the experience and management structure to participate in a global emergency planning and coordination exercise. A comment shared by many Libyan NGOs is that they were expecting more cooperation and partnerships from international organisations, UN agencies and INGOs, but also transfer of know-how and capacity building.

Another recurrent observation was that most international organisations focused on emergency relief activities (i.e. IDPs) whilst many civilian organisations, particularly in eastern Libya, were already engaged in the post-conflict process and in political debates (the future constitution, debate on the freedom of associations and media, on the role of civil society in the political transition, the empowerment of women, etc.). The presence of international organisations was seen by Libyan CSOs as an opportunity for learning and exchange on these issues. The emergency culture and background of the international aid workers deployed in eastern Libya were not fully in line with these expectations. This created a certain level of misunderstanding and mistrust. It also led some international actors to say that “we have missed the nature of the crisis; in the context a strict humanitarian response was not relevant”.

The Flash Appeal and needs assessments

The Regional Flash Appeal for the Libyan Crisis was launched at the beginning of March and was a rapid reaction to the situation in Libya, to the massive exodus of people into the neighbouring countries and to the huge dilemma posed by the situation of the TCNs. A revision was launched at the beginning of May, more focused on the needs in Libya and well covered by INGOs (19 INGOs participated in the revision; only 7 had participated in the initial appeal). After September, and as a conclusion to a confused process, a CHAP – a 90 day plan (October, November and December) - was launched to cover the residual humanitarian needs. From a quantitative point of view the appeal was considered to be a success. 82% of the requirements of the Revised Regional Flash Appeal from May were secured. However, the appeal process was subject to several criticisms.

If the initial Regional Appeal was launched rapidly after the start of the Libya Crisis, the preparation of the revision of the appeal and even more of the 90 days plan was much too slow according to most humanitarian actors. Humanitarian needs were largely anticipated by donors, which contributed to strengthen their role and influence in the strategic decisions and coordination system.

The preparation of the plan was reported to be a confused process. Not only INGOs but also several UN Agencies did not fully comprehend the objectives and the methodology of the exercise. The inter-cluster communication lacked clarity and was sometimes contradictory.

The HCT had a marginal role in preparing and endorsing the appeal and the 90 day plan. Two reasons were mentioned:

- The shortcomings in inter-cluster coordination prevented the HCT from effectively intervening at the end of the decision chain.
- The lack of interest from INGOs that had not provided input on the principle and concept of the appeal.

The fact that coordination agencies did not carry out comprehensive needs assessments and lacked presence on the ground contributed to a strategy that did not properly reflect the operational context. Donors also mentioned that the 90 day plan did not reflect the phasing out strategy, and did not distinguish between short term priorities (e.g. de-mining) and mid-term plans (food security).

The lack of comprehensive needs assessment was highlighted as problem that seriously affected both appeals and contingency planning. The reports on those inter-agency missions conducted in Tripoli before September were highly appreciated by the humanitarian community but the agenda was mainly political. The other inter-cluster UN-led needs assessment conducted in the Nafusa Mountains, eastern Libya and Misrata were considered by the majority of interviewees as too superficial, due mainly to the movement restrictions of UN staff. INGOs were heavily involved in assessing the needs but the lack of common standards and agreed methodology prevented the clusters getting a quick and meaningful result out of them (with the exception of the Health Cluster and De-mining Sub cluster whose members apply common methods as well as to an interagency shelter assessment, which was still ongoing at the time of writing). OCHA in August proposed an exercise aiming at rationalizing and standardizing cluster approaches, a move appreciated by many. However this came too late in order for it to become operational. Mapping appeared to be an efficient tool for supporting assessments and standardizing approaches. It could have been used more systematically. WFP had the idea to establish a mapping working group. It was not done in the end but could have been useful.

The clusters

The clusters and sub-clusters with the best output in terms of effective planning and coordination of operations were undoubtedly the small groups focused on a specific territory.

This was the case of the **Health Cluster**, which operated in parallel and without much interference from Zarzis for the Nafusa Mountains and from Benghazi for the eastern part of Libya. The cluster was characterized by an active INGO participation, including co-chairing meetings (MERLIN in Zarzis), with members used to working under the common standards. The meetings were co-chaired by the Health Committee of the NTC in Benghazi and later in Tripoli by the Ministry of Health, which participated in strengthening the accuracy of the coordination. Well-coordinated by WHO, the cluster succeeded in issuing a “Strategic paper in September and a “Vision paper” in November, defining also with the MoH a coherent and negotiated phasing out procedure.

This was also the case of the **De-mining Sub-Cluster**, led by UNMAS. The sub-cluster operated under the Protection cluster but –due to the specificity of its activities- had de facto autonomous status. By establishing

in March the Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT), which included all demining INGOs operating in Libya, the cluster succeeded in rapidly establishing an integrated and efficient way of working and of communicating (monthly newsletters). JMACT acted as a coordination unit but also provided efficient logistical support to the members and liaised with the military authorities that co-chaired the cluster meetings. The cluster also succeeded, with its members and thanks to a strong coordination with ICRC, in being present in most of the spots where mining was an issue. It is also to be mentioned that, through JMACT, the De-mining Sub-cluster was able as early as May to ensure a real presence and follow-up in Misrata.

The **Logistics Cluster** led by WFP played a key role in the Libyan Crisis, particularly before September when Eastern Libya as well as Misrata was difficult to reach. Establishing strong synergies amongst INGOs, UN agencies and donors, the cluster organised valuable sea and ground transportation services. The regular boat connection between Benghazi and Misrata proved to be essential for the international and national agencies operating in Misrata. The UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) operated a plane ensuring regular flights connecting Malta, Cairo, Tunisia and Benghazi. It was a key element of the international aid system in Libya. Beyond logistical support, the cluster participated in strengthening the cohesion and coordination of the Humanitarian agencies.

The **Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster** also had a dynamic profile. Led by WFP and FAO, the cluster deployed three local "hubs" in Cairo, Benghazi and Zarzis and made a serious attempt during the period to maintain, not without difficulties, a strong coordination between these centres (e.g. weekly teleconferences). Maybe more than other clusters, the Food Security cluster succeeded in including Libyan organisations in the planning and coordination of activities and also tried to operate in the pro-Gaddafi controlled areas. As part of the phasing-out strategy LIBAID became its main counterpart in Tripoli.

The **Protection Cluster** led by UNHCR was operational before September in both Zarzis and Benghazi, with Zarzis as the main decision-making centre. It was the most important cluster in terms of attendance. Protection was also a key issue and became even more crucial after August, when the humanitarian organisations had to address the situation of those communities accused of having supported Gaddafi's forces. Well-coordinated by UNHCR (despite a high turnover, at least at the beginning, and the lack in Benghazi of someone specifically in charge of coordination) the functioning of the cluster was subject to discussions:

- Cluster meetings were heavily focused on IDP and NFI issues. This is due to the fact that the Shelter/NFI cluster was not fully operational. It is also due to the fact that meetings in Benghazi were soon co-chaired by the LCHR (which later became LIBAID). With LCHR/LIBAID mandated by the NTC to coordinate the support to IDPs, the cluster meetings became de facto "IDP meetings". Protection issues were therefore mainly addressed in separate working groups (e.g. gender-based violence, education, child protection).
- Some stakeholders questioned the co-chairing (in Benghazi and later in Tripoli), of the Protection cluster by an organisation representing a belligerent, which -according to them- prevented the cluster being able to address sensitive protection issues. Others considered that LIBAID always kept a neutral and open position and had a valuable role of intermediary between the humanitarian community and the authorities.
- Finally, the restriction on movements of UNHCR staff before and after August was seen as a major constraint which limited the capacity of the cluster to rapidly and effectively assess and respond to protection issues. Protection is a sector where the role of the UN lead agency is considered to be more important (in terms of legitimacy and capacity for negotiating with the authorities) than in other sectors.

UNDP tried in August to activate in Benghazi an **Early Recovery working group**. This attempt failed due to diverging opinions and an unclear definition of the objectives of the working group. However, the first meetings initiated valuable discussions and brain storming on ways to include and support Libyan NGOs. Those INGOs that participated in these discussions considered that UNDP could have been more persistent in continuing the exercise. An early recovery approach made sense in Libya and could have better prepared the cluster to the post conflict period and also could have also contributed to better addressing cross-cutting issues.

General Coordination Meetings

The general coordination meetings were appreciated by humanitarian stakeholders but as a place to meet people rather than for their operational or informative value. Some stakeholders regretted that the general coordination meetings were losing importance and substance due to the numerous cluster meetings and working groups (low attendance, passivity of the participants). They suggested short, focused general coordination meetings, as a way "to start the week" and to address cross-cutting issues which may not have been properly discussed within the sectoral meetings.

Phasing-out

Clusters were de-activated in November/December and replaced by working groups which continued to be chaired or supported by the lead agencies. Ministries from the new transitional government have continued participating in the working groups or chairing them (e.g. MoH for the health working groups). LIBAID, supported by WFP and the HC office, took over the coordination of activities related to IDPs and food security which has led to a better integration of international and national organisations. However, strong capacity building for national stakeholders was required and not effectively provided. Many international stakeholders consider the phasing out of the clusters to have been premature with regards to the capacity of the national counterpart in ensuring the coordination (human resources, know-how). On the other hand, although residual humanitarian needs and sensitive protection issues remain and require the presence of international stakeholders, they do not justify maintaining the HCT and the heavy cluster machinery.

Room for improvement

Shortcomings in inter-cluster or inter-agency coordination was a problem which affected the preparation of the flash appeal and CHAP, the relevance of the contingency planning exercises and, as already mentioned, the functioning of the HCT.

There was a lack of a clear and coherent definition of the role and geographic coverage of each coordination centre or hub, as well as an efficient communication system between the different centres. When the centres are located in different countries, as was the case for the Libyan crisis, a global, coherent strategy is even more necessary.

With exception of the De-mining Sub-Cluster and the Logistics Cluster, the humanitarian needs and operations in Misrata were not sufficiently integrated into the cluster coordination system. More structured mechanisms are to be defined for supporting the coordination of those INGOs operating in areas where cluster lead agencies are not present and for linking these ad hoc coordination bodies with the clusters. The way they integrate into humanitarian coordination structures should be clarified.

Turnover of the staff in charge of cluster coordination should be avoided.

The practice of 'double-hatting' where the cluster coordination structure proposed by the lead agency also has operational and fundraising duties is seen by most INGOs as a conflict of interest. The specific agenda and fund raising policy of the agency can interfere with the coordination tasks, which creates unbalanced and biased relations within the clusters.

The lack of relevant contingency planning (involving equally UN agencies and INGOs and endorsed by the HCT) was a weak aspect of the coordination set-up and appeared to be particularly problematic after August, although the evolution of the crisis was relatively predictable.

Field and needs assessments are a key element of the coordination system. Efforts need to be made - from the very beginning of the deployment of the clusters - to define and standardise assessment tools and methods. The cooperation between UN agencies and INGOs in planning, conducting and processing the needs assessments must be defined and systematized. Mapping could also be more systematically foreseen and used as a tool for improving assessment methods.

INGO staff should be better prepared for participating in the cluster meetings. Crash courses for INGO staff, as suggested by UNHCR in Benghazi, could also be a good option. Participation in the cluster meetings should be included in the job description of the INGO staff and be compatible with their operational task.

An Early Recovery approach made sense in Libya. A cluster -strongly connected to Libyan stakeholders- should have been established in Benghazi from the beginning of the humanitarian deployment.

The phasing out process should have been better accompanied by extensive capacity building for Libyan stakeholders. Capacity building was, in general, from the outset of the humanitarian presence in Libya, a major request of Libyan stakeholders (authorities and CSOs). The response by clusters, UN agencies and INGOs to this responsibility was weak.

6. Conclusion

Humanitarian Reform coordination structures for the Libyan Crisis were deployed in a complex environment and had to overcome major constraints: the regional dimension of the crisis; the necessity to adapt to a volatile political and military context where the situation and corresponding humanitarian needs were fluid and rapidly changing; localised humanitarian operations disconnected from one another until August and subsequently spread over a large territory.

The impressive mobilisation of Libyan society and its capacity to respond efficiently to humanitarian needs had a decisive impact on the effect of the crisis but was also a challenge for the coordination system: how to include the Libyan stakeholders in the coordination framework or how to complement them without overlapping or competing?

In this difficult context and despite weaknesses and mistakes - easy to criticize but hard to avoid- the coordination has proved to be successful in enhancing the cohesion of international humanitarian actors (UN agencies, INGOs and donors) and humanitarian operations. What was achieved in Libya was, on the whole, implemented within a single operational framework and under jointly agreed principles and methods.

One of the main lessons to be drawn from the Libyan crisis is related to the difficulty of the humanitarian system to establish an efficient coordination system and operational framework in a country with no previous UN set-up. The use of surge staff by most lead (and cluster member) agencies resulted in a very high turn-over, which has affected the coherency and continuity of the strategies and operations.

With regards to the pillars and main elements of the Humanitarian Reform, the following remarks can be drawn from the Libya experience:

- **Improved humanitarian leadership**

Efforts need to be made to empower the HCT, which in Libya was still some way off being a truly strategic decision making body. The quality and regularity of the participation of INGO members of the HCT also needs to be improved as well as their accountability to other INGOs and key National NGOs. A certain level of formalism (in terms of membership and procedures) must also be preserved in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the HCT.

The leadership of the HC and its mandate to represent the whole humanitarian community has not been challenged and was largely recognised by the INGOs. However, a more regular and pragmatic communication with the ground actors needs to be established in order to strengthen its credibility and leadership.

The cluster coordinator has a key role in ensuring the quality of the debates and of the outputs of the clusters. In most cases, the work of the cluster coordinator has been recognised and appreciated by the aid community. However efforts need to be made in order to decrease staff turn-over, which was definitely a major weakness of the cluster, and to clarify the role of the coordinator in regard to the overall management and fund raising policy of the Lead Agency.

- **Better coordination of humanitarian action**

Rapidly established, the clusters undoubtedly succeeded in ensuring the cohesion of the actors and in building for each sector a common operational framework. Weaknesses can be mentioned but not failure.

What undoubtedly needs to be improved, so as preserve the overall cohesion and efficiency of humanitarian operations and contingency planning, is inter-cluster or inter-agency coordination. The mediation between the clusters and the HCT/HC, a level where information is synthesized and prioritised, was certainly a significant shortcoming of the Libyan Crisis.

- **Faster, more predictable and equitable humanitarian funding**

The Regional Flash Appeal was rapidly launched and reflected the priorities (e.g. migrants and TCNs) as well as the response capacity of the UN agencies, IO and INGOs (few of them were operational at the time of launching the appeal). However, the revision of the appeal and, later, the preparation of the 90 day plan (CHAP), were considered too slow and confused by most humanitarian actors. The content and relevancy of the revised appeal and of the CHAP were also questioned. Various elements of the process are certainly to be improved: quality of the needs assessments, relevancy of the contingency plans, effective participation of the INGOs, inter-cluster coordination and prioritizing of the needs, role of the HCT and OCHA's communication on the preparation process.

- **More effective partnership among humanitarian actors**

Clusters clearly facilitated communication between humanitarian actors and the establishment of formal partnerships (INGOs/ UN agencies particularly). Informal synergies were also extremely strong and efficient (for example between WFP and INGOs for the management of the boat between Benghazi and Misrata).

Operational partnerships with national organisations (e.g. LRCS and Libyan Boy scouts) have also been successfully established.

However, the financial relationships between lead agencies and INGOs biased the functioning of the clusters. Participation in cluster meetings and other coordination mechanisms was viewed by many INGOs as an opportunity for lobbying and fund raising. This bias is even stronger when donors take an active part in the meetings. Significantly, this aspect of the meetings was given by some national NGOs as a reason not to participate ("it is not for us").

- **Accountability to affected population**

This element of the Humanitarian reform process is difficult to evaluate, particularly because Libyan stakeholders acting outside the coordination framework played a key role in organising and delivering humanitarian aid and social basic services to affected populations. Humanitarian needs were also geographically localised and evolving rapidly. In this context, some humanitarian aid workers reported an impression of "having chased beneficiaries".

Accountability was very positive in the case of the migrants and TCNs. The support to this population and their evacuation was remarkably well organised by IOM/UNHCR (supported by Libyan and international humanitarian actors) and remains for many international and Libyan observers the best achievements of the international humanitarian intervention. It is more questionable in the case of Misrata under siege and later for the populations of Sirte and Ben Walid as well as for Tawargans.

- **Role of national and local actors**

As already mentioned, the role of the local actors and their inclusion in the coordination was a key issue during the Libyan crisis.

On the one hand, the coordination system succeeded in involving the key Libyan partners (NTC committees, LIBAID, LRCS, the Libyan Boy Scouts) in the debates as well as in joint humanitarian operations. Most of the cluster meetings in Benghazi and later in Tripoli were attended or co-chaired by Libyan actors.

On the other hand, clusters and international humanitarian organisations only managed to liaise, support or cooperate with the numerous charities and associations (which emerged spontaneously after February in eastern Libya and later in all Libya) on a limited basis. The international system and these national actors were working in parallel and did not interact very much. An Early Recovery approach initiated at the beginning of the humanitarian deployment could have facilitated this cooperation.

7. Recommendations

By the end of December, the Libyan humanitarian reform coordination structures were completing the phasing out process. Sectoral working groups continued to meet but the clusters were de-activated and OCHA closed its offices in Tripoli and Benghazi. Recommendations are therefore not applicable to Libya but should be considered as “lessons learnt” for further humanitarian deployments in a similar context.

Recommendation 1

Ensure regular and meaningful communication and interactions between the HC and clusters at both central level and at field-based operational hubs.

The presence of the HC is decisive for the overall coherence of the coordination system. In a volatile and rapidly evolving context, there is a need to regularly reframe approaches and strategies; ground actors need to be involved and well informed. It is important also for the HC to understand the constraints faced by the ground actors and their opinion on the efficiency and weaknesses of the coordination system.

Recommendation 2

The role of the HCT and HCT members needs to be clarified, formalized and strengthened:

- Clarification of the HCT's role (advisory role or decision-making) and of the decision-making mechanisms (e.g. regarding flash appeals, contingency plans, decisions on the activation and phasing out of the clusters, etc.).
- Ensuring a good preparation for meetings (agenda and support documents) and quality of minutes and follow up.
- Improving the participation of INGO members of the HCT in the meetings: senior representation, regularity and consistency of in participation, accountability to the other INGOs (and key national NGOs). The participation in the HCT is a responsibility and an additional and significant work load. It needs to be taken into account when applying for membership.

Recommendation 3

Communication on security issues between UN and NGOs should be enhanced. Mechanisms for sharing (relevant) UN security information with INGOs need to be defined, and the framework of SLT should be adhered to.

Security constraints must be discussed at the beginning of the intervention (within the HCT and the clusters) and strategies must be adapted accordingly.

When INGOs are taking over coordination tasks in places where OCHA cannot be present for security reasons (as was the case in Misrata), clear mechanisms for supporting INGOs and ensuring the inclusion of INGO coordination in the general coordination framework must be defined. Donors must be involved in the discussion.

The role of the HC in endorsing or influencing security rules should be clarified.

A clear communication on security issues is important on an operational point of view but also for avoiding misunderstanding and mistrust between UN agencies, INGOs and donors. The principles of the Saving Life Together (SLT) framework must be better explained and applied. It is certainly a key point for the cohesion of the overall coordination system.

INGOs and UN agencies can (and do) complement each other. However, INGOs do not have the mandate, the legitimacy and often the means to replace UN security structures. This has to be taken into account.

Recommendation 4

Humanitarian reform structures should ensure that all key actors and donors (Arab States from Persian Gulf, Islamic associations, etc.) are involved in the coordination set-up. Communication should be established and mechanisms should be defined for a better inclusion of these key players.

Recommendation 5

When the clusters are deployed in different locations, and even more, when they are deployed in different countries, there is a need to clearly define their respective role (in the strategic decision making, in liaising with national authorities) and geographical coverage. It is also essential to ensure good communication and coordination between the centres.

Confronted with different contexts and establishing different types of relations with local counterparts, coordination centers or hubs develop different -and possibly contradictory- analyses of the situation and of humanitarian priorities. Weak communication has a negative impact on the coherency of overall strategies and generates frustrations and misunderstandings.

Recommendation 6

The functioning and quality of the participation of humanitarian actors in the cluster meetings should be improved and regularly monitored. Particularly:

- The role of the cluster coordinator should be clearly defined and result-oriented ToRs should be made available.
- Cluster coordinators must be fully dedicated to coordination tasks and must have the necessary skills (including facilitation and mobilisation). Excessive turnover of the cluster coordinators should be avoided.
- The specific agenda and fund raising policy of cluster lead agencies should not interfere with functions related to coordination of the cluster. The roles - within the Lead agency - of the Head of office and of the cluster coordinator need to be clarified and differentiated.
- INGOs should strengthen their participation in clusters by preparing and briefing their staff on the objectives and methods of the cluster system. Crash courses on the spot (e.g. organized by OCHA, a lead agency or an IASC member), involving key INGOs and national NGOs could also be usefully delivered.
- Cluster meetings should not be limited to being information platforms. Key issues for action must be included in the agenda and discussed collectively.

Recommendation 7

Extensive efforts should be made to ensure an optimal inter-cluster coordination in view of:

- Improving the content and speeding up the preparation and revision of the flash appeals and CHAP.
- Accelerating the preparation and improving the relevance of contingency plans; better defining their priorities.
- Facilitating the discussions and decision-making of the HCT/HC by providing synthetic analysis and data.

Recommendation 8

A needs assessment strategy and standardized methods for collecting and processing information should be defined at the beginning of the humanitarian deployment and within each cluster. If needed, specific working groups on needs assessments could be organized for the humanitarian stakeholders. The use of mapping services should be systematized and included in the assessment strategy.

Analysis and subsequent adoption of strategies during the Libyan crisis were often based on secondary information.

Recommendation 9

In a middle-income country like Libya, an Early Recovery approach must be initiated at the very beginning of the humanitarian intervention.

In most of the eastern part of Libya, the situation normalized soon after the first NATO air strikes. Many local organisations were engaged in post-conflict projects whilst international organisations were almost exclusively focusing on humanitarian needs.

Recommendation 10

In a context such as that of Libya, there is a need to improve cooperation with local actors and to address cross-cutting issues.

A framework needs to be defined for encouraging and improving the partnerships and cooperation between international and national actors, particularly in a context such as the Middle East and North Africa where CSOs play a key role in the political transition. A strict humanitarian approach – responding to the needs without taking into account the capacity of local actors- is arguably not relevant. Supporting the participation of national stakeholders in the coordination system should be a cross-cutting issue for all clusters.

- Capacity building of local stakeholders must be included in the strategies from the beginning of the humanitarian intervention.
- Mechanisms for establishing operational partnerships with national CSOs, including funding mechanisms, need to be identified.
- Where possible, humanitarian organisations should have staff, with the necessary skills, dedicated to cooperating with local organisations and providing capacity building and technical support to local organisations.

Strengthening dialogue and cooperation with local organisations is also a key way **to address cross-cutting issues** (which are hardly taken into account within a strict humanitarian approach).

Recommendation 11

The decision-making procedures for de-activating the clusters should be clarified and made more transparent. Strong capacity building and (long term) technical support should be delivered to those national bodies taking over the coordination tasks.

Annex 1

Documents related to the humanitarian response in Libya consulted for the case study (selection):

- ECHO crisis reports, February-November 2011
- FAO, Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster, Libya Crisis, April – November 2011 (Final Report)
- JMACT Libya, Newsletters (May-December 2011)
- HCT Libya, Minutes of the HCT Meetings (April-November 2011)
- Inter-Agency Coordination Misrata, Minutes of the meetings (June-November 2011)
- IOM, Humanitarian Emergency Response to the Libyan Crisis, Seven months Report on IOM mission, September 2011
- Minutes on the cluster meetings (Cairo, Benghazi, Zarzis), <http://libya.humanitarianresponse.info>
- Misrata Interagency hub security updates (June-September 2011)
- OCHA, Situation reports (February – December 2011), <http://libya.humanitarianresponse.info>
- OCHA, Survey of Surveys, Coordinated Needs Assessments Libya, <http://libya.humanitarianresponse.info/>
- United Nations, regional Flash Appeal for the Libyan Crisis, 5 March 2011
- United Nations, Regional Flash Appeal for the Libyan Crisis-Revision, 18 May 2011
- United Nations Security and Humanitarian Access Mission, Wazin – Nalut – Jadu – Zintan, 30 June and 1 July 2011
- WFP, FAO, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA), eastern Libya

The NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project II

A chance to influence the humanitarian system

