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DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE**

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**HUMANITARIAN AID IN DAC PEER REVIEWS**

**A COMPILATION OF COVERAGE 2004-05**

**17 January 2006**

*This document compiles the coverage of humanitarian aid in DAC Peer Reviews since the introduction of the Assessment Framework for Coverage of Humanitarian Action in 2004. It is a compilation of DAC main findings and recommendations regarding humanitarian aid and the humanitarian aid coverage in the Secretariat reports. It includes the following Peer Reviews:*

*2004 - Norway and Australia*

*2005 - Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany*

*This document is distributed for INFORMATION, and should be looked at together with DCD/DAC(2006)3, Humanitarian Aid in DAC Peer Reviews : a Synthesis of Findings and Experience 2004-05.*

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## HUMANITARIAN AID IN DAC PEER REVIEWS 2004-05

1. The purpose of this document is to provide an accessible and comparable compilation of the coverage of humanitarian aid in DAC Peer Reviews 2004-05. In 2004 the DAC agreed to take an “active role” in pursuing the *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD) and to give particular attention to humanitarian aid by applying a GHD Assessment Framework in all DAC Peer Reviews.<sup>1</sup> Members’ agreed that humanitarian action constitutes a distinct dimension of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and that a methodical inclusion of humanitarian action in the Peer Reviews would contribute to a more complete overview of all dimensions of a DAC member’s ODA. To determine the usefulness of Peer Reviews in promoting GHD, a synthesis report summarising findings and experiences from the reviews included in this document will be presented to the Committee at its meeting in January 2006 (DCD/DAC[2006]3).

2. DAC Peer Reviews support three main objectives: monitoring and assessment of members’ policies and programmes to assess effectiveness and results; identification of best practice; and, mutual learning from shared experience and improved co-ordination. These objectives are of equal relevance to promote GHD as they are to improve development aid effectiveness. To date six Peer Reviews including GHD coverage have been completed: Norway, Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany).<sup>2</sup>

Reviewed country	Date	Examiners	Field missions including Humanitarian aid assessments
Norway	Nov. 2004	Spain and Japan	---
Australia	Dec. 2004	Ireland & United Kingdom	Cambodia
Sweden	May 2005	Australia and Belgium	Burundi
Switzerland	June 2005	Norway and New Zealand	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Belgium	Oct. 2005	Austria and Portugal	DRC
Germany	Dec. 2005	France and Netherlands	Ethiopia

3. The Peer Review is formally carried out by an examining team composed of representatives of two DAC members (“Examiners”) and the DAC Secretariat. To facilitate coverage of GHD in the Peer reviews, the Secretariat has included a humanitarian advisor in the Peer Review team with the special responsibility for the assessment of humanitarian action. A visit to the donor capital constitutes the main fact finding mission of the Review Team and specific sessions on humanitarian aid were organised for in-depth discussions. Field visits including humanitarian assessment have also been included in most of the reviews.

4. The major written product of the Peer Review is the two-part documentation prepared by the Secretariat in consultation with the Examiners. In chronological order, “*Secretariat Report*” is produced first and provides the overall findings, facts and analysis of the examining team. Based on this report a shorter document entitled “*DAC Draft Main Findings and Recommendations*” summarises the main findings and recommendations of the DAC. In the first two Peer Reviews covering GHD (Norway and

<sup>1</sup> See Annex B or OECD document identifier DIR(2004)11

<sup>2</sup> DAC Peer Reviews are available at [www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac).

Australia), humanitarian issues were integrated in the Secretariat report. Subsequently, it was decided to present humanitarian aid material in an Annex of the Secretariat report. The annexes are structured as the Peer Review report, covering six areas: (1) policies and principles; (2) volume and distribution; (3) crosscutting and emerging issues; (4) policy coherence; (5) organisation and management; and (6) country operations. In both approaches humanitarian aid was included as a separate item in the DAC's Main Findings and Recommendations.

5. This document presents the full texts of the six reviews in chronological order. It starts by providing the DAC main findings and recommendations followed by the humanitarian aid content of the secretariat report. It should be noted that in the cases of Norway and Australia, the relevant texts have been compiled from the main report as no Annex was made in these two cases: although the order of paragraphs have been changed the texts are the same as in the original report. Two annexes are included: The Principles and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship (Annex A); The Assessment Framework for Humanitarian Aid coverage in DAC Peer Reviews (Annex B).

## NORWAY<sup>3</sup>

### The DAC's Main Findings and Recommendations

6. Norway takes a leading role on humanitarian donorship and is a major contributor to the multilateral agencies through the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. The UN, international organisations and NGOs view Norway as a provider of timely and flexible funding. Norway's experiences with humanitarian action and involvement in peace processes have helped reinforce the relationship between peace and development and emphasized the need for a systematic approach to transitional assistance and peace-building. A special budget line to fill the financing gap during transitions has been established as a result. A strategic framework for peace-building within development co-operation has also been launched.

7. There is no comprehensive policy document explaining Norway's humanitarian policies other than the annual budget proposition to the Storting. This makes it more difficult to assess how Norway sets priorities and ensures that its support for humanitarian action adheres to the fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence in situations where conflicting objectives may be perceived.

8. Management structures and procedures involved in administering humanitarian action continue to be complex, placing high demand on efficient co-ordination. As for many donors, the administration of Norwegian humanitarian and transitional assistance poses particular challenges to optimize intra- and inter-ministerial co-ordination to ensure effectiveness and consistency.

9. Humanitarian needs assessments are being improved at the international level to better inform decision makers on funding requirements for humanitarian action. This work in progress will enable donors to ensure funding will be provided according to need and to give a more objective basis for decision-making. Beneficiaries' involvement in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response needs to be more adequately addressed globally and better reflected in donors' policies and procedures. Increased civil and military co-operation in Iraq and Afghanistan raises major concerns for all involved regarding impartiality, effectiveness and security. This must not compromise humanitarian objectives and principles and reduce the capacity to deliver an effective humanitarian response.

10. One finding from the Peer Review of Norway confirms that the lack of relevant DAC data makes it difficult to monitor donor performance in humanitarian action. The absence of a common definition of humanitarian action and vague reporting formats constitute a challenge for harmonised donor practices and improved efficiency.

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<sup>3</sup> In the Peer Review of Norway the relevant texts has been compiled from the main report as no Annex was made, although the order of paragraphs have been changed the texts are the same as in the original report.

### *Recommendations*

- The government could consider elaborating a comprehensive policy document for humanitarian action, including actions in response to natural disasters (especially in relation to prevention and preparedness), to ensure consistency with the endorsed principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship. The policy document should also address issues related to beneficiaries' involvement.
- Norway must ensure intra- and inter-ministerial co-operation to optimise its humanitarian response and decision-making for funding humanitarian action.
- Norway could strengthen its procedures to ensure that the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies are respected. Given the fact that there is no good practice in the complex field of civil and military co-operation, Norway is well placed to take an active role in addressing these questions in international fora.
- To improve the financial tracking of global humanitarian action, Norway could engage in initiatives to improve accuracy and timeliness in donor reporting on humanitarian action.

### **Secretariat Report**

#### ***Norway's support to humanitarian action***

11. As one of the largest international donors firmly committed to multilateral co-operation, Norway has a long tradition of involvement in humanitarian action and conflict resolution. It has played an important and constructive role in support of peace negotiations and transitions, *i.e.* in Colombia, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, the Middle East and Sudan.

12. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the management, policy development and administration of humanitarian action before, during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters. Emergency and distress relief account for more than 13% of Norway's ODA. This indicates the importance given to humanitarian issues in Norway's foreign policy.

13. Norway has become one of the major donors in financing humanitarian action: disbursements for emergency and distress relief have increased by 300% over the last ten years, from USD 113.21 million in 1993 to USD 304 million 2003 (17% of gross disbursements).<sup>4</sup> According to Norwegian statistics another USD 53 million were disbursed as transitional support to countries emerging from conflict and/or natural disasters.

14. Since 1994 and in accordance with the DAC reporting directives, Norway includes expenditures for assistance to refugees in their first twelve months of stay in a developed country. In 2003, these amounted to 50% of Norway's reported emergency and distress relief.

15. Policies on allocation between multilateral and bilateral channels are not spelled out but Norway is a great supporter of the multilaterals, aiming at a 50/50 divide between bilateral and multilateral channels. Norway is a large contributor to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals (CAP) and

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4. DAC data do not have a statistical category for humanitarian action. In DAC reporting directives the term "*Emergency and distress relief*" includes emergency assistance, relief food aid and other emergency and distress relief.

the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Appeals. In 2003, it was the largest donor to the CAP measured by contributions as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the fifth largest donor measured by contributions in dollars (UN, 2004).

16. Notwithstanding the importance given to humanitarian issues, the objectives of Norway's support to humanitarian action are not found in any comprehensive policy document or strategy other than the annual budget proposition to the Storting. A valid representation of humanitarian policies is difficult to access since the *Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance*, presented in 1999, has not yet been adopted nor confirmed by the present Government, in office since 2001.<sup>5</sup>

17. In its approach to actions identified in relation to armed conflicts, the MFA refers to a concept of "humanitarian affairs" including "humanitarian assistance" and "conflict resolution". This classification is reflected in the organisational structure within the ministry. The Department for Global Affairs is responsible for humanitarian action in response to armed conflicts and natural disasters. The management and support for transitional assistance is managed by the Regional Department, and peace-building policy is placed within the International Development Policy Department as part of the portfolio of the Minister for International Development (see Chapter 5).

18. In the absence of an official and comprehensive presentation of the current government's humanitarian assistance policy, Norway refers to the priorities described in the annual budget proposals to the Storting. To manage humanitarian action in complex emergencies, the Department for Global Affairs drafts an internal document at the beginning of the budget year based on the annual budget. This document broadly outlines how the humanitarian assistance budget will be allocated during the year, including geographic, thematic and organizational priorities. The document gives general guidance to the Section for Humanitarian Affairs for further allocation of funds and is presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for comments and final approval. It is subject to continuous internal reviews as well as more general mid-term reviews.

19. Norway has endorsed the *1994 Yokohama Strategy*<sup>6</sup> and is an active participant in the preparation of the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction. It is also a major contributor to International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and a member of *ProVention*, a multi-stakeholder consortium for the prevention of natural disasters. Support for actions in relation to natural disasters is funded through a separate budget line under the responsibility of the Ministry of International Development and managed through the humanitarian structures. The management functions and approaches to prevention and mitigation, such as the use of local capacities in response to natural disasters, could be developed further.

20. The nature of humanitarian action places special demands on budgetary systems and governments use different methods to ensure an appropriate response. These include annual allocations of ODA for multilateral, bilateral and NGO funding; reallocations of bilateral ODA; special institutional arrangements, including rapid response funds and special budgetary transition arrangements. Norway could consider making budgetary allocations for humanitarian action more transparent and sharing its experience in managing a large and complex humanitarian programme.

21. The absence of a strategy or policy document makes it more difficult to assess how Norway sets priorities and ensures that its support for humanitarian action adheres to the fundamental principles of

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5. This information was provided to the Secretariat by the MFA on 10 September 2004.

6. Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World: *Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation*, in particular its Plan of Action, adopted on 27 May 1994 by the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction.

humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence in situations where conflicting objectives may be perceived.

22. In 2003 Norway endorsed the *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD). Although most of these are not new to Norway, they could provide a relevant point of departure for developing a new strategy for supporting humanitarian action which should recognise and respect the specific objectives and role of humanitarian action.

*Norway: a good humanitarian donor*

23. Although Norway's principles for financing humanitarian action are not spelled out, principles for funding remain solid. Funding levels are quite stable, but longer term funding arrangements are in reality limited and subject to parliamentary approval. Financing decisions usually relate to available needs assessments through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the CAP, in combination with the MFA's internal assessments and NGO applications. The DAC mission noticed from its briefings with MFA staff that an unspecified connection to "where a Norwegian contribution can make a difference" is often added which can include areas of specific interest, i.e. a potential role in mediation.

24. NGOs, international organisations and the UN view Norway as a provider of timely and flexible funding. However, it is unclear how Norway ensures that funding of humanitarian action directed to high profile crises does not adversely affect meeting the needs related to ongoing "forgotten" crises.

25. There is little evidence of how Norway ensures adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response. Norway mainly depends on its implementing partners to provide needs assessments when applying for humanitarian funds and encourages them to involve the beneficiaries in the projects. Such "empowerment" policies may also include making the funding of Norwegian NGO projects dependent on co-operation with local NGOs when feasible. The government could elaborate further on measures to ensure beneficiaries' involvement.

26. To further strengthen Norwegian capacities to respond to emergencies, the MFA established the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) in 1991 in close co-operation with Norwegian humanitarian NGOs, the Norwegian Export Council and Norwegian suppliers of relief items. The purpose of NOREPS is to offer relief products, service packages and personnel in emergencies. Support teams were also established in co-operation with the UN, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the Danish Emergency Management Agency, the Finnish Rescue Department and the British Department for International Development. They are used to provide services to humanitarian actors, including the UN, and can co-ordinate relief activities and conduct emergency assessments.

27. Norwegian practices point toward recognizing and supporting the role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action. Norway has long been a strong supporter of the UN's coordination efforts, including those of OCHA and the Consolidated Appeals Process. It is a member of the OCHA Donor Support Group and one of the co-organizers of the main donor coordination initiatives, the Montreux Process.<sup>7</sup> In addition to its annual "core" contribution to OCHA (NOK 30 million in 2004), it is contributing to OCHA's coordination efforts in specific emergency situations through the CAP and Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP). Norway is also an important partner to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation

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7. Since 2000, donor representatives, UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs have met in Montreux to discuss humanitarian policy development and donor coordination.

of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The role and mandate of the ICRC/IFRC are also well recognised and respected by Norway.

28. Norway is also an active member of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP).<sup>8</sup>

### ***Emerging issues***

29. Norway recognizes the primary position of civilian organizations in implementing humanitarian action. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, it strives to ensure that such use conforms to IHL and humanitarian principles and recognizes the leading role of humanitarian organizations. Norway was an active participant in the drawing up of the *Guidelines for the use of military and civil defence assets in natural disasters and man-made disasters*, (MCDA). It has also established contacts with OCHA concerning possible co-operation on training and awareness-raising measures. These concern practical civil-military interaction in conflict areas based on the MCDA guidelines and the June 2004 Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) reference paper on civil-military relations.

30. Norwegian NGOs have criticized the government for using humanitarian funds for contractors operating under a military mandate, with particular reference to the Norwegian presence and policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. In these two situations regular Norwegian military personnel have been engaged in humanitarian action. Norwegian military have been involved in civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) activities in Afghanistan. In Iraq, they have been used for meeting humanitarian needs in the absence of civilian humanitarian actors. Norway has also contributed observers in Sudan and Sri Lanka. These, however, are not part of an armed military force.

31. Learning from the context of Iraq and Afghanistan, the MFA initiated a dialogue with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to raise awareness of the dilemmas involved in relation to the interface between civilian/humanitarian and military action in armed areas. The MFA and the MoD have initiated a dialogue with major Norwegian humanitarian NGOs and international organizations, such as the ICRC, on these issues. There is also co-operation between the MoD, the MFA and the Norwegian Red Cross on training military forces in International Humanitarian Law. There is general agreement that Norwegian military peace contingents should have as their primary task the creation of a stable security environment to allow for civilian humanitarian action, reconstruction and development. However, the MFA also argues that in situations of extreme insecurity, military forces may be the only actor able to reach vulnerable groups with life-saving aid, adding that such provision of humanitarian assistance should be exceptional and limited in time.

32. Civil and military co-operation in humanitarian action raises a major dilemma regarding impartiality, effectiveness and security. One issue in this context is that of creating and maintaining "humanitarian space".<sup>9</sup> It can be argued that merging humanitarian action with political/military roles is inevitable and constructive. On the other hand, there is a danger of bringing political, military and humanitarian objectives within the same framework. This could compromise humanitarian objectives and principles and reduce the capacity to deliver an effective humanitarian response. It can also be argued that these issues need to be approached on a case by case basis and in relation to the specific context of an

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8. ALNAP, established in 1997, is an international interagency forum working to improve learning accountability and quality across the humanitarian sector. It has 51 full members and 370 observers.

9. "Humanitarian space" refers to a necessary state of security in which humanitarian agencies are able to conduct humanitarian action.

emergency (Barry, J. and A. Jefferys, 2002). There are no recognised good practices in this field. With its experience and practice of humanitarian assistance in situations of armed conflicts, Norway is well placed to take an active role in addressing these questions in a constructive way.

### *Learning from experience*

33. Norway's broad experience in financing humanitarian action includes interesting approaches, for instance in bridging the transition from humanitarian action to development programming and addressing the relationship between humanitarian action and conflict management. It could provide useful references for learning and identify good practices that could be shared with the DAC.

### *The relationship between humanitarian assistance and development co-operation*

34. Norway's approach to humanitarian action and peace-building also recognises problems related to shortfalls and a possible vacuum of funds during transitions from conflict to peace. Although in general the MFA rejects a linear approach to phases of complex emergencies, it has developed an innovative system for addressing objectives related to the return to sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to development. In 2002, a new budget line for transitional support (GAP fund) was introduced to cover assistance to countries and areas recovering from conflict and natural disasters against the background of difficulties in finding resources for this type of co-operation. Spending on transitional assistance totalled USD 42.3 million that year, with Afghanistan as the major recipient (USD 11.3 million), followed by the Democratic republic of Congo (USD 5.2 million) and Sudan (USD 5.1 million). Other recipients were Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Guatemala, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sri Lanka (MFA, 2003a).<sup>10</sup> Such initiatives can be crucial to reinforce political agreements and facilitate development co-operation programming.

35. The transitional budget line represents a positive approach to fill the gaps between humanitarian assistance and long term development co-operation and could also contribute to peace-building activities. Following the recent reorganization of the aid administration a number of country "team groups" were established, involving the relevant departments within the Ministry and NORAD for the co-ordination. However, the effectiveness of the co-ordination between the various departments within MFA as concerns the management of the fund remains unclear (see Chapter 5).

36. Norway's experiences with humanitarian action and involvement in peace processes have helped reinforce the relationship between peace and development and emphasize the need for a systematic approach to transitional assistance and peace-building.

### *A new strategic framework for peace-building*

37. In 2002, together with the original members of the Utstein group (Netherlands, Germany, UK and Norway), Norway launched a process to identify good practices for peace-building activities. Surveys were conducted to produce relevant policy recommendations. In the case of Norway, the survey covered activities financed between 1997 and 2001 in nine countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Guatemala, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Sudan). The findings were summarised in two evaluation reports (MFA, 2004g). In 2004, the MFA presented its new Strategic Framework for Peace-Building from a development perspective (see Box 1).

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10. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003a), *St.prp.nr 1 (2003-2004)*, GAN, Oslo, pp. 149-150.

### Box 1. Norway's new strategic framework for peace-building

The strategic framework identifies the objective of peace-building as "lasting and sustainable peace" and underlines the recognition that peace and security are basic preconditions for development. It largely follows the *DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* and groups the instruments for peace-building into three dimensions: Security; political development; and social and economic development. The strategy emphasizes that peace-building should encompass all three dimensions at the same time. A sequential approach is not usually recommended.

The three dimensions identify the following components or areas of support:

1. *Security*: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including child soldiers; humanitarian mine-action; control of small arms and light weapons and security system reform.
2. *Political Development*: Political and administrative authorities and structures, reconciliation, good governance, democracy and human rights; civil society and the media; judicial processes and truth commissions.
3. *Social and Economic Development*: Repatriation and integration of refugees and internally displaced persons; reconstruction of infrastructure and key public functions; social development (education and health); economic development (private sector development, employment, trade and investment).

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway (2004), Strategic Framework. Peace-building – a Development Perspective.

38. The strategic framework for peace-building identifies areas of special relevance in developing good donor practices. The role of multilateral organisations is emphasised along with co-ordination, harmonisation and national ownership. Women and children are given special attention and gender is considered a key dimension in conflict analysis, needs assessments and in the planning, execution and follow up of programmes. The framework notes that women remain underrepresented in most peace processes and negotiations and excluded from active participation in most peace-building activities. In this regard Norway intends to develop a plan for follow-up to the Security Council Resolution on Women Peace and Security.<sup>11</sup> Similar recognition is given to children's needs and rights.

39. A study commissioned by the MFA and published in advance of the strategy focuses on Norway's role in the field of security sector reform (Tjonneland, Elling N., 2003). Rather than calling for major changes the author recommends sharpening the focus on a few components of the security sector (e.g. policing and judicial reform) to improve the effectiveness of Norwegian assistance. The importance of maintaining a high level of support to multilateral and regional organisations is highlighted. Finally the author advocates focusing Norwegian bilateral assistance on governance and oversight of the security sector reform and identifying areas of comparative advantages.

40. In focusing bilateral assistance there is, nonetheless, a clear need for co-ordination with other donors engaged in security system reform. While this can be improved by working with, or through, multi-lateral organisations, there is a general tendency among donors to focus on issues relating to oversight and accountability of the police and judicial system. This can often be done to the detriment of other reform requirements, such as structural, procedural or management reforms. The experience of external actors, including Norway, in the Balkans illustrates the need to take a system-wide approach to security sector

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11. United Nation Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on *Women, Peace and Security*, adopted by the Security Council at its 4213<sup>th</sup> meeting, 31 October 2000.

reform. Norway's recent experience with the national police could be used to apply lessons learned to their engagement in this area.

### ***Managing humanitarian action within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs***

41. The establishment of the Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Affairs and of the sub-regional office in MFA for the Balkans, combined with the move from the regional desks of Afghanistan-related tasks and the peace process in Sri Lanka, contributed to a fragmentation of the organisation (ECON, 2003). This situation remains after the reorganisation. Although the MFA would prefer to place budget and policy responsibility within the same unit, management of humanitarian affairs and peace-building continues to be complex, indicating an organisational divide in relation to management, reporting structures and the budget.

42. Humanitarian affairs is a critical component of Norwegian foreign policy. Humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution and conflict prevention are placed within the Department for Global Affairs, which reports to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of International Development. The support to these areas is handled by two sub-divisions: the Section for Humanitarian Affairs and the Section for Peace and Reconciliation. The Department for Global Affairs also manages the sections for Human Rights/Democracy and the UN; and is responsible for humanitarian action in response to natural disasters, which is treated as a separate issue with its own budget.

43. The budget line for transitional assistance (the gap fund) is administered by the Regional Department. The DIDP has the responsibility for the overall policy issues of peace-building, which it follows-up in the IFIs. The follow-up in countries and regions is the responsibility of the Regional Department, whereas the Department for Global Affairs is responsible for the follow-up in the UN. There is presently no formal co-ordinating function.

44. The organisation outlined above provides an unclear picture. Management structures and procedures involved in administering humanitarian action continue to be complex, placing high demand on co-ordination. As for many donors, the administration of Norwegian humanitarian and transitional assistance poses particular challenges to optimize intra- and inter-ministerial co-ordination to ensure effectiveness and consistency. Furthermore, the structure for humanitarian affairs and peace-building does not correspond to the ambition and the agenda set by existing and recently introduced policies (see Chapter 3). Learning in relation to humanitarian action across departments and other arms of government could also prove difficult in the present set up.

45. Despite the constraints in analyzing data on humanitarian action based on the present reporting directives, Norway's report systems for humanitarian assistance are transparent and show a high degree of accuracy. The government could favour a more detailed format for humanitarian action and participate in work to improve accuracy and timeliness in donor reporting on this topic.

### ***Future considerations***

- The government could consider elaborating a comprehensive policy document for humanitarian action, including interventions in response to natural disasters (especially in relation to prevention and preparedness) to ensure consistency with the endorsed principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship. The policy document should also address issues related to beneficiaries' involvement.
- In its support of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access, Norway could strengthen its procedures to ensure that the 1994 *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* and the 2003 *Guidelines on the Use of Military and*

*Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* are respected.

- Given Norway's important contribution to humanitarian action, measures could be taken to further improve the transparency of funding decisions and the predictability of long-term funding arrangements for protracted emergency situations. In addition, more flexibility in using such funds could be granted to partners implementing humanitarian activities.
- Norway must ensure intra- and inter-ministerial co-operation to optimise its humanitarian response and decision-making for funding humanitarian action.



## AUSTRALIA<sup>12</sup>

### The DAC'S Main Findings and Recommendations

#### *A new approach to humanitarian donorship...*

46. Australia has doubled its allocations for humanitarian action over the last three years. Disbursements for emergency and distress relief have increased from USD 25 million in 1993 to USD 113 million in 2003. The emergency assistance share of gross ODA disbursements has also increased, from 3% in 1993 to 11% in 2003. This trend clearly indicates the increasing importance of humanitarian action in Australia's foreign policy which has called for renewed and coherent policies for Australia's support to humanitarian action.

47. In December 2004 Australia launched its new policy for humanitarian action. It takes its departure from the *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD) endorsed in 2003 and declares that these principles constitute the general benchmark against which Australia will assess the coherence, impact and accountability of its humanitarian actions. Furthermore, it indicates a shift from reactive response to a growing recognition that "the humanitarian imperative has a place in development" and outlines the relationship between development assistance and conflict resolution. Policies relating to resource allocation between multilateral and bilateral channels are not explicitly stated but Australia aims to increase its support to multilateral humanitarian agencies.

48. Humanitarian action is mainly managed by AusAID. AusAID's role in managing co-ordination and communication in this area should be recognised but could be strengthened further. The new policy will place increased demands on management and monitoring systems which need to be further adjusted before all aspects of the policy will be reflected and implemented. Australia could also further develop its procedures for ensuring adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response to complex emergencies.

#### *... taking on a regional responsibility ...*

49. Following the focus of its overall aid programme resulting from its special geographical position and role, Australia's support to humanitarian action is primarily concentrated within the Asia-Pacific region. This regional approach plays an important role by targeting emergencies that would otherwise be unlikely to attract broader international attention. Australia's security interests and regional focus could risk compromising its needs-based approach to humanitarian response and the principles of neutrality and impartiality. This risk requires care in defining and designing responses to emergencies.

50. Australia's long-term commitments in its engagement in complex emergencies in the region have also resulted in a positive approach to the relationship between humanitarian assistance and development co-operation, integrating transition issues into its country and regional development co-operation strategies. This is further reflected in Australia's *Peace, Conflict and Development Policy*.

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<sup>12</sup> In the Peer Review of Australia the relevant texts has been compiled from the main report as no Annex was made, although the order of paragraphs have been changed the texts are the same as in the original report.

51. Australia also recognises natural disaster prevention and preparedness as key features of its humanitarian action and AusAID is a main actor in capacity building for reducing vulnerability to natural disasters in the Pacific region. Australia has been a major contributor in establishing regional emergency response stand-by mechanisms together with key donors in the Pacific.

*... with a potential to do more and address challenges ahead*

52. Through its new humanitarian action policy Australia has committed itself to respond to emergencies on a needs-based approach. In view of Australia's recent strong economic growth and the positive experiences of its humanitarian programme, there is an opportunity for improving its humanitarian performance and for increasing allocations to meet humanitarian needs in other regions.

53. The humanitarian action policy states that Australia will "improve the effectiveness, efficiency and combined efforts of military and humanitarian actors" and in this context it is important that Australia affirms the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in situations of armed conflict and during peace keeping and/or military interventions.

54. One general finding from the Peer Review of Australia is that the lack of policy-relevant DAC data makes it difficult to monitor donor performance in humanitarian action. Present vague reporting definitions and formats constitute a serious challenge for harmonised donor practices and improved efficiency among DAC members collectively.

#### *Recommendations*

- Australia's achievements in developing a policy for humanitarian action are recognised and appreciated. Australian experience gained from its regional involvements could provide useful references for international learning which could help identifying best practice, especially in relation to natural disaster prevention and preparedness and transition support.
- When increasing its aid volume, Australia should consider also increasing its support for humanitarian action, in line with its policy and consistent with its needs-based approach.
- Australia should affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in delivering humanitarian action and ensure that the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality enshrined in its policy on humanitarian action are followed through in implementation. In this context, Australia could also strengthen its procedures to ensure that the 1994 *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* and the 2003 *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* are respected.

#### **Secretariat Report**

##### ***Australia - an increasingly important humanitarian actor with significant potential***

55. Australia has doubled its allocations for humanitarian action over the last three years. Emergency and distress relief accounted for approximately 11% of Australia's ODA in 2003. This trend clearly indicates the importance of humanitarian action in Australia's foreign policy and its increased role within development assistance which in turn has called for renewed and coherent policies for Australia's support to humanitarian action. This development notably results from recent emergencies in Australia's neighbourhood, such as natural disasters caused by cyclones and drought, armed conflicts in Bougainville and Solomon Islands, and long-term transition support to Cambodia and Timor-Leste.

***Launching a new policy for humanitarian action***

56. In 2004 Australia launched its new policy for Humanitarian Action (AusAID, 2004g). This new policy takes its departure in the *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD) adopted in Stockholm and endorsed by Australia in 2003. The policy declares that GHD constitutes the general benchmark against which Australia will improve the coherence, impact and accountability of its humanitarian actions. Furthermore, the new policy indicates a shift from reactive response to a growing recognition that “the humanitarian imperative has a place in development.” In its policy Australia emphasises the strong link between development and humanitarian action and recognises poverty as a root cause of vulnerability. In this context Australia also explicitly refers to support in building national and community capacities to manage the risks and consequences of emergencies (see Box 2).

57. The policy for humanitarian action reflects Australia’s commitment to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the humanitarian principles of humanity and impartiality. The policy covers both support in relation to natural disasters and response to armed conflict and identifies actions of protection, material assistance, capacity building, prevention and preparedness. Australia places a strong emphasis on burden sharing and recognition of the principles of independence and neutrality. The policy provides a positive departure for humanitarian action and an interesting example of how GHD can be translated into national policies. One advantage of this policy is that it defines objectives, identifies policy goals and outlines how Australia intends to achieve these. Since the action policy is new and much remains to be implemented before all aspects of the policy can be reflected, management and monitoring systems might need to be further adjusted to ensure continued implementation.

58. Humanitarian action comes within the general framework of Australia’s development co-operation policies and is located under the *Peace Conflict and Development Policy* (see Annex B). AusAID’s Humanitarian Action Policy is informed and complemented by the *HIV/AIDS Strategy* and the *Food Security Strategy* (AusAID, 2004j).

### Box 2. Australia's humanitarian action policy

The overarching goal of the policy is to: protect lives, alleviate suffering, maintain human dignity and assist recovery from conflict, natural and other disasters, through effective response, prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. The policy identifies eight areas of focus and identifies actions to address the objectives:

1. Meet the protection needs of vulnerable people by alleviating the effects of abuse and restoring dignified conditions of life to people affected by disasters and complex emergencies.
2. Foster respect for international humanitarian law, refugee and human rights law.
3. Meet the safety requirements of humanitarian workers.
4. Create closer links between development and humanitarian programmes to address root causes of insecurity and vulnerability and improve transition planning.
5. Assist governments and communities in the region to develop their own capacity to reduce the impact of disasters and to prevent disasters from undermining development objectives.
6. Strengthen international, regional, and local partnerships to obtain rapid mobilisation of resources and provide an effective channel to extend the reach and impact of Australian humanitarian assistance beyond Australia's region.
7. Incorporate gender considerations in planning, design, response, monitoring and evaluation to reduce the differential impact of crises on women and men and to ensure the skills and capacities of both are fully utilised at all stages and levels of activities.
8. Reduce the vulnerability to and consequences of HIV/AIDS on those affected by humanitarian action and reduce the impact of crises on people living with HIV/AIDS.
9. Improve the effectiveness, efficiency and combined efforts of military and humanitarian actors.

Source: Humanitarian Action Policy (AusAID 2004g).

59. Humanitarian assistance is managed by AusAID and the Humanitarian Action Policy outlines the relationship between development assistance to eliminate poverty on the one hand and conflict resolution on the other hand by emphasising that humanitarian action itself cannot reduce poverty, nor prevent or reduce conflict. As stated in the introduction, "The Humanitarian Action Policy deals with the symptoms of conflict and complements the *Peace, Conflict and Development Policy* that specifically addresses conflict prevention, conflict management and reduction, peace-building and post-conflict recovery. Through such measures outlined in this policy, humanitarian action can help counteract social instability, reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen local capacities" (AusAID, 2004g).

60. Two distinctive perspectives need to be highlighted when referring to Australia's national interest in the specific context of humanitarian action; the regional dimension and the priority given to security related issues. Following the focus of its overall development co-operation programme resulting from its special geographical position and role, Australia's support to humanitarian action is primarily concentrated within the Asia Pacific region. However, Australia also commits itself to respond to emergencies on a needs based approach. Considering Australia's economic growth, there is an opportunity for improving its humanitarian performance and for increasing allocations to meet the humanitarian needs in other regions. The other dimension, prioritising security from an Australian perspective, is also reflected in the regional focus. From a humanitarian point of view this could compromise not only a needs based approach for humanitarian response, but also the principles of neutrality and impartiality. In this context, AusAID emphasises that it is not an implementing agency, and that out of respect for humanitarian principles, it

channels its main part of its humanitarian funding through multilateral agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). However, in order to ensure the requirement of humanitarian organisations to maintain a position of neutrality in relation to situations of armed conflict, Australia could consider strengthening its measures in this respect.

*From policies to practice - principles for funding*

61. Australia's financing decisions follow two stages. First, national allocations are made to partner countries based on past and predicted needs. Specific allocations are then made based on available needs assessments through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), in conjunction with internal assessments by AusAID and on NGO applications. A pool of unallocated funding remains for allocations to acute emergencies and UN/OCHA flash appeals. Additional funds can also be made available through reallocations during the course of the financial year.

62. Funding arrangements for increased predictability and improved dialogue have been introduced through an approach of strategic partnerships with selected UN agencies such as OCHA, World Food Programme (WFP) and the ICRC. Similar arrangements have been made with a core group of Australian NGOs through an accreditation process that was open to all accredited Australian NGOs. In 2003, AusAID entered into co-operation agreements with five Australian NGOs to enable rapid engagement in humanitarian response efforts. The partnership approach has contributed to streamlining implementation, defining priorities and paving the way for more flexible funding arrangements including reduced earmarking and exploring multiyear funding mechanisms. Australia also supports harmonised procedures and standardised formats for reporting by implementing agencies. Given the context of a large increase of available funds, funding levels are perceived as predictable. However, longer-term commitments are subject to parliamentary approval in relation to the adoption of the annual budget.

63. Australia recognises disaster prevention and preparedness as a key feature of its humanitarian action. In the Pacific region, Australia is a main actor in capacity building for reducing vulnerability, especially in relation to annual cyclones and floods. The main share of this support is directed towards programmes implemented by Australian NGOs on co-operation agreements and regional organisations. Funds within country programmes may also be used to strengthen the mitigation capacity of partner countries through support to National Disaster Management Offices, local NGOs and community groups.

64. AusAID policies consider the participation of crisis-affected communities to be critical to effective humanitarian response. It is emphasised that outside assistance should complement local coping mechanisms. Mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations to strengthen capacities for response at local, national, regional and global levels are being supported. In this context Australia has also contributed to the work on developing guidelines on consultation and participation of crisis-affected communities through the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). However, it remains unclear how Australia intends to meet its own policy on ensuring adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response to complex emergencies.

65. The Australian approach to the relationship between humanitarian assistance and development co-operation is to integrate humanitarian action and transition issues into its country and regional development co-operation strategies. Australia does not have a special system or budget line to address transition support, but has recognised long-term commitments at an early stage in its engagements in peace processes *i.e.* Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Furthermore, Australia supports the Pacific Trust Fund which provides transition support in the region. In the promotion of good humanitarian donorship, Australia

identifies specific challenges in relation to prevention and risk reduction, and regarding the boundaries between humanitarian action and development in this specific field.

*Promoting co-ordination, standards and assuring accountability*

66. Australia supports and recognises the role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action and contributes to UN's co-ordination through the work of OCHA, the CAP and Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP). The role and mandate of the ICRC/IFRC are also well recognised and respected by Australia. To advance on international co-ordination issues, Australia participates in donor co-ordination initiatives such as the Montreux Process and the donor support groups of OCHA and the ICRC. As the CAP has limited application in the Pacific region, other measures have been developed for managing co-ordinated responses in the region. Australia has been a major contributor in establishing regional emergency response stand-by mechanisms together with key donors in the Pacific.

67. Australia has been engaged in the development of practical tools to promote accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action both by providing funding and supporting dissemination of standards and principles. AusAID has developed monitoring briefs and multilateral and regional assessment frameworks for performance reporting and is in the process of developing a new humanitarian and emergency programme performance framework to ensure indicators reflect internationally accepted criteria, standards and best practice.

68. To improve awareness of procedures and processes in relation to natural disasters, AusAID has developed a *Field Guide to Emergency Response Procedures*. The field guide is updated annually in advance of the Pacific cyclone season and includes a condensed version of AusAID's *Emergency Response Standard Operating Procedures*, outlining flowcharts for response, procedures for field assessments and reporting, responsibilities, contacts and mechanisms.

69. Australia recognises the constraints of existing systems for the collection of policy relevant data on humanitarian action spending and the need for improved and consistent statistical definitions. In this context Australia's reporting systems for humanitarian action aspire to a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency. Based on its experience, these are areas where Australia could reinforce its contribution to international policy development.

*Issues emerging*

70. The humanitarian action policy states that Australia will "... improve the effectiveness, efficiency and combined efforts of military and humanitarian actors". This position highlights a crucial issue in the discourse of humanitarian action, notably for creating and maintaining secure "humanitarian space", in which humanitarian agencies are able to do their work. In conflict-related emergencies, there is a constant danger of mixing political, military and humanitarian objectives, compromising humanitarian objectives and principles and as a result reducing the capacity to deliver effective humanitarian response. It can also be argued that these issues need to be approached on a case-by-case basis and in relation to the specific context of an emergency. It is of great importance that Australia continues to affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in situations of armed conflict and during peace keeping and/or military interventions. The 1994 *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* and the 2003 *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* provides the framework in this field. AusAID recognises these challenges and seeks to address them by affirming the primary position of civilian organisations through: advocacy in whole-of-government settings; and

participation in policy dialogue and training that the Australian military undertakes as part of its obligations under the Geneva Conventions (e.g. Defence Peace Keeping Operations, CivMil co-operation).

71. To achieve the objectives set out in the new strategy, AusAID will need to develop its systems to support learning for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action. Work is to be started on developing a specific monitoring and evaluation framework, designed to measure political and social impacts as well as administrative performance and quantitative results.

***Conflict prevention and peace-building – new approaches and a change in policies***

72. Recent conflicts in Bougainville, Fiji and Solomon Islands necessitated new policy approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building. Strengthening regional security by enhancing partner governments' capacity to prevent conflict, enhancing stability and managing trans-boundary challenges have become an important part of Australia's development co-operation programme. Australia views security as a fundamental pre-condition of economic development and emphasises that conflicts can be created and exacerbated by poverty.

73. In 2002 Australia introduced its new *Peace, Conflict and Development Policy* (AusAID, 2003d) outlining a three dimensional approach to conflict prevention and peace-building. The first dimension addresses issues related to "conflict prevention" and "peace-building" including actions to facilitate dialogue, strengthen governance and measures to prevent the availability and trafficking of small arms. There is also a special focus on addressing rural and urban tension and inequitable access to resources.

74. The second dimension focuses on "conflict management" and "conflict reduction", including "humanitarian relief." The activities outlined include peace dividends, support to refugees and internally displaced persons, support to women and children and support to the media. The third dimension addresses issues of "post-conflict recovery". Its priorities are identified as direct support to peace and reconciliation processes, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, demining and reconstruction and economic recovery. Strengthened collaboration with neighbouring countries on peace and security issues is a major component of the whole-of-government approach and complements Australia's development co-operation. The policy concludes that aid interventions are one of Australia's primary instruments for conflict prevention and conflict management. So far, conflict analysis has been incorporated into selected country programme strategies such as Burma, PNG, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands and Sri Lanka.

75. RAMSI provides a useful case study on how the "whole-of-government approach" has enabled Australia to adopt a new position to address complex emergencies in the Pacific region (see Box 3).

### **Box 3. Australia's new interventionism - the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)**

**Background.** The conflict in Solomon Islands relates to ethnic clashes, mainly between Malaitan settlers living in Guadalcanal Province and the Guadalcanal people. Social unrest increased as the government failed to deliver basic services due to ruined public finances and widespread corruption. A peace agreement reached in 2000 intended to end the conflict but inherent flaws in the agreement only contributed to increasing tensions. Distrust in the government increased when it failed to address the renewed and widespread violence. The security situation rapidly deteriorated as armed operations by ex-militants, including high ranking police officers, paralysed the government which then ceased to function. The situation became unmanageable and the government was forced to call for regional assistance.

**The Regional intervention.** In 2003, Australia and New Zealand reacted to the government's appeal and mobilised regional acceptance for the establishment of the RAMSI. A treaty was signed between Solomon Islands and sixteen member countries of the Pacific Islands Forum, which provided a legal framework and outlined the mandate of the operation. RAMSI provides an interesting example of a regional approach to conflict management, with ten Pacific Islands Forum members having contributed police and/or military personnel. Operations started with an intervention force, made up of 330 police officers and 1 800 military personnel, both predominately Australian, with a mandate to restore law and order and lay the foundations for a wider political, security and economic reform agenda. The purpose of RAMSI has been to restore physical and economic stability and the basic functioning of government to Solomon Islands. An economic assistance package to restore economic stability is a key part of RAMSI support to Solomon Islands, including budget support to ensure the maintenance of essential services delivery. As well, a significant programme of assistance was mobilised to support the effective functioning of the justice system and prison. In addition to police and military personnel, around 80 RAMSI officials are working in various government departments, including the finance and justice sectors. RAMSI was able to build on work already being undertaken through Australia's aid programme, particularly in the justice sector, as well as on economic reform, peace building, community development and health services.

**Results:** One year after its launch, RAMSI has largely been a success. Security has been restored and the military component has gradually been reduced. Key insurgents have been arrested and almost 4 000 small arms and light weapons have been collected and destroyed. Reconstruction of the national police service is under way. Justice and prison infrastructure have been significantly upgraded to support the restoration of the rule of law. In addition, significant gains have been made in stabilising government finances by introducing budget discipline, controlling expenditure, enhancing revenue collection and meeting financial obligations.

**Future role of RAMSI.** The operation has now entered a second phase which will have to address the more long-term solutions of state building measures. In particular, a major programme to rebuild and reform the machinery of government has commenced. In this context it will be crucial to identify and manage ways to empower Solomon Islanders to build on initial successes and implement a comprehensive reform agenda of state building. Australia is set to continue its crucial leadership of the operation, recognising the need for a long-term commitment.

A key to future success lies in how to increase opportunities for Solomon Islanders to participate and influence the work of RAMSI, focusing in particular on governance and the rule of law to ensure provision of basic services to the community. However, one researcher (Dinnen, 2004) argued that the concepts of "failed" or "collapsing states", commonly used to describe situations such as the one of Solomon Islands, could be misleading and might risk simplifying the problem of state building. Many of the so-called failing states could hardly be regarded as functioning states before crisis emerged. "What is needed is a different approach to state building that addresses directly the complexities of trying to build a unitary state and sense of 'nation' in such fragmented and diverse environments. This cannot be achieved quickly or simply engineered through a massive infusion of external resources and expertise. Nor can it be accomplished by focusing exclusively on state structures. It is the dysfunctional character of state-society relations that needs to be addressed if sustainable improvement is to be achieved".

*Source:* Briefings AusAID, & Dinnen (2004).

*Support to humanitarian action*

76. Disbursements for emergency and distress relief have increased from USD 25 million in 1993 to USD 113 million in 2003 (constant 2002 dollars).<sup>13</sup> The emergency assistance share of gross ODA disbursements has also increased from 3% in 1993 to 11% in 2003. Since 1999 and in accordance with the DAC reporting directives, Australia includes expenditures for assistance to refugees in their first twelve months of stay in a developed country. This item accounted for 22% of the disbursements for “Emergency and distress relief” in 2003.

77. Policies relating to resource allocation between multilateral and bilateral channels are not explicitly stated but Australia strives to increase its support to multilateral humanitarian agencies. UN data shows that Australia contributed 1.16% of global humanitarian funding in 2003. According to the same source Australia’s contribution to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals (CAP) totalled USD 31.8 million in 2003, equivalent to 0.81% of total contributions to the CAPs, which positioned Australia as the 11<sup>th</sup> largest CAP donor (OCHA 2003).<sup>14</sup>

***Future considerations***

- Australia’s achievements in developing a policy framework for humanitarian action are recognised and appreciated. Australian experience gained from its regional involvements could provide useful references for international learning which could lead to identifying best practice in relation to these complex issues.
- Australia should ensure that the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality enshrined in its policy on humanitarian action are followed through in implementation. In its support of humanitarian action, Australia could strengthen its systems to ensure that international guidelines regarding the use of military and civil defence are respected.
- Australia should consider further increasing its support to humanitarian action, in line with its humanitarian action policy and consistent with a needs-based approach.

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13. DAC data do not have a statistical category for humanitarian action. In DAC reporting directives the term “Emergency and distress relief” is used, which includes “Emergency assistance”, Relief food aid and “Other emergency and distress relief”.

14. UN OCHA Reliefweb, Financial Tracking Service, *Major Donors in 2003*, [www.reliefweb.int/fts/](http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/)



## SWEDEN

### The DAC'S Main Findings and Recommendations

#### *A strong presence in the humanitarian field*

78. Sweden allocates a large proportion of its ODA to humanitarian aid (16% in 2003) and provides timely and flexible funding. Many of Sida's partner countries are in difficult situations of transition or armed conflict and this has stimulated the government to focus more on the relationship between humanitarian aid and development co-operation. It has introduced a humanitarian policy which confirms previous practice, while strengthening compliance with principles and practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). This approach to policy could serve as a model for other donors.

79. Humanitarian aid management is divided between the MFA and Sida, with MFA responsible for policy development and co-ordination of humanitarian aid and Sida responsible for implementation and follow-up. A national disaster response unit, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), which is under the authority of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), may also be called upon to implement humanitarian action. Consultations between the MFA and Sida are formal and instructions to Sida have become more detailed as Sweden's interest in humanitarian action increases. Humanitarian aid is not delegated to the field, but Sida uses regional humanitarian co-ordinators to improve assessments, monitoring and follow-up

#### *Improvements at the margin*

80. Although Sweden's new humanitarian policy does not introduce entirely new issues, it will, together with the PGD, place new demands on humanitarian aid operations. Existing Sida strategies merit some review, consolidation and revision. Furthermore, there seems to be no plan yet for systematic follow-up of the way policy is translated into practice. In 2004 the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the MFA imposed new guidelines for management of ODA budget lines. These changes have the potential to negatively affect Sida's provision of timely and flexible funding for humanitarian action and its ability to manage transition situations.

81. Management of humanitarian aid could be further streamlined: different units in the MFA manage the multilateral agencies involved in humanitarian action. Sida manages its humanitarian aid programmes from a department with multiple responsibilities including support to civil society, humanitarian aid and conflict management. The logic of this organisational set-up is potentially inconsistent with the efficient management of this large and growing portion of the Sida portfolio and may interfere with the independence of humanitarian action in relationship to other agendas. Management at the field level could also be further strengthened by reinforcing the role of the regional humanitarian advisors. The present arrangement for supervision of the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (MOD, MFA and Sida) appears to be an inefficient management approach.

#### *Recommendations*

- Sweden's **humanitarian aid policy** requires further operational articulation. The MFA should clarify, in a more operational manner, how to protect civilians. It should also examine possible negative effects of current humanitarian aid budgetary guidelines. Sida should consider the

merger of its existing strategies and position papers into one comprehensive strategy with an implementation focus. The MFA and Sida are encouraged to jointly develop methods and systems for monitoring implementation of the humanitarian aid policy.

- Current **humanitarian aid management** merits attention. The MFA should consider managing humanitarian multilaterals through one administrative unit and Sida should consider creating a separate department responsible for humanitarian aid to ensure the independence of humanitarian action and improve transition support. The role and functions of regional humanitarian co-ordinators could be better integrated between MFA and Sida in Stockholm and at the level of the embassy. MOD, MFA and Sida should also clarify their operational relations and procedures with the Swedish Rescue Services Agency.

## Secretariat report

### *Humanitarian Policies and Principles*

82. In 2004 the Swedish government introduced a new humanitarian aid policy (Swedish Government, 2004b), based on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence and further guided by the “*Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*” (GHD). According to the policy, Swedish response to emergencies (situations of armed conflict, natural disasters or other emergencies) will be needs-based and serve to save lives, protect civilians and non-combatants and to prevent and alleviate human suffering. The policy provides guidance on preventive measures for natural disasters, conflict prevention and the relationship to development co-operation. It sets a framework for funding principles, recognises the leading role of the UN and the special mandate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and also outlines the Swedish relation to the humanitarian work conducted by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office of the European Union. The new policy is far reaching and advanced and could in many areas serve as a model for other donors.

83. Sweden believes the advantages of the new policy rests in two areas: First, it provides the necessary and relevant guidance. Second, it formally affirms the government’s commitment to humanitarian principles, international humanitarian law and other foundations of humanitarian action in one document. It also identifies three areas of engagement; advocacy and diplomacy; financial support to operations by implementing agencies; and national humanitarian response capacity and preparedness. Although the policy is new it does not introduce new themes or priorities but rather confirm previous practices, priorities and sectors, and clarifies relations to other policy areas. Despite making a clear distinction between humanitarian “*assistance*” and “*protection*”, it remains vague on how to deal with the complexity of protection especially in relation to areas of conflict prevention and peace-building.

84. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) has formally translated the policy into guidelines for Sida’s humanitarian aid. However, Sida regards the new policy as confirmation of previous practice. In the absence of an official policy Sida had developed its own set of guidelines and strategies for humanitarian support (*i.e.* guidelines on humanitarian aid in the education and the health sector (Sida, 2002 a and b), the rights of the child in complex emergencies (Sida, 1999a), separate strategies on mine action (Sida, 2002c) and on conflict prevention and peace building (Sida, 1999b). Sida should consider merging its existing humanitarian strategies into one comprehensive guiding document aligned to the new policy.

### *Volume and distribution*

85. Sweden has become an increasingly important humanitarian donor and disbursements for humanitarian action have increased significantly. In 2003 Sweden reported USD 315 million in emergency and distress relief, (17% of ODA). Since 1994 and in accordance with the DAC reporting directives, Sweden includes expenditures for assistance to refugees in their first twelve months of stay in a developed country. In 2003, this item amounted to 49% of Sweden's reported emergency and distress relief.

86. Sweden funds humanitarian action from a separate budget line for "*humanitarian assistance and conflict management*" administered by Sida. In 2004 the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the MFA imposed restrictions in managing the budget line. In order to distinguish humanitarian action from conflict prevention and peace building activities, a maximum expenditure for conflict prevention (200 million SEK) was introduced. Furthermore, to ensure the availability of funds for unexpected disasters throughout the budget year, a limit of 80% pledging and disbursements over the first six months were introduced. Sida regards these new measures as a limitation. The MFA should consider following up on the effect of these restrictions and to what extent they contribute to the objectives of the humanitarian policy.

87. Sweden mainly funds humanitarian action programmes implemented by UN humanitarian agencies, the International Red Cross movement, and Swedish or international non-governmental organisations. Sweden responds to appeals or applications from these agencies and organisations through annual and consolidated appeals that address humanitarian needs in long-term emergencies usually caused by conflict, or by applications or flash appeals addressing acute emergencies such as sudden-onset natural disasters. In addition operational activities by other Swedish authorities may be financed from the humanitarian budget, (*i.e.* Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control). Sweden strives to support the leading role of the UN and the ICRC by allocating the lion-share of its support to multilateral channels (approximately 80% of disbursed funding in 2003). This share has increased significantly during the last years. In 2004, Sweden was the largest donor to the UN-CAP measured by contributions as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the fifth largest donor measured by contributions in dollars.<sup>15</sup>

88. Sida's directives for Humanitarian Assistance are an important tool in managing applications from NGO's. These directives lay down the conditions when applying for Swedish grants and make explicit reference to internationally agreed standards and Sida's position on humanitarian response. In light of the new policy Sida could consider revising the directives to ensure compliance with the new humanitarian policy and the Policy for Global Development.

89. Implementing agencies and NGOs perceive Sweden as a provider of timely and flexible funding. Sweden strives to make early disbursements of UN-CAP funding (January or February) and provides stable, un-earmarked funding to major humanitarian partners. Multi-year funding arrangements can be obtained up to three years in advance, subject to parliamentary approval. To speed up decision making processes, Swedish NGOs are trusted with "rapid response funds" for unforeseen emergencies and Sida still uses "soft" earmarking in its funding. Sweden strives to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in high profile crises does not adversely affect meeting needs in other ongoing crises. Although not spelled out as a policy, Sweden's ambition is to fund all UN-CAPs unless already well funded compared with other appeals, such as the response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami (see Box 4).

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15. United Nations, UN OCHA "*Humanitarian Appeal 2005*"5.

#### **Box 4. Responding to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami**

The 2004 tsunami flooded coastal areas in 11 countries and claimed the lives of more than 200 000 people. It caused large scale displacement and wiped away homes and infrastructure leaving several million people affected and in need of assistance and protection. The enormity of the destruction and the multiple international dimensions prompted an unprecedented global response from the general public, the private sector, organisations and governments highlighting the need for improved donor mechanisms when responding to natural disasters.

On 30 December the Swedish government stated that it was making available an initial USD 61.9 million (SEK 500 million) for assistance to victims of the Indian Ocean Tsunami, and the public and private sector raised an additional USD 123.8 million. Of the funds available, USD 25.4 million was used in the emergency phase by Sida's humanitarian division whilst the remaining USD 35.3 million was allocated to reconstruction efforts managed by Sida's regional Asia department. Sweden is normally among the top five contributors to UN consolidated appeals but in its response to the Tsunami, Sweden limited its allocations to USD 18.6 million to the UN appeal as a result of the extraordinary support from other governments and the public. After the immediate humanitarian response Sweden concentrated on sustainable and long-term approaches and to better manage the response, a co-ordinating mechanism was set up between the MFA and Sida. Sida was tasked to present a strategy for the reconstruction phase taking into consideration long-term development aspects and impact on Sida's development co-operation programmes in the affected region. A strategy was developed by Sida's Asia department in close co-operation with the humanitarian division and relevant sector departments. The reconstruction plan focuses on harmonisation, anti-corruption measures, risk reduction, poverty issues and a conflict and environment perspective. Sweden also recognises the importance evaluating the humanitarian operations in countries affected by the tsunami so as to provide accountability and lessons for improvement of future response to natural disasters. Sweden will undertake a national evaluation of all actions in relation to the Tsunami and will also participate in evaluation efforts led by the Active learning network for accountability and performance in humanitarian action (ALNAP). Sida will also conduct a specific internal evaluation on its humanitarian response and reconstruction support. In relation to transparency and accountability Sweden believes its report systems are sufficient to track funding and expenditure to the Tsunami response but expressed concern regarding clarity of data produced by the international system, including that of the DAC. Sweden has expressed support for the measures taken by the United Nations office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs (UN-OCHA) to improve transparency and accountability and indicated a willingness to support improved methods for data collection if made more permanent.

In April the government decided to supplement the humanitarian assistance budget line administrated by Sida for in 2005 with USD 37.1 million by authorising the transfer of funds from other budget lines that were unspent in 2004. Whether this meant the diversion of funds from other humanitarian or long-term development efforts should be examined. Another issue underlined by the Tsunami is the need for strengthening of the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, and respond to natural disasters. Sida could further develop its approaches by integrating risk reduction and disaster prevention into its development strategies.

#### ***Crosscutting and emerging issues***

90. **Promoting standards and enhancing implementation.** Sweden has supported the development of practical tools to promote accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action and dissemination of standards and principles. Sida follows up on adherence to the humanitarian guidelines through its system of application for Swedish grants and through evaluations and capacity studies of implementing organisations.

91. **Applying a rights perspective in humanitarian aid.** The PGD clearly identifies cross-cutting issues such as gender, rights of the child, and disabled. In line with the approaches in its development co-operation Sweden has gone far in developing a rights perspective in its humanitarian programme. Swedish humanitarian aid promotes the respect for the rights of the child and focuses on addressing and meeting the needs of children, especially in armed conflicts and during a reconstruction phase. Follow-up, such as evaluations of the impact of such strategies could be considered. Furthermore, Sweden could

elaborate on how it ensures and promotes adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.

92. **Transition support.** According to Sida statistics, 53% of Sida's country portfolio is allocated to countries in transition or armed conflict, (38 countries, disbursements amounting to SEK 3.5 billion). The PGD addresses relationships between humanitarian aid and development co-operation but largely leaves it to Sida to find the proper modalities to manage such transition. In post-emergency situations where Sweden will be engaged in longer-term rehabilitation, reconstruction and development support programme responsibilities are gradually transferred from Sida's humanitarian division to sectoral departments under the co-ordination of the regional department. The government's guidelines for Sida's humanitarian aid state that costs for transition should primarily be covered by the general development co-operation budget and occasionally through the humanitarian budget. However, Sida's experiences have been the opposite, transition from humanitarian aid to development co-operation has often been financed from the humanitarian budget. Until 2005, Sida could in fact operate development co-operation programmes through its humanitarian support, as in the case of Somalia.<sup>16</sup>

93. Managing transition situations has been made less flexible due to changes on what can be financed through the development co-operation budget and the budget line for "humanitarian assistance and conflict management". The MFA should, together with Sida explore the consequences of these changes to avoid shortfalls and a possible vacuum of funds during transitions.

#### ***Sweden's approach to conflict prevention and peace building***

94. Sweden is taking steps to conflict-sensitise its development co-operation. The MFA has developed guidelines for Swedish policy on conflict prevention - *Preventing Violent Conflict – A Swedish Action Plan*, (Swedish MFA, 1999) and *Preventing Violent Conflict - Swedish policy for the 21st century* (Swedish MFA, 2000). The PGD, the action plan and other conflict management-related publications by Sida demonstrate that the relationship between poverty and armed conflict, as well as the potential positive and negative influence of development co-operation and humanitarian aid on armed conflicts, is recognised. Policy documents also consistently cross-refer to DAC policy guidance in this area.

95. Sweden has taken important steps to develop and define a methodology to conflict management, including conducting detailed conflict analysis (November 2004) to understand better how development co-operation strategies, programmes and projects are affected by and can affect potential or ongoing violent conflicts. It also invests time and resources in promoting the principles of "do no harm" and conflict sensitivity among governmental and non-governmental actors. These efforts are also not limited uniquely to Swedish actors. It has underlined the importance of working both "in" and "on" conflict.

96. Three categories of activities have been identified which may be combined and applied, as appropriate, to loosely defined situations of submerged tension, rising tension, open armed conflict and post-conflict:

- **Promotion of dialogue** – support to initiatives promoting negotiation, de-escalation and reconciliation between primary and secondary parties to conflicts.

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16. The Peer Review Team was informed by the Embassy in Nairobi that 80% of the humanitarian programme in Somalia could be regarded as development co-operation activities.

- **Promotion of security** – support to interventions improving protection of individuals and groups affected by violent conflict. Such activities include disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, control of small arms and light weapons, civilian peace monitoring.
- **Promotion of structural stability** – interventions aiming at root causes of violent conflict and human insecurity such as political and economic inequalities, weak state structures, and human right abuses including ethnic discrimination.

97. As part of efforts in the area of security, in 2004 the MFA launched the “*Stockholm initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*” to gather together and draw on policy making and field expertise to strengthen international approaches and response to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. The meeting involved representatives from 23 countries and 14 national and international organisations, institutes and UN agencies. Working groups covered the areas of: i) peace agreements, negotiations and political processes; ii) funding mechanisms for the different DDR phases; and iii) reintegration and peace building. Sweden should ensure that the target audience of this work is clearly defined, that it complements other initiatives in this area and that it is followed-up through its own development co-operation system.

98. Sweden, like other development co-operation actors, must pay special attention to the challenge of following-up methodological and conceptual thinking with practical implementation. A consideration in this respect is the respective numbers and roles of in-capital and in-country officials working in this area, and the interaction between these officials and external consultants whose temporary involvement does not strengthen institutional knowledge over the long term.

99. One issue, already identified by Sida (in *Reflections on Development Co-operation and Violent Conflict*, (Sida, 2003e), is the division of labour between projects and programmes in situations of open armed conflict and post-conflict (comprising 80% of Sida’s conflict management work) relative to activities in situations of submerged and rising tensions. Given the current international priority on conflict prevention and early warning, Sweden will need to give continued attention to the areas where its development co-operation can have the most constructive and stabilising effect on dynamics of conflict and peace.

100. Questions exist over the distinction drawn between conflict management and conflict prevention. Many activities that can play a crucial role in “up-stream” conflict prevention, such as the majority of Security Sector Reform-related activities, are not run within the conflict management team in Sida, being housed either in the Division for Democratic Governance or in the MFA (particularly in respect of the “harder” security issues). Recent work on democratisation and armed conflict suggests good collaboration between Sida departments, and efforts are being made to conflict-sensitise all development co-operation. Good progress has also been made in integrating relevant DAC guidelines in this work. There is risk that conflict management may focus on conflict-affected situations (alongside humanitarian aid) to the neglect of conflict-prone environments. Attention should, however, continue to be given to the organisation of activities within Sida ensuring close communication between teams.

### ***Policy coherence***

101. **Civil and military interaction.** Civil and military co-operation in humanitarian action raises a major dilemma regarding impartiality, effectiveness and security. The Swedish policy makes explicit reference to guidelines on the use of military and civil assets and Swedish policy recognises the primary

position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action.<sup>17</sup> In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, Sweden strives to ensure that such use conforms to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and humanitarian principles and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.

102. **Untying Food Aid.** Sweden's position on food aid is outlined by the humanitarian policy. Sweden does not provide food aid but provide financial contributions for food purchases in or in close relation to the location of the emergency to avoid undermining local markets and distorting local food production. The policy also indicates an ambition to advocate these positions in relation to other donors.

### ***Organisation and Management***

#### *Humanitarian aid architecture – division of labour MFA and Sida*

103. Humanitarian aid management is shared between the MFA and Sida. The MFA is responsible for policy development and co-ordination of humanitarian aid and Sida for implementation and follow-up. Management of humanitarian aid is located in a separate division, staffed by six persons, placed in the Department for Global Security. The MFA humanitarian division also manages annual core grants to multilateral support (UNHCR, UN-OCHA and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East [UNRWA]) and international organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). A major humanitarian agency World Food Programme (WFP) is not managed by the humanitarian division but by the Department for Global Development. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is responsible for civil protection and domestic disaster preparedness policy and is also the regulatory authority over the national disaster response unit, the Swedish Rescues Services Agency (SRSA).

104. In its annual letter of appropriation to Sida the government decides on an overall framework for humanitarian action, delegating specific planning, management and follow up to the agency. Humanitarian aid within Sida is located in the Department for Co-operation with NGOs, Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management (SEKA). This department operates a diverse mandate. Apart from a large humanitarian portfolio (1.5 billion SEK) it is also responsible for development co-operation through civil society organisations (900 million SEK) and manages Sida's Civil Society Center, a development co-operation institute focused on the role of civil society in development. The division working with humanitarian aid is staffed by 12 persons, including an advisory team with a thematic responsibility for Sida's strategies on "conflict management" (formerly two officials but to be expanded with the addition of two new conflict advisers). The rationale and possible advantages of the present organisation are unclear.

105. Consultations between the MFA and Sida regarding humanitarian affairs are formalised through bi-weekly meetings, a unique arrangement for managing the relations between the MFA and Sida. Although not intended to be a co-ordinating function it respects Sida's independence and serves as an instrument for exchange of information and is viewed as a well-functioning system to bridge an organisational constraint. However, following the increased importance Sweden has placed on humanitarian action the instructions from the MFA to Sida have become more detailed signalling a wish for increased control by the MFA.

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17. *2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* and *1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief*.

### *Country operations*

106. Humanitarian action is often implemented in countries where Sweden has no bilateral agreement with the government or where there is no legitimate government. When natural disasters or armed conflicts occur in countries where country strategies and plans exist, humanitarian aid is normally provided outside ordinary development co-operation frameworks. In long-term complex emergencies, Sida may be instructed by the government to propose humanitarian country strategies to further strengthen a needs-based approach and prioritise between sectors and target groups, (*i.e.* Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan).

107. Humanitarian responsibilities and funds are not delegated to embassies. However since 1994 Sida has used regional humanitarian co-ordinates to improve assessments, monitoring and 'follow-up'. The role of the regional co-ordinators is to monitor developments with regard to natural disasters and armed conflicts, interact with UN co-ordination offices (OCHA) to follow-up on support and assist in determine the need for support. In 2005 Sida operated with four regional co-ordinators stationed in Abidjan, Nairobi, Kinshasa and Bangkok. The MFA and Sida could consider jointly evaluating this system to further strengthen its roles and functions.

### *National response capacity - The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA)*

108. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) is a central supervisory government authority for national and international rescue services. Since 1988 the SRSA has been commissioned by the government to maintain an emergency preparedness and response capacity (personnel and materiel) for international humanitarian operations. SRSA operations are mainly performed under the auspices of various UN bodies and financed through Sida. Although SRSA is a separate authority, existing practices and procedures in managing assignments are indistinct. The present arrangement is not optimal as SRSA *de facto* operates under the influence of two ministries (MOD and MFA) and on instructions from another state authority (Sida). The MOD and the MFA should explore ways of improving the organisational structure and mandate of the SRSA.

### *Promoting learning and accountability*

109. **Evaluation system.** Sweden conducts annual bilateral policy dialogue with the major humanitarian organisations and in addition Sida conduct capacity studies on the major implementing partner NGOs. Sweden is also a member of the ALNAP.<sup>18</sup>

110. **Accountability and transparency.** Sweden is concerned with the constraints of existing systems for the collection of data on humanitarian aid and has called for improved and consistent statistical definitions. In this context Sweden could consider taking a lead in advancing donors reporting systems contributing to improved accuracy and transparency.

### *Future considerations*

- **Humanitarian Policies and Principles.** In response to the Policy for Global Development and the policy for Humanitarian Aid, the MFA could consider clarifying how to operationalise the complexity of "protection", especially addressing the relation between humanitarian action and conflict prevention. Sida should consider integrating existing strategies and position papers in to a

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18. ALNAP, established in 1997, is an international interagency forum working to improve learning accountability and quality across the humanitarian sector. It has 51 full members and 370 observers.

comprehensive strategy focused on implementation issues. Sida directives on humanitarian support should also be updated to reflect these policies. The MFA and Sida should also consider developing methods and monitoring system for follow-up on the implementation of the humanitarian aid policy.

- **Funding.** Sweden could work to enlarge and diversify contributions from elsewhere in the donor community, including approaches to emerging donors and to donors outside the like-minded group. The MFA should examine the effect of humanitarian aid budget restrictions how they limit the objectives of humanitarian policy. The stricter instruction regarding the use of the humanitarian may have negative effects on flexibility in transition funding.
- **Management.** To streamline administration and dialogue, the MFA should consider placing management of humanitarian multilaterals in one administrative unit within the MFA. Sida should consider creating a separate department responsible for humanitarian aid. This would help ensure the independence of humanitarian action, simplify decision-making and improve facilitation of transition support. The MOD, MFA and Sida should also clarify operational relations and procedures with the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA).
- **Country operations.** The use of regional humanitarian co-ordinators could be further strengthened and the roles and functions could be better integrated at MFA, Sida and embassy level. The MFA and Sida should jointly explore ways to develop the potential of this field function. The humanitarian division should also have a greater influence over decisions regarding regional posts.



## SWITZERLAND

### The DAC'S Main Findings and Recommendations

#### *A strong and centralised system*

111. Humanitarian action holds a distinct position in Swiss foreign affairs and Switzerland has a strong tradition of humanitarian aid, being a valuable contributor to the international humanitarian system. The Federal Law on International Development Co-operation anchors this dimension in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the humanitarian principles. A humanitarian strategy further defines the mandate, principles, tasks and operational activities, translating the federal law's provision of humanitarian aid into a strategic approach. Switzerland identifies the promotion of IHL as a core area of its humanitarian policy and is also firmly committed to the "*Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*" (GHD). Its humanitarian system is advanced, with innovative and complementary approaches in disaster risk reduction and cash distribution projects.

112. Switzerland allocates humanitarian aid based mainly on needs. Detailed principles are not formalised. Traditionally, 20% of the ODA budget was earmarked for humanitarian aid. Since 2000, however, the share of humanitarian aid, including expenditure on refugees in donor countries, has not exceeded 15% of ODA. The humanitarian budget is divided into three parts: one third is allocated to bilateral programmes and programmes managed by Swiss NGOs; one third is committed to the International Committee of the Red Cross/International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; and one third is divided between United Nations agencies.

113. Management of Swiss humanitarian aid is centralised in the SDC within the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, which also holds authority over the advanced national rapid response mechanism. Co-ordination and consultations with units responsible for other political areas are in general well developed. Humanitarian responsibilities or funds are not delegated to embassies or co-operation offices. These can be strengthened with humanitarian specialists. Special co-ordination offices may also be established in affected regions. Switzerland's national response mechanism and Swiss NGOs hold a prominent position in implementing Swiss humanitarian aid. However, the cost of using national mechanisms should be weighed against that, and some of the other benefits, of using local capacities.

#### *Addressing further improvements*

114. With an increase in ODA level Switzerland could contribute even more to humanitarian action. The global multiyear framework credit could provide measures for predictable funding arrangements which should be explored further. Switzerland could also consider developing directives for making funding more timely. The budget structure could be simplified and better reflect (i) allocations to multilateral agencies; (ii) support to Swiss and local NGOs; and (iii) Swiss response capacity. The present division of budget lines also indicates limitations in terms of the untied status of food aid items.

115. Swiss humanitarian policy is clear but could be reflected more consistently in other SDC strategies. Humanitarian aid is considered a separate discipline within SDC but is sometimes referred to as a component of crisis prevention and crisis management. Hence there is a risk of overlapping policies and conflicting positions between divisions of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) in the area of

complex emergencies. Switzerland should continue to ensure that policy debates on migration do not influence humanitarian allocations and could consider evaluating its voluntary return programmes.

116. Switzerland could also develop further its management system for humanitarian strategies. To strengthen the needs-based approach and promote harmonisation and alignment in complex emergencies, it could explore further how to take full advantage of its country operations and develop humanitarian strategies based on the UN Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP). Strategies focused on implementation could also better address how to ensure involvement of beneficiaries as well as environmental and social (including gender-related) perspectives.

*Recommendations:*

- Switzerland should ensure that humanitarian aid remains an independent policy discipline, albeit interlinked to crisis prevention and management in operational terms.
- SDC could clarify multilateral and bilateral strategies in the field of humanitarian aid and make them focused on operations. The methodology for involving beneficiaries in humanitarian response and addressing environmental and social aspects of humanitarian aid should be further addressed in strategies for implementation.
- When increasing its ODA, Switzerland should maintain the percentage allocated to humanitarian aid. The budget structure could be further clarified and the food aid component should be untied.
- SDC should take advantage of having humanitarian aid as an integrated part of the aid system. It should ensure that the Humanitarian Aid Department is a full participant in development co-operation processes.
- SDC could develop its management system for humanitarian strategies and their alignment to the UN Common Humanitarian Action Plans. The use of humanitarian specialists in embassies and SDC co-operation offices could be evaluated to further strengthen this function in field operations.

## **Secretariat Report**

### ***Humanitarian policies and principles***

#### *The Swiss federal law - a robust legal framework for humanitarian aid*

117. Humanitarian action holds a distinct and important position in Swiss foreign policy. Switzerland's commitment to humanitarian aid is outlined by the federal law on international development co-operation and humanitarian aid which firmly anchors this dimension of ODA in IHL and the humanitarian principles. Switzerland's policy structure is exceptional as it is one of the few countries to have its humanitarian aid regulated by national legislation. According to the federal law the objective is to "... preserve the lives of human beings who are in danger and to alleviate suffering through preventive and emergency aid; such aid is intended for victims of natural disasters and armed conflict". The Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation can be provided worldwide. The advantages of having a legal mandate are two-fold: it provides a clear distinction between the objectives of humanitarian aid and development co-operation and it offers a framework for Switzerland's budget structure.

118. Switzerland is committed to the “Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship” (GHD).<sup>19</sup> Although few of the GHD principles are new to Switzerland they are perceived as a useful vehicle for donor harmonisation. Nonetheless, Switzerland recognizes some constraints in their application, for instance GHD is perceived as a narrow forum based on weak consensus and some issues such as predictability of multi-year funding could be counter-productive in terms of flexibility of funds. Switzerland also believes that there is room for improving and expanding GHD and would like to see the DAC take a more active role in this area, especially in terms of promoting linkages and better understanding between the two dimensions of ODA that development co-operation and humanitarian action constitute. With its experience in this field Switzerland is well placed to promote such improvements among donors.

*The humanitarian aid policy framework*

119. SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department has developed a strategy whereby its working principles, main tasks and its operational activities have been defined, translating the federal law's provision of humanitarian aid into a strategic approach (SDC, 2001). This sector strategy complies with SDC's guidelines and its implementation is to be reviewed in 2006. The Humanitarian Aid Strategy 2005 distinguishes four different situations where humanitarian aid may be provided: i) armed conflicts (including inter- or intra state conflicts); ii) crises (breakdown of state structures and the collapse of law and order); iii) natural disasters (earthquakes, floodings and droughts); and iv) technological disasters (nuclear, biological chemical and infrastructure incidents endangering people's lives). As humanitarian action is based on its own conceptual framework (needs-based approach), it should be situated outside the frameworks regulating development co-operation, (for instance with regard to conditionality clause), but SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department should try to work as much as possible in dialogue with other Swiss foreign policy dimensions.

120. Switzerland's humanitarian aid can be provided, before, during and after an emergency along the following priority tasks:

1. *Prevention:* Including early recognition and reduction of risks, anticipating and reducing the effects of disasters and limiting damage. Activities include support for prevention or preparedness for natural disasters, establishing early warning systems and support to civil risk management capacities, conflict mediation and strengthening of international co-ordination efforts.
2. *Emergency relief:* Actions directly aimed at rescue, saving lives and covering basic needs of victims. Support includes needs assessment, water, food and sanitation, shelters, emergency medical care, support to refugees and internally displaced persons and efforts to strengthen international coordination.
3. *Reconstruction:* Support that initiates measures for a safer future for victims through basic social and economic structures. Activities include: rebuilding basic infrastructure, housing, education. This item may also include structural assistance to persons returning from Switzerland to their country of origin.
4. *Advocacy:* A cross-cutting task aiming at strengthening responsibility for and commitments to the victims' cause in the three other priority tasks. Support may include passive protection through presence or testimony and support the commitment to humanitarian principles. Specific

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19. Switzerland endorsed the *Principles and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship* in 2003.

guidelines provide clear guidance to staff in this field, including an operational framework and the base for a code of conduct.

121. Although Switzerland's overall policy on humanitarian action is clear, there seems to be a disparity when referring to humanitarian aid in the overall SDC strategies. Humanitarian aid is considered as a separate department within SDC, but it is also sometimes referred to as a component of crisis prevention and management.

#### *Humanitarian aid in the multilateral strategic framework*

122. Switzerland strengthened its commitment to multilateral humanitarian aid following its accession to the UN in 2002. A multilateral strategy clarifying SDC's approach towards multilateral development co-operation and humanitarian aid was adopted in 2002. The humanitarian partner organisations have been included in this framework, but multilateral strategies in the field of humanitarian aid could still be more clearly spelled out by SDC. Regarding SDC's *Strategy 2010*, two of its thematic priorities directly or indirectly relate to humanitarian aid: "crisis prevention/crisis management" on the one hand, and "natural resources and environment" on the other. SDC sees a growing need for addressing global and regional humanitarian issues in relation to the armed conflicts with its humanitarian partners (UN, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs) and in multilateral institutions and fora. It attaches great importance to improving the coordination of humanitarian action at headquarters and at field levels. The role of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is key in this regard. For that reason, Switzerland's plans are to advocate, within UN relevant fora, for progressively increasing the proportion of the UN regular budget allocated to OCHA.

#### ***Volume and distribution***

##### *A potential to grow*

123. Switzerland is consistent in international burden-sharing to finance humanitarian action. However, at present it is underperforming in terms of ODA in relation to its national capacity and consequently, its potential role in financing humanitarian action is not maximised. As a new member of the UN, Switzerland should consider adopting the 0.7 ODA/GNI target and increase its ODA from existing 0.39%, while maintaining its percentage allocated to humanitarian aid. Switzerland's potential to increase its role in supporting humanitarian action should also be seen in light of its limited contributions to UN peace keeping operations.

124. Switzerland's humanitarian aid totalled USD 158 million in 2003, representing 12% of ODA. When reporting on ODA, Switzerland includes expenditures for assistance to refugees in their first 12 month's stay in a developed country in accordance with DAC reporting directives. In 2003, this item amounted to 14% of Switzerland's emergency and distress relief.

125. Based on tradition and according to Swiss authorities approximately 20% of the federal budget for ODA should consistently be allocated towards humanitarian aid. Nonetheless since 2000 the share of humanitarian aid, including expenditure on refugees in donor countries, has not exceeded 15% of ODA. Overall, there has been a decrease of ODA going to HA in both USD and as a percentage of ODA.

126. In 2003, approximately 70% of SDC's humanitarian aid was allocated through international organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross which is by far its largest recipient with more than CHF 90 million. Direct actions implemented by the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) accounted for 10%, and support to Swiss NGOs 10%. The remaining 10% is unspecified. Of the total SDC budget of CHF 272.2 million, more than 32 millions (*i.e.* 12%) was food aid, of which CHF 19 million was tied under the form of Swiss dairy products.

127. Data provided by UN-OCHA Financial Tracking System shows that Switzerland has increased its support to the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (UN-CAP) from USD 26 million in 2002 to USD 37 million in 2004, positioning Switzerland as the 12th largest CAP donor in 2004 (OCHA, 2005a, b), According to the same source Switzerland contributed 3.1 % (USD 142 million) of global humanitarian funding in 2004. (OCHA, 2005c).

128. As in most DAC countries, the enormity of the destruction of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami prompted an unprecedented response from both the general public and the private sector in Switzerland, which raised over CHF 200 million. The Federal Council allocated an additional amount of CHF 25 million for emergency relief in response to this large-scale disaster. The previous record for general public campaigns was CHF 74 million. SDC should, in collaboration with humanitarian NGOs and the private sector, reflect on what can be learned from this positive response and how this potential may be further utilised and monitored. The public generally places a high level of trust in humanitarian action, especially when delivered by Swiss NGOs. As Switzerland's humanitarian aid takes a lead position in opinion polls followed by bilateral aid and multilateral co-operation, SDC could make better use of the effectiveness and efficiency of its humanitarian aid, while advocating for increased ODA volumes as well as in its information to the general public.

### ***Principles, distribution and channels***

#### *Principles and distribution of funds – the bill and the four year global budget*

129. Switzerland's humanitarian aid is allocated based on needs for which detailed principles cannot be formalised *ex ante*. It can be provided worldwide: in 2003, 55 countries received humanitarian aid from Switzerland and 10 countries and regions were selected for specific attention. The humanitarian aid has proportionally been divided into three more or less equal parts: Approximately one third is allocated for direct actions implemented by SHA, programmes managed by Swiss NGOs and to various smaller activities. About one third is also committed to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (mainly for the ICRC) and the last one is divided between UN humanitarian agencies (WFP, UNHCR, UNRWA and OCHA mainly). In 2002, the Swiss Parliament approved a bill for the provision of humanitarian aid including a multi-year "global budget" of CHF 1.5 billion for financing international humanitarian action over a minimum of four years. This global budget is divided into six separate budget lines:

**Table 1. Switzerland's Humanitarian Aid budget structure**

Credit Framework International Humanitarian Aid 2002 – 2006/2007		CHF Million Total 1.500	%
1	Direct missions by SHA members (Including rapid response teams and specific tasks if required)	180	12
2	Contribution to the ICRC. Headquarters support (280 million CHF) and field operations, (140 million CHF)	420	28
3	Financial contributions for humanitarian operations (support to Swiss and international humanitarian partners organisations)	550	37
4	Food aid in form of Swiss dairy products	140	9
5	Food Aid in form of cereals (local purchases and/or triangular transactions)	100	7
6	Mandatory reserve for disasters and emergencies not covered by the annual budget	110	7

130. This bill is implemented by the Swiss Confederation and does not include the contributions by Cantons and Municipalities. The global multi-year framework credit budget is indicative and not binding. Annual budgets are being approved on a yearly basis by parliament, as with other development co-operation framework credits. Ideally the five-year credit framework could provide measures for multi-year funding arrangements, as in practice, however, annual budgets are subject to parliamentary approval. This rather complicated system works well, but could be simplified and budget lines merged. The budget should indicate allocations to multilateral support in relation to national rapid response mechanisms and support to Swiss NGOs. Furthermore, the present division of budget lines indicates limitations in terms of the untied status of food aid items (see Policy Coherence below).

131. Switzerland recognises and supports both UN coordination efforts and the unique mandate conferred upon the ICRC by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Existing policies encourage timely, flexible funding in relation to humanitarian needs. However, Switzerland could consider developing directives for timely disbursements of funds for CAPs.

#### *Channels – Swiss Partnerships for Humanitarian Action*

132. Swiss humanitarian aid is dependent on active partnerships with ICRC (and with the IFRC to a lesser extent), with UN-OCHA and with its main UN humanitarian partners as well as with international and national NGOs. Depending on the context, Switzerland may form ad hoc operational alliances with other countries and organizations to increase the effectiveness and the coordination of its actions. Co-operation with public and private institutions is also an important component. Switzerland recognizes the subsidiary role of the military in the provision of international humanitarian assistance under the existing international civil-military co-operation guidelines.

133. Swiss NGOs hold a strong position in implementing Swiss humanitarian aid. In 2003 Switzerland provided funding to 11 large NGOs. The five main partners were Caritas (24%); Terre des Hommes (13%); Swiss Red Cross (10%); Médecins sans Frontières (8%) and Medair (6%). It should be noted that 39% of the remaining funds were allocated to other NGOs, signalling a wide dispersion. SDC should make efforts to further concentrate its support to Swiss NGOs to prevent the proliferation of NGOs implementing humanitarian aid.

#### ***Cross-cutting and emerging issues***

##### *Cross-cutting issues*

134. *Promoting standards and enhancing implementation:* As the depositary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocols, Switzerland has traditionally made significant contributions to the implementation and development of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Switzerland identifies the promotion of IHL as a core area of its humanitarian foreign policy (Federal Council, 2000). On an operational basis, Switzerland has also contributed in developing practical tools to promote accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian institutions and by promoting the dissemination of standards and principles through NGOs.

135. *Involvement of beneficiaries:* The extent to which and how Switzerland ensures adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of its humanitarian activities is unclear. Furthermore, environmental and social (including gender-related) aspects of humanitarian aid could be more explicitly addressed by SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department.

*Innovative humanitarian approaches - cash projects and disaster risk reduction*

136. SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department has designed and implemented "cash projects" as a complementary method to traditional humanitarian assistance in emergency situations. Beneficiaries are offered unconditional financial contributions linked to their specific situations *e.g.* giving temporary shelters to victims of natural disasters or conflicts. A recent joint external review comparing in-kind and financial contributions in response to an emergency appeal in Mongolia (2003) concluded that cash projects offered significant advantages over in-kind contributions. The possibilities to plan and implement cash-based as well as vouchers approaches have therefore become a standard component of SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department programming tools. Between 1999 and 2004 approximately USD 17 million was spent on various cash projects assisting some 87,500 beneficiaries in various contexts. SDC has also tested micro-finance approaches in its response to natural disasters, but this approach should rather be managed through development co-operation programmes when addressing longer term reconstruction and recovery.

137. Disaster risk reduction is a priority task that SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department has further developed (see Box 5).

**Box 5. Switzerland's approach to disaster risk reduction**

Natural disasters worldwide have claimed more than 600 000 lives, affected the lives of over 2 billion people and caused economic losses estimated at USD 700 billion during the last decade. The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami tragically demonstrated the impact of natural disasters on development and poverty alleviation. In 2005 the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) addressed challenges relating to natural disasters identified in five areas i) governance, ii) risk assessments iii) advocacy and education iv) risk reduction and v) preparedness, response and recovery mechanisms. The output of the WCDR, "*The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015*", established recommendations for disaster risk reduction which pose a growing challenge to both development and humanitarian action. Switzerland contributed financially and substantially to the preparation and implementation of the WCDR. It is committed to support the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, at all relevant levels (sub-national, national, regional and global).

SDC recognises the complementary role of development co-operation and humanitarian aid in addressing the risks and impact of natural disasters. The Humanitarian Aid Department of SDC has developed an advanced approach of integrating prevention and preparedness in sustainable development programming. This approach focuses on disaster risk reduction and recognises how social vulnerability, identified in physical and social as well as economic terms, is a major reason for the massive increase in victims and economic loss caused by natural disasters. This approach also focuses on changed environmental conditions, brought about by climate change and large scale deforestation. SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department will take an active role in integrating risk reduction in sustainable development planning and it will continue to promote the mainstreaming of a culture of disaster risk reduction within SDC.

***Policy coherence***

138. *Civil military relations:* Switzerland supports the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action. In the past years, it has actively promoted the clarification of the respective roles of civilian and military actors in emergencies and it has advocated for further clarifications in the relevant international forums. Switzerland has advocated the respect for the humanitarian principles in international discussions on humanitarian action at the General Assembly, the ECOSOC and the Security Council. Similarly, it has supported efforts aiming at improved access for humanitarian organisations to civilian populations in need, to give greater protection to the latter during armed conflicts. Switzerland respects and further disseminates the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*. Switzerland may ask for military support in a subsidiary

role. Civil-military co-operation should be predefined and mutually planned with civilians retaining overall responsibility. Given its longstanding involvement, Switzerland could consider taking a lead role on the better respect for the existing Guidelines covering the provision of civil-military co-operation in natural disasters and in complex emergencies.

139. *Untying Food Aid:* While, the bill relating to the continued provision of international humanitarian aid offers clear guidance for supplying food aid, recognizing in particular the importance of cash contributions and the risk of destabilising local markets, it also provides a separate budget lines for food aid in the form of Swiss dairy products. Allocations of food aid are defined in accordance with the Federal Office for Agriculture of the Department of Economic Affairs. The criteria determining the distribution and the monitoring of dairy products are identified in separate operational guidelines. In view of the current trends in the trade negotiations and within the development co-operation debate, Switzerland should consider, without reducing the level of its commitment to fighting hunger and food insecurity around the world, to progressively provide its food aid in a fully untied form.

140. *Migration:* Voluntary return programs, including return support and structural assistance, have been financed and managed by the Federal Office for Migration (FOM) in co-operation with the SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department and other stakeholders. These programmes offer a range of services aimed at encouraging persons granted temporary asylum or those persons whose claims for refugee status have not been recognized by Switzerland to return to their country of origin on a voluntary basis. Switzerland should ensure that narrower national interests related to migration issues do not influence allocations and decision-making. Switzerland could consider evaluating its voluntary return programs from both cost efficiency and observance of humanitarian principles perspectives.

### ***Organisation and Management***

#### *Humanitarian aid architecture – a centralised system in SDC*

141. The Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation is highly centralised and located in the SDC within the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (see Figure 3). The Humanitarian Aid Department has a staff of 94 and is responsible for managing, co-ordinating, implementing and evaluating humanitarian aid. It has also authority over the Swiss Rescue response mechanism (see below). The Department has specialised divisions covering technical support, geographic and thematic responsibilities as follows:

- The *Division for Multilateral Affairs and Special Assignments* represents SDC in major humanitarian organisations, at the institutional and policy levels, in particular within multilateral humanitarian bodies and foras.
- The four *Geographical Divisions* (Africa, Asia and America, Middle East and North Africa, Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States) have the operational responsibility for bilateral (such as direct actions implemented by SHA experts) and multi-bilateral programmes in their respective regions. They are also responsible for the humanitarian aid programmes managed by staff in Swiss co-operation offices and Embassies.
- Two Divisions are involved in direct support to humanitarian activities; One manages the pool of humanitarian experts, *Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit* (SHA) and is responsible for recruitment, training and operational support; the second one is responsible for logistics, equipment support and transport.
- One unit is responsible for *evaluation and control*.

142. Co-ordination and consultation with other units of the Federal Administration responsible for areas such as migration, human rights, the environment and economic policy are well developed and are

key to continuing to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian action. There is, however, a potential risk of overlapping policies and conflicting positions within the DFA in the area of complex emergencies. Conflict prevention is a recognised component of humanitarian aid but it also remains a separate policy area within SDC. As well, the Political Division for Human Security (PD IV) within the Political Directorate, is responsible for peace promotion and interventions for the protection of Human Rights and Democracy. Increased consultations and coordination, including with the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports are needed to ensure coherence. Multilateral approaches could also benefit from better co-ordination.

143. Since 2003, the Humanitarian Aid Department has been physically located outside SDC headquarters, thereby creating a distance for accessing SDC's bilateral and multilateral development co-operation units. This could hamper SDC's efforts to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of its support to transition countries as well as to integrate disaster risk reduction in sustainable development planning. In any case, SDC should promote a more proactive system for managing the transition from humanitarian aid to development co-operation.

#### *Operational structures - an advanced national rapid response capacity*

144. *The Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA)* is a reserve unit with a pool of more than 700 humanitarian experts divided into nine specialised groups ready for short-term deployment or long-term missions. Experts are deployed to the field for direct actions or they are seconded for temporary support to multilateral humanitarian organisations (mainly UNHCR, WFP, UN-OCHA and the ICRC). SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department also manages a logistics base with emergency supplies to cover needs of more than 10 000 people for a three month period. In 2003 SHA experts completed 362 missions (of which 65 were secondments) at the cost of CHF 30 million. Of these 40 % were conducted in Africa.

145. *Swiss Rescue* is another mechanism under the management of SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department specialised in urban search and rescue activities. When it is deployed, for instance after a major earthquake, Swiss Rescue may be composed of about 100 persons (generalists and additional specialists, dog handlers, rescuers and emergency doctors), search dogs and humanitarian supplies from eight partner organisations (private and public, civilian and military). Swiss Rescue can be deployed within eight to twelve hours and can operate autonomously for up to seven days. In crisis situations or in a case-by-case basis, SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department may deploy smaller Rapid Response Teams (4-6 persons) for short-term assessment missions and for initiating relief efforts. All missions are financed through the SDC's Humanitarian Aid budget.

146. As demonstrated by the response to the earthquake in Bam (2003) the uncoordinated and excessive deployment of international Search and Rescue Teams often bypasses local capacities. Through its activities in the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), Switzerland advocates for supporting national response capacity mechanisms in conformity with its Humanitarian Aid Strategy 2005, to ensure that support to humanitarian action does not become a platform for advocating a self image or an area where each country pursues national interests. The cost of using international response teams should be weighed against using, building and empowering local capacities. SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department should continue to further develop local response capacity mechanisms in its programmes.

#### *Country operations*

147. SDC provided humanitarian aid to 55 countries in 2003. Humanitarian aid is a significant part of Switzerland's bilateral expenditure. Africa is the largest recipient (CHF 61 million) followed by Asia (CHF 49.3 million) and Europe (CHF 49.3 million), CHF 97 million is unclassified. Responsibilities for allocating humanitarian funds are not delegated to Swiss embassies or co-ordination offices but staff from

Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) may be deployed to strengthen field posts and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance in crisis situations. In 2003, SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department was represented in 16 Swiss co-operation offices.

148. Switzerland could develop further its use of humanitarian strategies, strengthen the needs-based approach and promote harmonisation and alignment in complex emergencies Switzerland could consider developing humanitarian country or regional programs based on the UN Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP).

#### *Promoting learning and accountability*

149. Increased attention should be paid to lessons learnt from evaluations. Switzerland is a member of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)<sup>20</sup> and could initiate a joint donor evaluation in the field of prevention and preparedness in relation to natural disasters given its advanced approach in this area. Regarding accountability and transparency, Switzerland should produce a more comprehensive statement in its annual report on the expenditure of humanitarian aid.

#### *Future considerations*

- **Policy:** Switzerland is well placed to promote GHD among other DAC and non DAC donors and should actively engage in this work, including exploring ways of broadening the funding base for humanitarian aid. Although Swiss humanitarian policy is clear, SDC should ensure that humanitarian aid remains a separate discipline, albeit interlinked, in relation to the policy area of “Crisis Prevention and Management”. SDC could further define its strategies in the field of multilateral humanitarian aid as well as making them operational. The methodology for involving beneficiaries in humanitarian response and addressing environmental and social (including gender-related) aspects of humanitarian aid should be further addressed in strategies for implementation.
- **Funding:** When increasing its ODA Switzerland should maintain the percentage allocated to humanitarian aid. SDC could also use its strong humanitarian aid while advocating for increased ODA volumes. The use of the credit framework for multi-year funding arrangements should be explored further. The budget structure could be simplified and structured to better reflect allocations to multilateral support in relation to rapid response mechanism and support to Swiss, international and local NGOs. Switzerland should ensure that the food aid component of its humanitarian aid be progressively fully untied. SDC should make efforts to develop directives for timely disbursements of funds for CAP's and to further concentrate its support to Swiss NGOs to prevent proliferation of NGOs implementing humanitarian aid.
- **Management:** The potential risk of overlapping policies and conflicting positions between DFA Directorates in the area of complex emergencies should be addressed. Increased consultation and coordination between SDC, the Political Division IV and the relevant units of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports is needed to ensure improved coherence. Multilateral approaches could also benefit from increased coordination. SDC should promote a proactive management of the transition from humanitarian to development co-operation by ensuring that SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department gets appropriate access to SDC development

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20. ALNAP is an international inter-agency forum working to improve learning accountability and quality across the humanitarian sector.

co-operation bilateral and multilateral planning. SDC could also develop the management of its humanitarian country and regional strategies and their alignment to the UN Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP). The use of humanitarian specialists (SHA) in embassies and co-operation offices could be evaluated to further strengthen this function in field operations. The cost of using rapid response mechanisms, such as Swiss Rescue and Rapid Response Teams, should be weighed against using local strengthened capacities and Switzerland should consider further support this approach while implementing its disaster risk reduction programmes.

- **Learning and accountability:** As Switzerland's humanitarian aid is involved in the voluntary return programs, it should consider evaluating such programmes from a cost efficiency perspective and observance of humanitarian principles. Switzerland should, in collaboration with humanitarian NGOs and the private sector, reflect on what can be learned from the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and how the use of the additional funds raised thereafter could be monitored. Switzerland could consider taking a lead role safeguarding the respect for the existing guidelines covering the provision of civil-military co-operation in natural disasters and in complex emergencies.



## BELGIUM

### The DAC'S Main Findings and Recommendations

#### *A humanitarian programme with potential to grow*

150. Belgium operates a comparatively small humanitarian aid programme although increased attention has lately been given to humanitarian aid. Belgium has committed itself to the “*Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*” (GHD) and participates in various fora related to humanitarian policy development. Since the last Peer Review in 2001 Belgium has increased its net disbursements on emergency and distress relief from USD 26.6 million in 2001 to USD 110.8 million in 2003. This volume represents 6% of gross disbursement and is below the DAC average (7.4%). However, this increase reflects disbursement on the item “refugees in donor country” and has not resulted in additional funding available for responding to humanitarian needs. Belgium’s humanitarian programme has remained constant around USD 33.5 million between 2000 and 2003, which is below the DAC average.

151. Management structures and procedures for administering humanitarian aid are complex. Responsibility for humanitarian aid is shared between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation. Administration of humanitarian aid is primarily located in two departments in DGDC, namely the Department for Special Programmes and the Department for Multilateral and European Programmes. The management system with dual responsibility for humanitarian aid is also reflected in a complicated budget structure which is fragmented and not optimised to promote flexibility and timeliness, placing high demands on co-ordination and administration in a system with very few staff.

#### *Addressing the challenges of good humanitarian donorship*

152. To confirm its commitment to GHD, Belgium should consider developing an internal implementation plan for GHD. Such plan should address challenges at policy level, management systems and administrative routines. Despite the Royal Decree of 1996 which sets the framework for financing humanitarian action and implementing humanitarian aid, there is no comprehensive policy document explaining Belgium’s approach to humanitarian action. This makes it difficult to assess how priorities are set and how support for humanitarian action adheres to humanitarian principles. Belgium should therefore consider elaborating a comprehensive policy document for humanitarian action. When developing its humanitarian aid policy Belgium should consider its implementation approach and how this policy area relates to other activities indirectly linked to humanitarian aid i.e. conflict prevention and assistance to “fragile states”. Furthermore, preventive measures for emergencies such as disaster risk reduction, including support to local capacities, could be further developed and integrated in Belgium’s development cooperation planning, in view of the priority it gives to partner countries vulnerable to natural disasters.

153. Belgium’s potential role in financing humanitarian action should be seen in light of the ambitious targets set to improve ODA volume. As Belgium moves towards the 0.7% ODA/GNI target in 2010, it should consider a substantial increase in allocations for humanitarian purposes. Belgium should also clarify and strengthen its management system for implementation of its humanitarian programme. To strengthen the needs-based approach and promote harmonisation and alignment in complex emergencies, it could explore further how to take full advantage of its country operations and develop humanitarian strategies based on the UN Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP).

### *Recommendations*

- Belgium should finalise and implement as soon as possible its policy document for humanitarian action reflecting the “*Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*” (GHD) which it has endorsed.
- Within a growing ODA budget, Belgium could consider increasing its allocation to humanitarian aid, including prevention and preparedness, emergency response and recovery and reconstruction in line with GHD and a needs-based approach. Measures should also be taken to further improve the transparency of funding decisions and the predictability of long-term funding arrangements to partners implementing humanitarian activities.
- Belgium should consider concentrating and consolidating its management of humanitarian aid by establishing a single unit within its organisation responsible for humanitarian aid. Belgium should also further develop its systems for intra- and inter-ministerial co-operation in order to optimise its humanitarian response and decision-making for funding humanitarian action.

### **Secretariat Report**

#### ***Humanitarian Policies and Principles***

154. Belgium’s humanitarian aid is governed by the Royal Decree of 19 November 1996, which sets the framework for financing humanitarian action and implementing humanitarian aid. This decree identifies “short-term emergency and rehabilitation aid” with the objective to provide humanitarian aid to “people in distress who have been the victims of natural or man-made disasters on a scale and gravity which exceed local and national assistance capabilities”. The concept of Belgium’s short-term emergency and rehabilitation aid is made up of the following three components:

5. **Preventing natural disasters:** Activities directly aimed at promoting preventive measures.
6. **Emergency aid:** Meeting the vital needs of people faced with human violence or natural disasters.
7. **Immediate post-emergency or short-term rehabilitation aid** aimed at developing short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in order to help disaster-stricken populations in reaching a basic level of self-sufficiency and to ensure the transition towards development programmes.

155. In addition Belgium distinguishes food aid as a special dimension of humanitarian aid and identifies three distinct categories: i) **Food Aid:** In the context of the 1999 Food Aid Convention, and in accordance with the agreements entered into with the European Union, Belgium supplies a minimum of 30 000 tonnes of cereal equivalent to developing countries each year. In accordance with EC Council regulations, Belgium allocates this aid to selected priority countries to overcome temporary food shortage arising from crisis situations. The objective is to temporarily restore food supplies and to support food security programmes;<sup>21</sup> ii) **Emergency food aid:** Supplied only in situations arising from unforeseeable emergencies; iii) **Rehabilitation food aid:** Aims to rebuild and restore rural production systems in a sustainable way among disaster-stricken populations.

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21 . EC Council Regulation no. 1292/96 of 27 June 1996.

156. Despite the Royal Decree of 1996 there is no comprehensive policy document explaining Belgium's approach to humanitarian action. This makes it difficult to assess how Belgium sets its priorities and ensures that its support for humanitarian action adheres to humanitarian principles. However, the Peer Review team were informed that a process of developing a humanitarian aid policy is underway. The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), endorsed by Belgium in 2003, should provide the point of departure for developing such new policy.

157. When developing its humanitarian aid policy Belgium should consider its implementation approach and how this policy area relates to other activities indirectly linked to humanitarian aid i.e. conflict prevention and assistance to so-called "fragile states". Furthermore, preventive measures for natural disasters such as disaster risk reduction, including support to local capacities, could be further developed and integrated in Belgium's development co-operation planning.

### ***Volume and distribution***

#### *Volume*

158. Since the last Peer Review in 2001 Belgium has increased its net disbursements on emergency and distress relief from current USD 26.6 million in 2001 to current USD 110.8 million in 2003. The emergency assistance share of gross ODA disbursements has also increased, from 3% in 2001 to 6% in 2004. However, Belgium's contribution is below the DAC average of 7.4% in 2003 and despite the increase in reported emergency and distress relief, additional funding for humanitarian aid has not been provided as this increase only reflects "refugees in donor country". Since 1997 and in accordance with the DAC reporting directives, Belgium includes in its ODA expenditures for assistance to refugees in their first twelve months of stay in a donor country. In 2002, this item amounted to 0.2% of the reported emergency and distress relief. After a shift in policy for reporting data to the DAC, this item accounted for 72% of emergency and distress relief in 2003. According to DAC figures, expenditure for humanitarian response remained unchanged, at around constant 2002 USD 33.5 million, between 2000 and 2003.

159. Belgium's potential role in financing humanitarian action should be seen in light of the ambitious targets set to improve ODA volume. As Belgium moves towards meeting the 0.7% ODA/GNI target in 2010, it should consider a substantial increase in allocations for humanitarian purposes.

160. Data provided by UN-OCHA's Financial Tracking System show that Belgium has increased its support to the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (UN-CAP) from USD 10.5 million in 2001 to USD 28.8 million in 2004, making Belgium the 15th largest CAP donor in 2004 (OCHA, 2005a, b).

#### *Budget structure*

161. The nature of humanitarian action places special demands on budgetary systems and governments use different methods to ensure a needs-based, timely and flexible response. Humanitarian budget systems include specially earmarked annual ODA envelopes for multilateral, bilateral and NGO funding; reallocations of bilateral ODA; special institutional arrangements, including rapid response funds and special budgetary transition arrangements.

162. Belgium funds humanitarian action from a separate budget line. Its humanitarian budget structure is divided in two main parts, of which one is managed by three divisions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation, and the other part is managed within the DGDC (Table 2).

163. This budget system is fragmented and not optimised from the viewpoint of flexibility and response speed. The budget structure is further complicated by the way funds are managed and by the fact

that responsibilities for humanitarian aid are divided between two units of the ministry (described separately below). To improve performance this budget might be reviewed.

#### *Funding principles*

164. Belgium funds humanitarian action implemented by UN humanitarian agencies, the International Red Cross movement, and national or international non-governmental organisations. It is mainly in response to appeals or applications from these agencies and organizations that Belgium provides such grants. Certain operational activities of other national agencies may also be financed from the humanitarian budget, such as the national response capacity B-FAST (see the section on national intervention capacities, below). Financing decisions are based on available needs assessments, mainly those produced by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), in conjunction with internal assessments and separate NGO applications. It is unclear how Belgium ensures that funding of humanitarian action directed at high-profile crises does not adversely affect meeting the needs of other ongoing and “forgotten” crises.

**Table 2. Belgium's budget structure for Humanitarian Aid**

Humanitarian Aid (EUR thousands)		2004	%	2005	%
<b>Public Federal Service of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development co-operation (PFSFA)</b>					
1	General services (Division 40)	1 261	2.3	1 178	2.4
2	Directorate-General for Consular Affairs (Division 52)	122	0.2	122	0.3
3	Directorate-General for Multilateral Affairs and Globalisation (Division 53)*	54 322	97.5	47 312	27.8
	<i>Sub Total – MFA</i>	<i>55 7053</i>		<i>48 612</i>	
<b>DG – Development Co-operation</b>					
4	Special Programmes – Food Aid (DGDC – D2.1)	12 800	45.1	17 000	46.7
5	Special Programmes - Transition, reconstruction and consolidation of society (DGDC – D2.3)	5 500	19.4	9 000	24.7
6	Multilateral Co-operation - Voluntary contributions to humanitarian organizations (DGDC - D4.3)	10 072	35.5	10 400	28.6
	<i>Sub Total – DGDC</i>	<i>28 372</i>		<i>36 400</i>	
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>84 077</b>		<b>85 012</b>	

\* The amount shown also covers non-humanitarian aid commitments, since it includes all allocations, embracing preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as well as emergency and rehabilitation assistance.

Source: Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation, Activity Report 2004.

165. Policies relating to resource allocation between multilateral and bilateral channels are not explicitly stated but Belgium is striving to increase its support to multilateral humanitarian agencies. Belgium uses “soft” earmarking in its multilateral funding.

166. Due to constraints in the budget system Belgium cannot make longer-term funding arrangements and Belgium is limited by law to funding international and Belgian NGOs only. National NGOs of other countries may not be financed from the humanitarian budget. In order to speed up funding procedures Belgium could consider developing a system where implementing partners could be entrusted with handling “rapid response funds”.

167. Belgium should try to make its UN-CAP contributions early in the year (January or February) and to provide stable, un-earmarked funding to its major humanitarian partners. It could also further develop its approaches to ensure that humanitarian aid is needs based. In doing so Belgium could consider developing a way of participating in all UN-CAPs. Multi-year funding arrangements should also be considered for long-term, complex emergencies and current constraints to such funding should be reviewed.

### *Crosscutting and emerging issues*

168. **Promoting standards and enhancing implementation:** Belgian practice recognises and supports the role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination for international humanitarian action. Belgium contributes to UN OCHA's coordination efforts and the Consolidated Appeals Process. It is also a member of the OCHA Donor Support Group. The roles and mandates of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) are also recognised and respected.

169. Belgium supports the development of practical tools to promote accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action and dissemination of standards and principles. To ensure that implementing organisations adhere to humanitarian guidelines and codes of conduct Belgium insists on its application procedures and formats. However these application procedures could be up-dated once the new humanitarian policy is adopted, and they could be supplemented with assessments of implementing partners' capacities.

170. **Transition support:** The current organisation of Belgium's humanitarian and transitional assistance administration poses particular challenges to intra- and inter-ministerial co-ordination. The role of the Belgian Technical Co-operation office (CTB) in transition planning is not clear. Six of Belgium's top ten recipients in 2002-03 were countries immersed in or emerging from armed conflict. Two budget lines managed by the Social Development Department (D2.3) are used for transition in post-emergency situations where Belgium will be engaged in longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction. The budget line for "Conflict Prevention and Peace Building" aims at providing support for democratic development and reconciliation. It falls under the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A second budget line for use in transition situations was introduced in 2001 and falls under the responsibility of the Minister for Development Co-operation. The usefulness of this dual approach should be looked at further.

171. **Involvement of beneficiaries:** The extent to which Belgium ensures adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of its humanitarian activities, and how it does so, is unclear. The government should elaborate further on measures to ensure beneficiaries' involvement and develop operational approaches to address environmental and social (including gender-related) aspects of humanitarian aid in implementation.

### *Policy coherence*

172. **Civilian and military interaction:** Civilian and military co-operation in humanitarian action raises major concerns regarding impartiality, effectiveness and security. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support humanitarian action, Belgium must strive to ensure that such use conforms to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and humanitarian principles and must recognise the leading role of humanitarian organisations. A new policy should make explicit reference to guidelines on the use of military and civilian assets and should recognise the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action.

173. **Untying status of emergency food aid:** Belgium has a policy of untied food aid, which also applies to emergency food aid. The Belgian position is that whatever form food aid takes it should be provided as a gift to the beneficiary countries, and preference is given to local and regional purchases. Emergency food aid policies are appropriate and should be reflected in the new humanitarian aid policy.

### ***Organisation and Management***

#### *Humanitarian aid architecture*

174. Belgium's organisational approach to humanitarian aid is scattered. Political responsibility is shared between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Co-operation. Humanitarian aid is administered primarily by two departments in the Directorate-General for Development Co-operation (DGDC), namely the Department for Special Programmes (D2) and the Department for Multilateral and European Programmes (D4).

175. Since the last Peer Review there have been two important changes in management of humanitarian aid. In 2004 responsibility for humanitarian action was transferred to the minister for Foreign Affairs. With further changes in 2005, responsibility for humanitarian action in partner countries is now shared between the minister for Foreign affairs and the minister for Development co-operation. Moving responsibility for humanitarian aid to the minister for Foreign affairs has partially removed humanitarian aid from the DGDC's purview towards that of the Directorate-General for Multilateral affairs and Globalisation (DGM). A small portion of the humanitarian aid budget is also managed through the Directorate-General for Consular Affairs (DGC). It can be argued that this strengthens co-ordination between approaches to humanitarian and development assistance. Nonetheless it also creates an unnecessary administrative constraint that slows response times and diminishes flexibility.

176. The administration of humanitarian aid is primarily located in two divisions within the department of Special Programmes in the Directorate-General for Development Co-operation (DGDC).

- i) Emergency Aid, Rehabilitation and Food Aid (D2.1), responsible for financing, planning and monitoring of programmes related to disaster prevention, emergency response, and short-term rehabilitation following armed conflicts or natural disasters. Humanitarian aid programmes may also take the form of long-term food aid programmes.
- ii) Social Development (D2.3), which finances projects and programmes related to peace building, primarily focused on the existing partner countries of Belgian development co-operation. The division is also responsible for field monitoring of programmes.

177. Also within the department of Special Programmes is the Belgian Survival Fund (D2.2), which is exclusively focused on food security programmes in Africa and is not involved in financing or administration of humanitarian aid programmes.

178. The United Nations Division (D4.3) within the Multilateral and European Programmes Department (D4) administers annual core grants to multilateral support and international organizations involved with humanitarian aid (OCHA, UNCHR and ICRC/IFRC).

179. It is unclear where the responsibility for policy development and co-ordination of humanitarian aid is located and managed and to what extent humanitarian aid is represented in the department of Policy Support (D0.1). And it should be noted that the responsibility for the monitoring GHD is shared between two departments, (D2.1 and D4.3). The extent to which humanitarian aid relates to the Directorate of Non-Governmental Programmes (D3) is also unclear.

180. Management structures and procedures for administering humanitarian action continue to be complex, placing high demands on co-ordination and additional weight on limited resources. At 12, the staffing level for managing humanitarian aid is critically low. The organisational management structure outlined above betrays a lack of clarity that is likely to have a negative effect on delivery. Belgium should explore ways to consolidate and concentrate management of humanitarian aid while ensuring its independence in accordance with humanitarian principles. The organisational structure of other DAC donors, such as Switzerland, might be of interest here.

*The national response mechanism – The Belgian First Aid & Support Team (B-FAST)*

181. In November 2000, at the proposal of the minister for Foreign affairs, the minister for Home affairs and the minister for Defence, the Federal Council of ministers authorised the creation of a rapid response structure with the mandate to dispatch emergency aid teams to countries affected by man-made or natural disasters. This interdepartmental structure groups the Office of the Prime Minister and the federal ministries of Foreign affairs, Foreign trade and Development co-operation, Public Health & Environment, Home affairs, Budget and Defence all under the co-ordination of the minister for Foreign affairs. In 2004 it operated with an annual budget of EUR 24 million.

182. Once a decision is made by the B-FAST's executive body, the Coordination Council, chaired by the minister for Foreign affairs, Belgian emergency teams can be mobilised within 12 hours and they will remain in the field, in principle, for 10 days. During and after the operation, the team reports to a Planning Committee, responsible for the strategic phases, and to an Advisory Committee, which includes national experts and NGO representatives. Three conditions must be met to trigger a B-FAST response: i) the problem must be too big for the emergency services in the country in question to cope with and human lives or health must be at risk; ii) the authorities in the country affected must request assistance from Belgium, or at least from the international community; iii) there must be no armed conflict under way in the country requesting assistance.

183. At the international level, Belgium has also contributed to the establishment of the European coordination mechanism. B-FAST is involved in many projects such as those of INSARAG (International Search & Rescue Advisory Group) under the auspices of the OCHA/UN.

*Country operations*

184. Embassies are not delegated any humanitarian decisions or funds. Embassies have an advisory role, but cannot make commitments. Co-operation Attachés in embassies handle all issues concerning development co-operation policy but their role in relation to humanitarian aid remains ill defined. Belgium should consider strengthening its field representation with humanitarian specialists where situations call for closer monitoring. This would also strengthen approaches to transition from humanitarian to development support.

185. To promote the implementation of the Good Humanitarian Donorship agenda, Belgium, together with the USA, took the lead in an approach aimed at improving the UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and rallying donors to a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Box 6).

*Promoting learning and accountability*

186. **Evaluation systems.** The Department of Follow-up, Evaluation and Statistics (D0.2) is responsible for measuring and monitoring the performance of the co-operation programmes financed by the DGDC. Its involvement and the resources it employs in evaluating humanitarian aid could be better defined and strengthened. Learning across departments and other arms of government in relation to

humanitarian action could also prove difficult with the present management of humanitarian aid. If a new or updated policy or strategy is to be adopted it should be closely monitored.

187. **Accountability and transparency.** Belgium's reporting systems for humanitarian aid could be further refined and it could benefit from a more detailed format. Belgium should follow and adjust its reporting capacity to the work under way within DAC and the UN Financial Tracking System. Belgium should also consider making information on its humanitarian aid disbursements more transparent and detailed in its annual reports on development co-operation.

#### **Box 6. Taking GHD to the field – improving the Common Humanitarian Action Plan in the DRC**

**Context:** The armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II and has resulted in the loss of nearly 4 million lives since 1998. The recent war originated after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. When groups responsible for the genocide took refuge in eastern Congo, Rwanda and Uganda backed a rebellion in the Congo in 1997 which installed Laurent Kabila. Following Kabila's attempts to remove ethnic groups in the government, Rwanda intervened again in 1998. With assistance from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, Kabila managed to avoid this second invasion but the conflict spiralled into large scale-war. Despite a ceasefire in 1999 and deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) in 2000, the violence continued. In 2001, Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. Peace negotiations continued and a power-sharing unity government was set up in 2003. Meanwhile, regional conflicts over land and mineral wealth in eastern Congo escalated into widespread inter-ethnic violence and massacres during 2002-2003. An EU mission was launched in 2003 which improved security and a strengthened UN mission (MONUC II) was deployed in 2003. The conflicts in the eastern region of the country (North and South Kivu and Ituri) have had dramatic humanitarian consequences. Observers claim that an estimated 1 000 people are dying daily as a result of hunger and disease caused by war. The humanitarian community has attempted to respond to increased humanitarian needs without the benefit of a comprehensive assessment, further hampered by the lack of operational capacity, financial resources and humanitarian access. Given the enormous needs, successful humanitarian action depends on increased funding and the flexibility of all actors to respond given the unpredictable operating environment. The goal of the humanitarian community in the DRC is threefold: a) to save lives; b) to reduce vulnerability in the affected communities; and c) to optimise coordination mechanisms and to facilitate the transition from humanitarian assistance to development.

**The GHD Pilot Exercise:** The DRC was selected for pilot implementation of GHD for the period 2003–05. The purpose of the approach was to strengthen the UN Consolidated Appeal (CAP) and seek ways to harmonise donor practices around the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP). The pilot exercise aimed to encompass all of the GHD principles/practices through the elaboration of fourteen impact indicators to measure donor behaviour in the DRC. Emphasis was given to working within established UN processes to avoid overlap or duplication and to promote the role of the UN in providing leadership and coordination of international humanitarian action. Leadership for the pilot was shared between Belgium and the USA, which set out to enlist major donors (Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK), UN agencies and representatives from NGO community. Belgium and the USA undertook missions to the DRC to discuss the GHD initiative with field-based partners and participated in the UN CAP/CHAP workshop to prioritise humanitarian action for 2005. A "peer review mechanism" was elaborated to improve project selection for the CAP. This was an important step in determining whether donors have the basis for further harmonisation of practice in line with the GHD principles in a country-specific context.

**Outcomes:** Donor participation in elaborating a humanitarian strategy for the DRC helped to clarify their intentions and also served to improve prioritisation within the CAP and the CHAP. As the 2005 UN-CHAP for the DRC reflected a clearer hierarchy of needs, it raised expectations that donors would provide increased funding in support of the agreed strategy. The 2005 Consolidated Appeal for the DRC amounted to USD 200 million but six months after its launch funding levels only amounted to 35% of the total request. Funding decisions based on a solid assessment of need is a cornerstone of GHD. However, little progress was made in using common needs assessment formats or in tracking or analysing data from existing needs assessments. Future work in relation to GHD should focus on how to systematise the use of needs assessments and to derive a common framework for analysis. Donors involved in this pilot agreed on the need to better define targets and indicators including monitoring of OCHA's performance in the field and to measure work on protection. The pilot also aimed at improving the process of linking humanitarian and development partners and activities. Bilateral development partners participated and specific activities/program areas were highlighted during the process as being important to humanitarian work but more appropriate for development actors. An evaluation of donor behaviour planned for 2005 will see to what extent donor funding addresses highest priority needs. The participants in the pilot exercise also agreed that consideration should be given to identifying a "neutral forum", such as the DAC, to pursue future activities.

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(cont'd)

**Belgian perspectives on the pilot exercise:** Humanitarian aid constitutes 10% of Belgium's ODA to the DRC. In 2004 Belgium provided 8% of the funding to the DRC CAP making it the fourth biggest donor. Belgium remains concerned over the quality of needs assessments and calls for further improvements regarding the content of the CAP. In its view, OCHA's role must be strengthened, the CAP focused on humanitarian components only and UN agencies must refrain from using the CAP as a general fund raising vehicle. As NGOs are the main implementing partners of bilateral donors and the UN alike, donors should support the Humanitarian Coordinator in ensuring that NGOs are equal partners in all processes. Belgium would also like to see a more active involvement of the EC-ECHO.

### *Future considerations*

#### *Policy*

- Belgium should consider elaborating a comprehensive policy document for humanitarian action, including natural disaster response (especially in relation to prevention and preparedness), to ensure consistency with the endorsed principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship. The policy document should also address issues related to beneficiaries' involvement, environment and rights perspectives, especially gender.
- Belgium could strengthen its procedures, including those for safe access to humanitarian help, to ensure they respect the 1994 *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* and the 2003 *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*.

#### *Funding levels and principles*

- While increasing its ODA, Belgium should also consider further increasing its allocations to humanitarian aid in line with a needs-based approach.
- Measures could be taken to further improve the transparency of funding decisions and the predictability of long-term funding arrangements for protracted emergency situations. In addition, more flexibility in using such funds could be granted to partners implementing humanitarian activities.

#### *Management*

- Belgium should consider concentrating and consolidating its approaches to humanitarian aid by establishing a separate unit within its organisation responsible for humanitarian aid and to facilitate transition to reconstruction and long-term development.
- Belgium should further develop its systems for intra- and inter-ministerial co-operation in order to optimise its humanitarian response and decision-making for funding humanitarian action.



## GERMANY

### The DAC's Main Findings and Recommendations

#### *Need for an integrated approach*

188. Germany is an important contributor to financing humanitarian action. Considering its national capacity, G7 status and expected ODA levels in relation to the 0.51% and 0.7% targets, however Germany's potential in financing humanitarian action is not optimised. Humanitarian aid remains a small part of Germany's development co-operation expenditure. According to DAC data "Emergency and distress relief" in 2004 totalled USD 186 million, accounting for only 2% of total German ODA compared with the DAC average of 7%. Germany is the second largest contributor to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of all DAC members with pledges of USD 634 million planned to be disbursed by 2009. There has been an important German political commitment on the additionality of these pledges. As for other donors, an ongoing challenge will be to turn pledges into disbursements while ensuring that the needs of other emergencies are not compromised.

189. An assessment of the German policy framework indicates a need to synchronise, update and broaden policies to better reflect the scope of actions as required by the principles and good practices of good humanitarian donorship (GHD). There is no comprehensive policy on humanitarian aid to guide actors within the German development system. Humanitarian aid managed by the Federal Foreign Office focuses on emergency response. Detailed funding principles are not spelled out apart from what is regulated by legislation and in the 12 guiding principles. Humanitarian aid funding is always earmarked and may not be subject to any form of conditionality other than for auditing and reporting purposes. Projects are limited to short-term funding and ideally should be completed within a six month period. Funds managed by BMZ are regulated by different procedures. A budget line introduced in 2005 on "development oriented emergency and transitional aid" has increased Germany's ability to have a broader and more flexible humanitarian response.

190. The German humanitarian aid system is compartmentalised. It is managed by two ministries with interdependent areas of responsibility. A detailed and rather inflexible budget system contributes further to a fragmented approach. On one side, the Federal Foreign Office holds responsibility over a strong and independent unit focused on emergency response. On the other side, BMZ operates a smaller unit with a broad and more loosely defined mandate. This divided management approach creates a disconnected structure where the sum of the parts is less than the total. The effect is to isolate parts of humanitarian operations both from each other and from other parts of the ministries in which they reside. This reduces their ability to address the complexity of contemporary emergencies and thus makes the aid less effective. It complicates synchronisation of actions both within humanitarian action and in how it relates to development co-operation. The challenge applies to all aspects of planning, operations, as well as follow-up and learning.

191. Whereas the strength of the present system rests in the timeliness of funding, approaches to other funding principles (flexibility, predictability) need to be further addressed. Germany should explore opportunities to use new aid modalities for humanitarian allocations, such as common humanitarian action plans and pooled funding.

*Recommendations:*

- Germany should develop a **comprehensive humanitarian policy** reflecting the GHD principles and good practices. Such a policy should reflect strategies for implementation providing guidance on civil-military relations, disaster risk reduction, environmental and social aspects.
- While increasing its ODA Germany is encouraged to **increase allocations** to humanitarian aid. Germany should also explore opportunities of using new humanitarian aid modalities such as pooled funding and humanitarian funds.
- In order to facilitate a broadened humanitarian approach, Germany should consider **enhancing the coherence** of all components of humanitarian aid (prevention and preparedness, emergency response, recovery and reconstruction) which should be facilitated within a common budget.
- As Germany's humanitarian aid expands it should consider developing its evaluation system in this field. Germany should also consider evaluating the overall performance of its humanitarian aid system involving the Federal Foreign Office and BMZ.

**Secretariat Report**

192. In the field of humanitarian action German authorities make a clear distinction between “humanitarian aid” and “emergency and transition aid”. This distinction forms the basis for German management structures, budget arrangements and implementation. Among other DAC members, the term “humanitarian aid” encompasses a spectrum of activities including “prevention and preparedness”, “emergency response” and support to “reconstruction and recovery”. Germany, however, uses the term “humanitarian aid” exclusively for activities with a direct humanitarian objective (“emergency response”), whilst “emergency and transition aid” refers to activities with a development objective executed in an emergency related context. Consistent with practice in other DAC Peer Reviews, this annex uses the broader definition of humanitarian aid as its point of departure. The term “emergency response” will be used to describe what is referred to as “humanitarian aid” by German standards.

***Humanitarian policies and principles***

193. German policies clearly distinguish between “emergency response” and “emergency and transitional aid” (also referred to as “developmental humanitarian aid”). A third, smaller category in the field of German humanitarian aid is “humanitarian mine action” which has its own policy and budget. These categories are reflected both in the policy structure and division of responsibilities between the Federal Foreign Office (AA) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The AA is responsible for emergency response and humanitarian mine action whilst BMZ is responsible for the broader area of developmental humanitarian aid. The AA also provides some funds for disaster risk reduction. The organisational structure, described separately below, has implications for the location and responsibility of policies and principles.

194. There is no comprehensive policy document on humanitarian aid to guide actors within the German development system. The single most useful document is the special humanitarian report to Parliament prepared by the AA (Deutscher Bundestag, 2003) on a four year cycle (the last covered the period 1998-2001). It outlines the principles of German humanitarian aid and provides information on Germany’s humanitarian system and on crosscutting issues such as gender, detailed budget information and data on disbursements.

195. Twelve basic rules for humanitarian aid guide the AA's engagement in emergency response. These were developed and adopted by the Federal Government in 1993 in collaboration with NGOs (Box 12).

**Box 7. Germany's twelve basic rules of foreign humanitarian aid**

1. Catastrophes, wars and crises cause people suffering which they cannot overcome by their own efforts. To alleviate such suffering is the objective of humanitarian aid.
2. All people are entitled to humanitarian aid and humanitarian protection; moreover they must be granted the right to provide humanitarian aid and humanitarian protection.
3. Aid and protection shall be provided irrespective of race, religion, nationality, political convictions or other distinguishing features. Humanitarian aid must not be made conditional on political or religious attitudes and must not promote these. The only criterion in setting priorities for aid shall be the suffering of the people.
4. The relief organisations and the state agencies participating in the discussion group shall act on their own initiative according to their own guidelines and strategies for implementation.
5. They shall respect the dignity of man in providing aid.
6. They shall respect the laws and customs of the country concerned. If the efforts to provide the best possible aid collide with regulations in force in the recipient country, a solution to this conflict shall be sought bearing in mind the objective of humanitarian aid.
7. They shall assist each other and cooperate in humanitarian aid measures as far as possible.
8. Those providing aid shall be accountable to both the recipients of the aid and those whose donations and supplies they accept.
9. Humanitarian aid is first and foremost aid for survival. It shall include self-help measures and shall help to reduce susceptibility to catastrophe. Where necessary, it shall take development needs into consideration.
10. From the very beginning the organisations and state agencies active in humanitarian aid shall involve local partners in their planning and measures.
11. The recipients shall also be involved in organising and implementing the measures.
12. Aid supplies must be used according to needs and should correspond to local standards; only the current emergency determines the selection and delivery of aid. In procuring aid supplies, priority must be given to purchasing in the region hit by the catastrophe.

196. The AA's separate policy for humanitarian demining focuses on situations where landmines and unexploded ordnance create a barrier to humanitarian relief and acutely threaten the lives and health of people. Priority is given to those countries which have acceded to the Ottawa Convention.<sup>22</sup>

197. The BMZ is tasked with responsibility over "development oriented emergency and transitional aid". In 2005 the budget lines "Food and Emergency Aid, Refugee Assistance" and "Food Security Programmes" were merged into a new budget line which was introduced to fill the perceived gap between emergency response and long term development co-operation. Theoretically such assistance should begin as emergency response activities come to an end and bridge the time until long-term development co-operation can start. It addresses issues such as food security, minimum basic social services and infrastructure, facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods and address refugee needs. However, specific policies or principles have not yet been developed.

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22. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

198. BMZ's development-oriented emergency and transitional aid is implemented by international organisations (WFP, UNHCR, ICRC), the Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ) or German NGOs. It is also involved in policy development albeit to a limited extent. It is an integrated component of the German development co-operation and BMZ developed a comprehensive policy paper in 2005.

199. Germany endorsed the "*Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*" (GHD) in 2003 and views their main value as a set of commonly established standards and principles that can strengthen the independence of humanitarian aid. Concerns have been expressed that implementation of GHD may be hampered by national legislation. For Germany this concerns earmarking of funds, limited involvement in pooled funding and harmonising reporting requirements where strict legislation has to be followed. Predictability and flexibility of funds which conflict with other positions of GHD are also a constraint. Germany believes the main focus of GHD should be on timeliness, needs-based approaches, and independence from other political initiatives or development efforts. An assessment of the German policy framework from a GHD perspective identifies a need to synchronise, update and broaden policies to better reflect the scope of actions as required by GHD.

### ***Volume and distribution***

#### *An important donor with a modest humanitarian ODA volume*

200. Germany is an important contributor to financing humanitarian action. However, considering its national capacity, G7 status and ODA levels in relation to the 0.7% target, Germany's potential in financing humanitarian action is underutilised. Humanitarian aid remains a small part of Germany's bilateral expenditure. According to DAC data "Emergency and distress relief" in 2004 totalled USD 186 million accounting for 2% of total German ODA in 2004, to be compared with the DAC average of 7%. Germany contributes with approximately 20 % to the budget of the European Community Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO).

201. When reporting on ODA, Germany includes expenditures for assistance to refugees in their first 12 months stay in a developed country in accordance with DAC reporting directives. Such expenditure has steadily decreased from 91.7% in 1991 to 37.8% in 2000. In 2004, it amounted to 7.5% of Germany's emergency and distress relief. Despite this decrease, there has been no increase in net disbursements for humanitarian aid excluding refugees in donor countries. Disbursements on humanitarian aid excluding refugees in donor countries decreased from USD 227 million in 2002 to USD 172 million in 2004, making the percentage of emergency and distress relief of total ODA the lowest since 1991. As Germany moves towards scaling up ODA to be in line with its EU commitment, it should also consider increasing its allocations to humanitarian aid.

202. Data provided by UN-OCHA's Financial Tracking System shows that Germany contributed 4.1% (USD 189 million) of global humanitarian funding in 2004 (OCHA, 2005a). Germany also increased its support to the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (UN-CAP) from USD 9.4 million in 2000 to USD 56 million in 2004, making Germany the 10th largest CAP donor in 2004 (OCHA, 2005b, 2005c).

#### *Humanitarian budget structure*

203. The federal humanitarian budgets (Table C.1) are determined by Parliament as a budget law to be executed through government structures. Funding is granted on the basis of the calendar year budget. There is no reprogramming of funds although under exceptional circumstances (*e.g.* Afghanistan, Iraq, Darfur, Indian Ocean Tsunami) additional funds can be made available through the Federal Ministry of Finance.

204. For humanitarian aid granted through the AA there are several budget lines which amounted to approximately EUR 104 million in 2005. The budget for "Emergency and Transitional Aid" totalled

EUR 113.5 million in 2005 including EUR 25 million for Tsunami-related activities. Ninety per cent of the funds are allocated according to a strategic planning process. Part of the budget is earmarked by German commitments regulated by the Food Aid Convention. Another part is used for projects in countries involved in armed conflict. 10 % of the funds are allocated to an unspecified reserve fund, which is used for unforeseeable disasters and complex crises.

**Table 3. Germany's humanitarian aid budget structure 2005**

	<b>Budget line</b>	<b>Amount Million €</b>
<b>AA</b>	Humanitarian aid (worldwide)	71.7
	Humanitarian mine clearance, (worldwide)	11
	Special humanitarian fund Balkan countries	5
	Special fund humanitarian mine clearing in the Balkans	2.5
	Special fund humanitarian mine clearing Afghanistan	3.2
	Support for humanitarian action by UNRWA (unearmarked)	2.5
	Support humanitarian aid UNRWA	2.7
	Support to UNHCR (unearmarked)	4.8
	Support to UN OCHA (unearmarked)	0.4
<b>BMZ</b>	Development oriented emergency and transitional aid (worldwide)	88.5
	Tsunami response	25.0
<b>TOTAL</b>		217.3

205. This detailed and rather inflexible budget system contributes to a fragmented approach to Germany's humanitarian funding. From a system point of view, and to improve performance, Germany could consider merging the present structure into one common humanitarian aid budget line. Whilst national legislation and budget restrictions raise concerns, Germany is encouraged to address the issue of flexibility. The Inter-ministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention has established a task team to address possibilities for pooling resources. This might also provide opportunities to explore new modalities for humanitarian aid allocations.

#### *Principles, distribution and channels*

206. Humanitarian aid managed by the AA focuses on emergency response with a strong emphasis on a needs-based approach. Detailed funding principles are not spelled out apart from what is regulated by legislation and in the 12 guiding principles. Humanitarian aid funding is always earmarked and granted on the basis of an application or project proposal. Financing decisions depend on available needs assessments through the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in combination with internal assessments and implementing agencies and NGO applications. Decisions should be made without political considerations. Funding may not be subject to any form of conditionality other than for auditing and reporting purposes. Projects are, by definition, limited to short-term funding and should ideally be designed to be completed within a six month period.

207. Funds managed by BMZ are regulated by different procedures. The budget line "development oriented emergency and transitional aid", introduced in 2005, increased Germany's ability to have a broader and more flexible humanitarian response. Medium term funding of periods from six months of up to three years are possible depending on the emergency situation which enables the transition from emergency situations to long-term development and promotes peace-building and conflict prevention. Allocations shall mainly be guided by human rights criteria and the principles of "do-no-harm".

208. It is unclear how Germany tackles the dilemma of under-funded emergencies. The Tsunami response is one example of uneven attention and distribution of resources, (Box 2 in Chapter 2). The

German approach rests on a rapid needs-based response, however, the limited availability of funds is a constraint. Germany should develop principles that better guide allocations to reflect the degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate.

209. According to data provided by Germany, emergency response allocations on behalf of the AA can be divided into two parts. Approximately half of all budgetary means are allocated either to the UN humanitarian agencies (mainly UNHCR, UNRWA, UN-OCHA and WFP) or the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The remaining budget finances programmes managed by German implementing agencies and NGOs. Humanitarian aid managed by BMZ is allocated through the following channels: GTZ (47.5%), UN agencies, mainly WFP or UNHCR (29.8%) and German NGOs (21.6%).

210. Germany has increased funding to UN-CAP but because of national legislation this funding is earmarked to specific projects. Pooled funding is not possible for the same reason. The AA also contributes to the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and financed the development of the ISDR Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning (PPEW).

211. GTZ plays an important implementing role and offers advice and services in disaster risk reduction. An advisory project on "Disaster Risk Management in Development Cooperation" is being developed to promote the application of disaster risk management in German development co-operation. Germany should make stronger efforts to integrate disaster risk reduction and prevention into its development strategies.

212. NGOs hold a strong position in implementing humanitarian aid. In 2004 BMZ provided funding to seven German NGOs and the AA to about 50 German NGOs (10 of them received two-thirds of the AA Funding). While considering the growing number of NGOs involved in humanitarian aid delivery, especially recognised in the context of the Tsunami response, Germany should consider approaches to prevent further proliferation of NGOs implementing humanitarian aid and ensure that its partners adhere to the SPHERE standards.

### ***Cross-cutting and emerging issues***

213. *Promoting standards and enhancing implementation:* Germany adheres to international recognised humanitarian guidelines through its system of application for grants and evaluations of implementing organisations. As mentioned earlier, Germany should consider updating its policy framework thereby modernising application procedures to strengthen the promotion of standards. Germany supports and recognises the role of the UN in leading and co-ordinating humanitarian action and the efforts and the mandate conferred upon the ICRC. Germany participates in donor co-ordination initiatives such as the Montreux Process and the donor support groups of implementing agencies to advance international co-ordination issues. Germany also participates in ECHO's Humanitarian Aid Committee.

214. *Involvement of beneficiaries:* How Germany ensures adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of its humanitarian activities is unclear. Although it is a general principle of German humanitarian aid and explicitly mentioned in the 12 guiding principles for humanitarian aid, involvement of beneficiaries is limited. Methods to ensure participation are vague and Germany relies on its implementing organisations and international organizations in this area.

215. *Humanitarian space -* Germany is careful to respect the position of civilian organizations in implementing humanitarian action. In most situations Germany regards funding independent and impartial civilian organizations the best practice to creating humanitarian space. State agencies like the military or civil defence organizations should only conduct humanitarian tasks on rare occasions. Government policy

concerning civil-military co-operation is regularly discussed among humanitarian actors and the Coordinating Committee for Humanitarian Aid of the German government (see below).

### ***Policy coherence***

216. *Civil military relations*: Germany respects the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies. However, there are no explicit policy statements outlining positions on civil and military interaction in humanitarian aid. However following engagement in Kosovo and Afghanistan intense discussions in parliament resulted in a position supportive of the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action. The military should only carry out civilian tasks such as humanitarian aid, in situations where no civilian organisations are available to perform such activities. Furthermore a BMZ discussion paper on development and military issues was published in 2004 which takes a broader view on the different interfaces between the two policy fields. The AA could consider developing a similar approach for emergency response.

217. *Untying humanitarian aid*: The last of the 12 guiding principles for German humanitarian aid states that “aid supplies must be used according to needs and should correspond to local standards; only the current emergency determines the selection and delivery of aid. In procuring aid supplies, priority must be given to purchasing in the region hit by the catastrophe”. German food aid is relatively cost effective with goods purchased locally or regionally. Humanitarian aid, apart from emergency food aid, seldom receives attention within the discourse of untying aid. Germany could, however, consider developing this field and exploring ways to address emerging issues of untying humanitarian aid such as the current practice of tying contributions to national NGOs, contracting procedures during reconstruction situations and valuation of gifts in kind.

### ***Organisation and Management***

#### *Humanitarian aid architecture – a divided organisational setting*

218. The German humanitarian aid system is compartmentalised. It is characterised by two separate ministries managing two interdependent areas of responsibility. On one side, the AA holds responsibility over a strong and independent unit focused on emergency response. On the other side, BMZ operates a smaller unit with a broad and more loosely defined mandate. This divided management approach creates a disconnected structure where the sum of the parts is less than the total. The effect is to isolate parts of humanitarian operations both from each other and from the other parts of the ministries in which they reside. This reduces their ability to address the complexity of contemporary emergencies and thus makes the aid less effective. It complicates synchronisation of actions both within humanitarian action and in how it relates to development co-operation. The challenge applies to all aspects of operations, planning, implementation as well as follow-up and learning.

219. Management of German humanitarian aid is located within the AA in Berlin. The Humanitarian Aid and Mine Action division within the Global Affairs Department has a staff of 24 responsible for managing, developing policies, co-ordinating, implementing and evaluating emergency response. Management responsibilities related to prevention and disaster preparedness, reconstruction and recovery are within BMZ. A specialised division holds the responsibility over funds for “emergency and transitional aid”. Management responsibilities include transition assistance, recovery and reconstruction and co-operation with the UN World Food Programme and the Food Aid Convention. The division is currently has 10 staff members.

220. To manage the organisational divide between AA and BMZ a well functioning but complicated and a time-consuming system of co-ordination and consultation has been developed. The AA's emergency response is co-ordinated with the partner division for emergency and transitional funding in the BMZ and vice versa. There is also an interchange in regard of project planning and monitoring as well as with situation reports. In addition humanitarian projects funded through BMZ are supposed to be harmonised with other development co-operation commitments and integrated in the development co-operation programming. To assist and ensure co-ordination, Germany has established co-ordinating mechanisms such as the Humanitarian Aid Coordinating Committee. The Parliament has created a permanent Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid.

221. The Humanitarian Aid Coordinating Committee is an interesting and important feature of the German emergency response system. The committee was established in 1994 and its mandate is to ensure co-ordination, involvement and information sharing across ministries, government agencies and German NGOs. The committee is chaired by the AA and meets either bi-monthly or during special ad-hoc meetings for specific humanitarian crises. It comprises a total of 32 members 18 of which represent German NGOs. Other German government agencies represented are the BMZ, and the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Federal Ministry of the Interior responsible for the national response authority and the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). All members of the Coordinating Committee subscribe to the 12 basic rules of humanitarian aid.

222. In 1998 the German Bundestag established a permanent Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid, replacing a previous subcommittee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid. The new committee advises the Committee on Foreign Affairs on Human Rights and Humanitarian issues and monitors policy coherence in this field. The Committee consists of 17 members representing all parties. The Committee meets behind closed doors but may occasionally arrange public hearings. Although the main work stream of the Committee relates to human rights, humanitarian issues and implementation are included in the mandate. It can make specific recommendations for policy and implementation.

223. In 1998 the Federal Foreign Minister appointed a Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid within the AA. The Commissioner monitors and assists in bilateral and multilateral dialogue with governments and non-governmental organizations and submitting operative proposals on Federal Government policy to the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs.

### *Managing transition*

224. Germany rejects linear approaches of humanitarian aid and recognises that various phases unfold simultaneously and overlap, hence the sequence of aid modalities can often be discontinuous. Consequently, post conflict transition does not form an integral part of a German approach to humanitarian aid. In theory the AA and the BMZ should work closely together to optimize aid delivery in transition situations and avoid funding or delivery gaps. In practice, however, the AA has limited access and influence in development planning and takes a distant position in transitional arrangements. The strong emphasis on emergency response by the Foreign Office limits further involvement. BMZ's development oriented emergency and transitional aid is designed to bridge towards development co-operation and involves methods like food-security measures, rebuilding and supply of infrastructure and re-enforcement of self-help structures.

225. German policies are far reaching in terms of conflict sensitising and post-conflict reconstruction. A comprehensive inter-ministerial action plan for conflict prevention and post conflict peace-building was adopted in 2004 (Chapter 3). It would be useful to explore to what extent this action plan affects Germany's humanitarian approach. Transitional aid should be interlinked with Germany's long-term development co-operation in a synchronised and co-ordinated way.

*Promoting learning and accountability*

226. The AA evaluates humanitarian aid projects through its reporting requirements and targeted evaluations and missions. Germany is a member of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). Given the extensive response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Germany should take full advantage of ALNAP's special Tsunami Evaluation Coalition which serves as a unique accountability initiative promoting sector-wide approaches. Germany should ensure that these evaluations are disseminated at an inter-ministerial level and that evaluation recommendations are better reflected and integrated in policy development and programming. Learning in relation to humanitarian action across departments and other arms of government could, however, prove difficult with the present organizational setting.

227. Regarding accountability and transparency, Germany reports all humanitarian funding through the 14-point-facts-system of the European Union and to the OCHA Financial Tracking System. Internal reporting systems for humanitarian assistance are transparent and show a high degree of accuracy. Considering the limited data available at international level, Germany could make a valuable contribution to work to improve accuracy and timeliness in donor reporting on this topic and could consider producing a comprehensive annual report on its expenditure of humanitarian aid. This would provide useful and complementary information between the special humanitarian reports to parliament.

*Country operations*

228. According to data provided by AA some 300 humanitarian aid projects were managed by the AA in 2004 totalling EUR 55 million. Actions in 56 countries were financed within the humanitarian budget. Of these allocations 56% were in Africa, where the five biggest recipients were Sudan, Chad, Uganda, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 26% went to Asia where Afghanistan and Palestinian Autonomous Territories were the main recipients. Europe received 14% mainly within the context of the Balkans Stability Pact. The remaining 4% was used in Latin America. In addition, 17 countries received a total of EUR 16.5 million in funding for humanitarian mine clearance.

229. Funding decisions for humanitarian aid are not delegated to field level but embassies are consulted on projects and routinely report on the humanitarian situation in the host countries. Perspectives on food insecurity retained by the DAC Peer Review team during its mission to Ethiopia in September 2005 are presented in Box 13. The BMZ relies on implementation by GTZ, NGOs and international organizations with their respective field offices. German practices point toward recognizing and supporting the role of the UN in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action. Germany has increased its funding to the UN co-ordination efforts and supports a leading role by UN OCHA. Funding for co-ordination and support services has increased in German contributions to the UN-CAP from USD 0.2 million in 2000 to USD 13 million in 2005 (OCHA, 2005d). To strengthen the needs-based approach and promote harmonisation and alignment in complex emergencies Germany should consider developing humanitarian country and regional programmes based on the UN Common Humanitarian Action Plans.

### Box 8. Tackling food insecurity in Ethiopia

**Food insecurity:** The first of the eight MDGs focus on food insecurity and include the target “reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger”. Experience from famine response proves that food insecurity needs to be divided into two categories: chronic/predictable and acute/unpredictable. Root causes of chronic food insecurity relates to governance and economic factors, (*i.e.* inadequate policies, weak government institutions, legislation and market structures) and are accelerated by population growth, environmental degradation, social factors (*i.e.* HIV/AIDS and/or gender inequalities) and limited access to social infrastructure. Chronic food insecurity make populations exposed to natural hazards. Despite locally functioning mechanisms, unstable climate and weather events may easily bring large populations into acute emergencies although agricultural production at national level does not fall drastically.

**Ethiopian context:** The horn of Africa is one of the most vulnerable areas in the world with more than 40% of 160 million people suffering from food insecurity. Chronic and acute food insecurity remains permanent features of Ethiopia’s development and it is rooted in its ecological, economic, political and social systems. At least 5 million people have received food aid for the last 7-10 years and during the acute crisis in 2003 over 13 million people, 21% of the population, were affected. Institutional responsibility for food security has rested within a disaster commission at federal level who manages its programmes through annual emergency appeal systems. The 2003 humanitarian crisis called for renewed short and long term policies and the government launched the “New coalition on Food Security in Ethiopia”. Although some of its components remain controversial it provides opportunities to move away from previously established approaches. However, it also remains obvious that national response capacity to manage acute situations will be necessary for an unforeseeable future. With a growth rate of 2.7-3 % per year Ethiopia’s population is estimated to reach 111 million by 2020 causing enormous pressure on already scarce resources.

**Donor challenges:** Assumptions that famine is an event caused by food supply failures, resulting in malnutrition and mortality which could be managed by external supplies and improved food distribution created a “food-first” approach making Ethiopia the largest recipient of food aid in the world. While successfully addressing acute situations, donors have neglected measures to strengthen prevention, preparedness and recovery. Instead food aid has been institutionalized within a complex Ethiopian humanitarian enterprise. While humanitarian aid cannot be expected to achieve objectives, it is not designed for and fears of creating dependency never can compromise response to an acute situation, donors must address the disconnect between humanitarian and development policy from an aid effectiveness perspective. Development co-operation should, as the MGDs suggests, make food security a specific objective of poverty eradication and not be managed as a separate sector. Strategies must include explicit measures to strengthen the federal and regional governments’ and the local civil society’s capacity to deal with both chronic and acute situations. Donors must shift from *ad-hoc* annual appeal, improve the quality and flexibility of food aid programming by moving to a cash-based programmes. Adequate monitoring and early warning systems with specific food security indicators must be developed, supported and put in practice and build national response mechanisms able to manage national and regional shock.

**Issues for Germany:** Germany should consider ways of increasing its support to the G8 action plan to combat famine in Africa. The introduction of the new BMZ budget line for development relief creates opportunities for more long term and predictable approaches. Germany should place food security as a central objective of its country program, move away from a project-based approach and scale up activities. Present project implementation by GTZ could be transferred to local NGOs for cost effectiveness and sustainability reasons. Germany is also encouraged to participate in efforts towards a common donor co-operation strategy for Ethiopia, including a long-term strategic approach for food security. With the priority area strategy “Sustainable Utilization of Natural Resources for Improved Food Security”, Germany has done an important first step and developed a joint vision with the Ethiopian government on how to improve agricultural productivity through the protection of natural resources. Germany could use its position as chair of the donor group on agriculture and rural development to strive for a better implementation of food security policies and to promote synchronisation of humanitarian and development aid.

*Future considerations*

- **Policy:** Efforts towards more effective and holistic approaches to humanitarian aid should be considered. Germany could update its policy structures by developing a comprehensive humanitarian policy reflecting the principles and good practices of good humanitarian donorship (GHD). Such updated policy should reflect implementation strategies providing guidance on civil military relations and inclusion of disaster risk reduction in development co-operation planning. Environmental and social, including gender-related, aspects of humanitarian aid could also be more explicitly addressed. Germany could also further include humanitarian issues in its multilateral policy framework.
- **Funding:** While increasing its ODA Germany should also consider increasing its allocations to humanitarian aid. Whereas the strength of the present system rests in the timeliness of funding, approaches to other funding principles (flexibility, predictability) need to be further addressed. Germany could consider developing directives for pooled funding, coverage and timely disbursements of funds for UN-CAPs. Budgets used for financing humanitarian action could be brought in to one budgetary framework.
- **Management:** Germany should consider enhancing the coherence of all components of humanitarian aid (prevention and preparedness, emergency response, recovery and reconstruction) which should be facilitated within a common budget.
- As Germany's humanitarian aid expands it should consider developing its evaluation system in this field. Germany should also consider evaluating the overall performance of its humanitarian aid system involving the Federal Foreign Office and BMZ.
- **Learning and accountability:** As Germany's humanitarian aid expands it should consider developing its evaluation system and approaches. Given the extensive response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami Germany should maintain an active role in ALNAP's special Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.



## ANNEX A

### PRINCIPLES AND GOOD PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP

#### *Objectives and definition of humanitarian action*

1. The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.
2. Humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of *humanity*, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; *impartiality*, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; *neutrality*, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and *independence*, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.
3. Humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.

#### *General principles*

4. Respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.
5. While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.
6. Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.
7. Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.
8. Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.
9. Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.
10. Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action.

***Good practices in donor financing, management and accountability***

*(a) Funding*

11. Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.
12. Recognising the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations.
13. While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.
14. Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

*(b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation*

15. Request that implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action.
16. Promote the use of Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.
17. Maintain readiness to offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access.
18. Support mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response.
19. Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, ensure that such use is in conformity with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.
20. Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

*(c) Learning and accountability*

21. Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action.
22. Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.
23. Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting.

## ANNEX B

ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR COVERAGE OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN DAC  
PEER REVIEWS

The text below is an extract of the document DIR(2004)11. The DAC has agreed that the framework will be used until further notice. The framework groups the GHD principles under four headings:

1. **Humanitarian Policies**, embracing definitions, objectives, general principles and relation to development strategies.<sup>23</sup>
2. **Funding**, including priority setting, financial planning, predictability, flexibility and issues of increased un-earmarking of financial contributions.<sup>24</sup>
3. **Promotion of Standards and enhanced implementation**, focusing on the promotion of international guidelines and principles on humanitarian action, ensuring conformity with International Humanitarian Law and humanitarian guidelines and principles.<sup>25</sup>
4. **Learning and Accountability**, covering transparency in reporting and systems for evaluation and learning.<sup>26</sup>

These four headings are presented in separate sections below with questions relevant to the GHD principles:

**Section One - Humanitarian Policies**

- a) How and by what instance are the objectives of humanitarian action defined by the government under review? What type of actions can be covered by the definition?
- b) To what extent do the policy/policies reflect a commitment to respect the following:
  - i) Legal commitments under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and other relevant bodies of law.<sup>27</sup>
  - ii) the core humanitarian principles of humanity and impartiality.
  - iii) the requirement of humanitarian organisations to maintain a position of neutrality in relation to a given conflict or political dispute; and more generally the requirement to maintain the independence of humanitarian action from other policy agendas?
- c) Do the existing policy/policies ensure a system that encourages flexible funding in relation to humanitarian needs?
- d) Do the existing policy/policies ensure a system that promotes timely funding?

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<sup>23</sup> “The principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship”, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

<sup>24</sup> “The principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship”, Paragraphs 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14

<sup>25</sup> “The principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship”, Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20

<sup>26</sup> “The principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship”, Paragraphs 7, 21, 22, 23

<sup>27</sup> International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is the body of rules which, in wartime, protects people who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities. Its central purpose is to limit and prevent human suffering in times of armed conflict. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 constitutes the principal instruments of humanitarian law.

- e) Do the humanitarian policy/policies take into consideration the need for strengthening of the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to emergencies?
- f) How are issues of recovery, return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities addressed?
- g) To what extent do policies recognise and support coordination? How is the role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, and the special mandate conferred upon the International Committee of the Red Cross in situations of crisis and conflict recognised and respected?
- h) Are there mechanisms to ensure adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response?

### **Section Two - Principles on Funding Humanitarian Action**

- i) In relation to a given context, and more generally, how does the donor:
  - Arrive at decisions about allocating resources in a way that respects the principle of responding in proportion to needs?
  - Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in high profile crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises?
  - Ensure predictable, flexible and timely funding?
  - Make choices between earmarking and non-earmarking of funds?
  - Make choices between multilateral and bilateral channels?
  - Make choices between implementing agencies, between northern NGOs and southern civil society organisations?
  - Contribute, on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals?
  - Support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies?

### **Section Three - Promoting standards and enhancing implementation**

- j) How does the donor ensure that implementing humanitarian organisations adhere to good practice and commit themselves to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action? How are the use of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee relevant guidelines and principles on Humanitarian Activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief respected and promoted?
- k) How does the donor offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access?
- l) Are mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations to strengthen capacities for response at local, national, regional and global levels being supported?

- m) How does the donor affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict and where peace keeping and/or military intervention is taking place?
- n) In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, how does the donor ensure that such use conforms with IHL and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations?
- o) How are the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies being implemented and supported?

#### **Section Four - Learning and Accountability**

- p) What is the current scope of evaluations of humanitarian action, what activities have recently been evaluated and how are the findings and recommendations being used to shape policy and programming decisions?
- q) Are there systems in place to support learning and accountability for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action? How is learning across departments and agencies ensured when several arms of government are involved?
- r) To what extent does the donor encourage, support and participate in joint evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance?
- s) To what extent is the involvement of beneficiaries in monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response ensured?
- t) Do existing report systems ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official Humanitarian Action spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats?