Forced Displacement
Literature Review

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1 The JDC Literature Review provides summaries of recently published research to encourage the exchange of ideas on topics related to forced displacement. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the literature included in this review are entirely those of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Data Center, UNHCR, the World Bank, the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. For convenience, the literature review contains links to websites operated by third parties. The Joint Data Center and its affiliate organizations do not represent or endorse these sites or the content, services and products they may offer, and do not guarantee the accuracy or reliability of any information, data, opinions, advice or statements provided on these sites.
Informing the Refugee Policy Response in Uganda: Results from the Uganda Refugee and Host Communities 2018 Household Survey

World Bank, 2019


Uganda hosts about 1.3 million refugees in 13 districts, the majority from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This report analyzes the socio-economic profile, poverty, and vulnerability of refugees and host communities in Uganda based on data from the 2018 Uganda Refugee and Host Communities Household Survey (a collaboration between the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), Office of the Prime Minister, and the World Bank). The survey is representative of the refugee and host population in Uganda, as well as the refugee and host population in the West Nile and South West regions, and the city of Kampala. The 2014 Population Census provided the sample frame for hosts, while UBOS constructed a new sample frame for refugees. Data was collected from 2,200 households in all 13 host districts in Uganda.

Key findings:

- **Demographic characteristics of refugee households contribute to their vulnerability.** Refugees are younger on average, with 57 percent of refugees below the age of 15 compared to 48 percent of hosts. One in two refugee households is female-headed, compared to less than one in three host households. The dependency ratio is higher among refugee households (1.7 dependent members for every non-dependent member, compared to 1.2 for hosts).

- **There is widespread poverty among refugees.** Almost half of refugees (46 percent) are living in poverty, compared to 17 percent of hosts. Poverty is highest in the West Nile region where 57 percent of refugees and 29 percent of hosts are poor. A household is less likely to be poor if the household head has some secondary education or is employed. Factors contributing to poverty include a larger proportion of children under 15, being a refugee, and residing outside Kampala, particularly in the West Nile region.

- **Food insecurity is high for both refugee and host households.** Seven in ten refugee households and five in ten host households experienced severe food insecurity.

- **Ownership of assets is lower among refugees,** particularly outside Kampala. Overall, refugees have fewer productive assets (livestock, land, and solar panels) than hosts. Refugee households also own less non-agricultural land compared to hosts, but there is little difference in the ownership of homes or appliances. Unlike asset ownership,
dwelling conditions depend more on the household’s region of residence than its refugee status.

- **The incidence of agricultural shocks is high for both refugee and host households outside of Kampala.** Most households, irrespective of refugee status, relied on savings, the help of family/friends, and changed cropping practices when faced with an agricultural shock.

- **For some services (water, improved sanitation, electricity, health care), refugees have better access than host communities, reflecting the significant humanitarian response.** Among refugee households, 94 percent have access to improved water (compared to 66 percent of host households), 39 percent have access to improved sanitation (compared to 26 percent of host households), and 52 percent have access to electricity (compared to 49 percent of host households). With the exception of Kampala, health care centers are slightly more accessible to refugees, both financially and in terms of geographical proximity.

- **Uganda’s policy of providing education to refugee children is leading to equitable school enrollment rates for primary school-age children.** Refugee children are enrolled in primary schools at a similar rate to that of hosts (net primary enrollment rate of 65 percent and 68 percent, respectively). However, primary completion rates are low for both populations, particularly for refugees (only 14 percent of refugees between the ages of 15 and 17 completed primary education, compared to 34 percent of hosts in this age group). Moreover, net secondary enrollment rates are low (9 percent for refugees and 27 percent for hosts) and secondary completion rates are low for both populations (14 percent for refugees and 34 percent for hosts). Both refugees and hosts identify cost as the main constraint to staying in school.

- **Aid dependence among refugees is high, particularly among recent arrivals.** 54 percent of refugee households report aid as their main source of income. While aid dependence declines with duration in the country, aid is still the main source of income for 37 percent of refugees who arrived five or more years ago.

- **72 percent of refugees are unemployed,** compared to 36 percent of hosts. Unemployment rates decline with duration in the country (77 percent for refugees who have been in Uganda for less than two years compared to 54 percent for refugees who have been in Uganda for five years or more), suggesting that, with time, refugees are better able to integrate into the labor market. Unemployed refugees are more likely to be young (average age of 25 years), have low levels of education (70 percent have no formal education or have some years of primary education but did not finish), and come from agricultural backgrounds (45 percent previously worked in agriculture and around 23 percent previously worked in services and sales). Only 8 percent of refugees have received skills and job training.

- **Self-employment is more prevalent among refugees, except in Kampala.** In Kampala, three quarters of refugees are in wage employment (compared to 55 percent of employed hosts), while outside Kampala only a quarter of refugees are in wage employment (similar proportion to hosts). Among the wage employed, refugees earn wages that are 35 to 45 percent lower than the wages earned by hosts, even when
considering the workers' observable characteristics. For both host and refugee communities, agriculture is the main sector of employment followed by small trade (services). Half of employed refugees (including self and wage employed) changed occupation after arriving in Uganda. One in five refugee households owns a non-agricultural enterprise.

- **Agricultural productivity is low among refugee and host communities.** On average, half of refugees have access to land. The large majority of refugees with access to land grow crops for their own consumption and a little more than half sell some of their crops. Almost 100 percent of refugee and host households in agriculture are engaged in rain-fed agriculture, which leaves them vulnerable to weather shocks. There is almost no adoption of improved inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.

- **Refugees are part of and contribute to local economies.** In the West Nile and Southwest regions, approximately 20 percent of refugees purchase their non-durable goods, and 17 to 18 percent purchase their durable goods in local markets outside refugee settlements. **Refugee enterprises generate jobs for Ugandan nationals.** About 1 in 5 employees of refugee enterprises were Ugandan nationals. In Kampala, the proportion is much higher: around 3 in 4 employees of refugee enterprises are Ugandan nationals.

- **There are positive signs of social integration between refugees and host communities, particularly in Kampala.** Around 60 percent of refugee households in the West Nile and Southwest regions and 84 percent of refugee households in Kampala report that their children have Ugandan friends with whom they share recreational spaces. Most refugees feel secure and welcomed in Uganda, a reflection of the country’s overall openness towards refugees.

- **With the exception of refugees in Kampala, refugees participate in social groups.** Around 13 percent of refugees participate in agricultural or livestock associations, 14 percent participate in savings groups and 9 percent participate in women’s associations.

**Conclusions:**

- Uganda’s progressive approach to hosting refugees has contributed to refugees having good access to basic services, such as primary education and health care, as well as feeling safe and welcome in the country. In addition, refugees participate and contribute to the local economy, and help create jobs for Ugandan nationals.

- Despite feeling secure and welcome, the refugee population in Uganda lives in precarious conditions with high rates of poverty and food insecurity, particularly among new refugee cohorts. It is necessary to continue programs aimed at alleviating poverty and food insecurity, particularly among recent refugees.

- Ensuring the self-reliance of refugees and reducing aid dependence should be at the core of policies and programs.

- Refugees are an untapped source of labor, which could contribute to Uganda’s economy. Skills formation and training of unemployed refugees should consider their
characteristics in terms of education, occupational background, and access to land. It is vital to stimulate labor demand in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities.

- Enhancing agricultural productivity and investing in water management may increase the wellbeing of refugees and hosts.
- Investing in access to basic services in host communities will contribute to their development and peaceful coexistence of both populations.
- Social groups and associations represent a tool in implementing refugee initiatives, outside Kampala.

**Missing Persons: Refugees Left Out and Left Behind in the Sustainable Development Goals**

Allison Grossman and Lauren Post
International Rescue Committee, September 2019

This paper examines **how refugees are faring in relation to national populations in terms of progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).**

**Key messages:**

- **Refugees are being “left behind”**. Four out of five fragile and conflict-affected states are not on track to achieve the SDGs. The vast majority of refugees are located in fragile contexts (12 out of 15 countries hosting the highest share of refugees are fragile). Moreover, statistics indicate that refugees have unique vulnerabilities and are frequently worse off when compared with the non-displaced population.

- **Refugees are being “left out”**. Refugees are excluded from SDG-related data collection, monitoring frameworks, national reporting, and national development plans. Of 42 countries that submitted 2019 Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs)—an optional self-assessment of national progress toward SDGs—only 13 mentioned refugees and none included data on refugees to measure their progress towards the SDGs. There is a lack of data on refugee outcomes and on their progress towards the SDGs.

- **There is no shared strategy for ensuring refugees achieve the SDGs**, despite UN Member States' commitment to “Leave No One Behind”.

To meet the SDGs by 2030, the authors advocate efforts to: (1) collect data that permit comparisons between refugees and non-displaced populations, align humanitarian data with
SDG indicators, and invest in national statistical capacity; (2) include refugees in SDG planning and monitoring, including VNRs and national development plans; and (3) remove barriers and scale-up approaches to improve refugee wellbeing alongside national populations, including both policy reforms and evidence-based interventions.

The migration of fear: An analysis of migration choices of Syrian refugees

Mehmet Balcilar and Jeffrey B. Nugent

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This study explores the relationship between refugees’ experiences of violence and their decisions to flee Syria, as well as the factors influencing their intentions to return or migrate elsewhere. The analysis is based on three waves of the Survey on Syrian Refugees carried out by the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (AFAD). Among the determinants of individual-level migration decisions subsequent to conflict, the authors consider: sex; education level; income level; conflict-related measures (such as death of family members and damage to home in Syria); the duration of time lived as a refugee; and the quality of services (water and hygiene, health, security) offered to the refugee household.

Key findings:

- Both the extent and duration of the violence in Syria and the duration of time as a refugee in Turkey raise the probability that a refugee will aspire to permanent settlement in another country and reduce the probability of return to Syria.
- The higher the quality of services provided to refugees in the form of health care and security, the more likely the refugees wish to stay in Turkey.
- Female refugees are more likely to return to Syria than males (but only if they are confident that it is safe to do so).
- Refugees with higher incomes, education, skills, and better access to migration networks are more likely to migrate out of Turkey to Europe and elsewhere.
Assessing Refugees’ Integration via Spatio-temporal Similarities of Mobility and Calling Behaviors

Antonio L. Alfeo, Mario G. C. A. Cimino, Bruno Lepri, Alex S. Pentland, Gigliola Vaglini

*IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems*, Volume 6, Issue 4 (2019), Pages 726-738


This paper analyzes the conditions that can contribute to the integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey by analyzing Call Details Record (CDR) datasets including calls from refugees and locals in Turkey throughout 2017. The authors propose the following set of metrics to assess the social integration of refugees:

- **Refugee’s Interaction Level**: percentage of calls made by a given refugee to a local in a given period of time, an indicator of the refugee’s social connections in the local community.
- **Refugee’s Calling Regularity**: number of calls made by a person in a given hour of the day during a given period of time. The similarity between the calling patterns of locals and refugees (dependent on daily routines) may be considered as a proxy for integration.
- **Refugee’s Mobility Similarity**: similarity between refugees’ and locals’ mobility patterns.
- **Residential Inclusion by District**: the coexistence of resident locals and refugees in a given district in a given month, based on the assumption that most calls during the night and early morning are made from a person’s residence.
- **District Attractiveness**: based on the percentage of resident refugees who do not leave the district in that month, i.e. continue to reside in the district the following month.
- **District Cost of Living**: average rent cost per square meter in a given district, as an indicator of the cost of living for that district.

The authors employ a novel computational technique (Computational Stigmergy) to analyze spatio-temporal patterns. They focus their analysis on the cities of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, which have the larger density of antennas (granularity of mobility patterns) and larger calling activity made by refugees. They find:

- Interaction level and calling regularity are positively correlated, suggesting that refugees that exhibit greater interaction with locals may have similar daily routines.
- Districts in Istanbul with higher residential inclusion may also be characterized by higher similarity between locals’ and refugees’ routines. This suggests that a minimum number of refugees per area is required for triggering integration.
- District attractiveness and cost of living are significantly and inversely correlated, suggesting that districts with a lower cost of living are more attractive to refugees.
• Calling regularity of refugees living in a district is correlated with the cost of living in that district. This suggests that calling regularity may be used as a proxy for daily routine similarity and for the economic capacity of refugees (i.e. the ability to meet a certain cost of living), and may therefore indicate the employment of refugees. This result is confirmed by evaluating the correlation of the cost of living with the distances between calling patterns of locals and refugees; as the distance increases, the district’s cost of living decreases.

• Variables with the strongest correlation with calling regularity are district attractiveness and cost of living, suggesting that economic capacity (e.g. being employed) and a long-term residence provide the greatest contribution to integration.

• Mobility similarity is correlated with interaction level. The more refugees have interactions with locals, the more they share urban spaces with locals.

• Social tension (drawn from news reports of violent brawls, clashes and terrorist attacks etc.) affects the behavior of refugees by reducing the amount of shared urban space with locals (i.e. lowering the mobility similarity after the event). Moreover, in terms of calls made toward locals, the social tension event has a greater effect on the group of refugees with lower interaction levels.

The authors conclude that **mobility similarity and calling regularity have great potential as measures of social integration**, since they are: (i) correlated with the amount of interaction between refugees and locals; (ii) calling regularity is an effective proxy for refugee’s economic capacity, implying refugee’s employment; (iii) mobility similarity is affected by social tension events; and (iv) the behavior of less integrated refugees appears to be significantly more affected by social tensions. The authors acknowledge that findings may be limited by the representativeness of a behavioral model based on call data (i.e. excludes other communication and messaging platforms).

**Segregation and Sentiment: Estimating Refugee Segregation and Its Effects Using Digital Trace Data**

Neal Marquez, Kiran Garimella, Ott Toomet, Ingmar G. Weber, Emilio Zagheni


This paper analyzes Call Detail Record (CDR) data to assess how communication and segregation between Turkish natives and Syrian refugees differ over time and space. The authors: (a) use CDR data to create metrics of geographic activity space and residential dissimilarity, as measures of segregation; (b) calculate spatial-temporal measures of the probability of refugees contacting Turkish citizens by phone and text, as a measure of group isolation; and (c) use Twitter posts that mention refugees to examine the relationship between the sentiment of tweets (revealing positive or negative attitudes towards refugees) and changes in segregation over space and time.

Key findings:

- **Metrics of activity space, i.e. the movements of refugees and Turkish citizens as indicated by CDR data, varies across major metropolitan areas.** Of the major metropolitan areas, Ankara had the highest activity space dissimilarity, while Istanbul had the lowest, though district level variance was twice as high in Ankara. There were significant differences over time at both the district and province level.

- **Residential dissimilarity was strongly correlated with activity space dissimilarity.** Activity space dissimilarity was frequently less than residential dissimilarity.

- **Twitter sentiment was found to change significantly over time but not over locations.** The data did not provide any significant evidence that higher dissimilarity and urban areas produced unfavorable sentiment towards refugees.

- **There is a significant positive relationship between social segregation, as measured by calls from refugees to Turkish citizens, and the sentiment expressed in tweets about refugees.** As weekly Twitter sentiment scores increased, i.e. revealing more positive attitudes towards refugees, there was a higher probability of refugees contacting non-refugees. The probability between cross-group connections was larger in urban areas than non-urban areas, and higher when dissimilarity was higher.

**Assessing the direct and spillover effects of shocks to refugee remittances**

Jennifer Alix-Garcia, Sarah Walker, and Anne Bartlett

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Over 60 percent of refugees in Kenya’s Kakuma refugee camp receive remittances, over half through informal money transfer services. On average, remittances comprise half of the income of families that receive them. In April 2015, in response to an Al Shabaab terrorist attack on Garissa University College, the Kenyan government shut down Somali-operated
money transfer agencies, known as hawala. Hawala is most commonly used by Muslims, since its modalities are consistent with Islamic norms. Hawala operators in Kakuma camp were estimated to transfer US$3 million into the camp each year. This paper examines the impact of the remittance shut down on refugees in the Kakuma refugee camp in terms of access to financial resources and household consumption, as well as the impact on host communities living in proximity to the camp. The authors rely on qualitative interviews and household surveys in Kakuma refugee camp and surrounding host communities during or shortly after the shut down.

Key findings:

• The remittance shutdown decreased remittance inflows into the camp, at least temporarily.

• Although overall consumption of food items did not change for the average refugee household, households most likely to use Islamic transfer schemes experienced large decreases in the consumption of milk, meat and phone cards. Refugees who actively used hawala in the past or were members of ethnicities likely to be Muslim decreased their consumption of meat and milk by magnitudes ranging from 26 to 33 percent.

• At the same time, households more likely to use other transfer systems increased their consumption of these same items, suggesting that prices may have decreased due to weakened demand from remittance-receiving households.

• Less than 10 percent of host households living in close proximity to the camp receive transfers, compared to over 60 percent of refugees.

• Prior to the shutdown, host households living in close proximity to the camp had higher purchases of some key items, suggesting that host households living round the camp are somewhat better off than those farther away.

• The shut down negatively affected host households living in close proximity to the camp, which were less likely to purchase sugar and tea. These households experienced statistically significant decreases of 12 and 25 percent in the probability of purchasing sugar and tea, which are considered luxury items among this population. These effects were stronger for households selling animals near the camp. This is consistent with the theory that host households that are more engaged with markets are more likely to be affected by a decrease in cash flows to the camp.

These findings highlight the economic integration of refugee camps and surrounding host communities, even when refugees are limited in their ability to engage in the labor market, and demonstrate the multiplier effects of remittances. The authors conclude that policies that directly reduce the ability of refugees to purchase goods are likely to hurt the host populations living near the camps. Conversely, policies supporting refugee’s ability to
purchase goods, such as cash transfers rather than in kind assistance, are likely to have positive repercussions for host populations.

**The Impact of Refugees on Employment and Wages in Jordan**

Belal Fallah, Caroline Krafft, Jackline Wahba

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According to the 2015 Population Census in Jordan, there were 1.3 million Syrians living in Jordan compared to a population of 6.6 million Jordanian citizens. Until 2016, Syrians were not officially permitted to work, although many found employment in the informal sector. Since 2016, Syrian refugees were allowed work permits in certain sectors, such as agriculture, construction, food, and manufacturing; these sectors disproportionately employed migrant labor even prior to the refugee influx. This paper investigates the short-term impacts of the Syrian refugee influx on labor market outcomes for Jordanian citizens. The authors make use of Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey data from before (2010) and after (2016) the Syrian refugee influx, combined with information on where the refugee influx was concentrated.

**Key findings:**

- From 2010 to 2016, the number of working-age Syrians rose from 19,000 to 644,000. Although the Syrian working age population was about 16 percent the size of the Jordanian population in 2016, the Syrian labor force was equivalent to about 9 percent of the Jordanian labor force. There were 1.3 million employed Jordanians in 2016 compared to 117,000 employed Syrians.

- Overall, Jordanians living in areas with high concentrations of refugees have had no worse labor market outcomes than Jordanians with less exposure to the refugee influx. This result hold across unemployment, employment, characteristics of employment (formality, occupation, open sector, health and human services sector, private sector), hours, and wages.

- Overall, Jordanian workers in areas with high concentrations of refugees experienced a significant increase in job formality, an increase in hourly (but not monthly) wages, and a shift in employment from the private to the public sector. For a percentage point increase in the share of the locality that is Syrian, the probability of formal employment increases by 0.3 percentage points and hourly wages increase by 0.9 percent. However, because hours have decreased (insignificantly), the effect on month wages is insignificant. Additionally, Jordanian workers exposed to a greater
refugee influx are less likely to work in the private sector and more likely to work in the public sector.

The author posits that several channels that may have ameliorated any potentially negative impact of the massive influx of Syrian refugees including: (a) the composition and characteristics of Syrian refugees in Jordan (predominantly young and with a higher proportion of female-headed households) means that their labor force participation is low (only 45 percent of men and 4 percent of women are in the labor force); (b) the take-up of work permits by Syrians has been low (by the end of 2017 only 87,141 work permits to Syrians were issued out of 200,000 available permits) and therefore few Syrians are competing in the formal labor market; (c) the number of non-Syrian immigrants in Jordan has not decreased in the same period, and Syrians mainly compete with economic immigrants in the informal sector; (d) the inflow of foreign aid may have created labor demand among Jordanians; and (e) the increase in demand for public services, in particular education and health, has resulted in the Jordanian government increasing the provision of those services, which in turn increased the demand for workers (almost exclusively Jordanians) in those sectors. The results **suggest that allowing refugees to work legally, and complementing legal work opportunities for refugees with aid and trade opportunities may yield offsetting effects for natives’ labor market outcomes.**

**The Effect of Refugees on Native Adolescents’ Test Scores: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from PISA**

Semih Tumen


This paper **investigates the impact of Syrian refugees on the school performance of adolescent children in Turkey.** The analysis is based on the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) microdata for 2009 and 2012 (pre-influx) and 2015 (post-influx), and employs a difference-in-difference approach based on province-year variation in refugee intensity and an instrumental variable strategy to address the potential endogeneity of refugees’ location choices.

Key findings:
Math, Science, and Reading scores of Turkish native adolescents have notably increased following the Syrian refugee influx, conditional on parental education, which is used as a proxy for unobserved ability.

The increase in PISA scores is more pronounced for males than females.

The increase in test scores mostly comes from the lower half of the test score distribution.

The author argues that the labor market forces that emerged in the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis have led native adolescents, who would normally perform worse in school, to take their high school education more seriously, i.e. the increase in refugee concentration generates pressures in the low-skill labor market and those pressures provide incentives for increased school achievement.

Development Approaches to Migration and Forced Displacement: Key Achievements, Experiences and Lessons Learned 2016-2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Technical Working Group on Migration and Displacement, 2019

This report describes the achievements, experiences and lessons learned from UNDP projects on migration and displacement between 2016 and 2018. Since 2011, UNDP has supported 125 displacement-related initiatives amounting to US$1.3 billion. At the onset of crises, UNDP interventions range from supporting early recovery coordination to comprehensive, resilience-based responses for host communities and refugees. In the medium and longer term, UNDP supports initiatives to address root causes of forced displacement and, where applicable, the return and reintegration of displaced persons. A key flagship initiative is the joint UNDP-UNHCR Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) in response to the Syria Crisis and neighboring regions. The report describes the significant achievements of UNDP’s displacement-related initiatives in Somalia, Iraq, Nigeria, Turkey, Syria and Yemen.

The report identifies the following lessons learned:

- Displacement is inherently multi-sectoral, and therefore UNDP’s work must transcend organizational silos.
• Displacement solutions are intrinsically linked to the achievement of the SDGs—the international community should design and implement projects with a clear contribution to the SDGs.

• Policies and institutional frameworks for displacement are key to success in finding displacement solutions, and preventing or reducing forced displacement.

• Success depends on political will, and strong institutions that lead on displacement.

• Capacity building is not a one-off requirement, but a continuous process that should target both international and local organizations as well as national and local government.

• Displaced people should be included in host communities’ support structures and systems from the outset.

• UN agencies and others should put more effort into supporting national and local governments to establish effective coordination structures.

• Importance of data gathering, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and benchmarking to strengthen displacement policy and programming and ensure it is evidence-based.

• Importance of South-South cooperation.

• The resilience-based development approach has worked within the 3RP.

• The area-based approach has proven efficient in identifying and responding to community priorities, as well as ensuring inclusiveness and ownership.

• Government involvement, culture of innovation, theories of change, IT, management of risks and multi-year funding are important dimensions of displacement initiatives.

• Localization of programs and locally-led approaches are a way to benefit from local knowledge and expertise and address the scale of the crisis.

• Importance of adjusting and improving existing initiatives through feedback mechanisms and ‘learning by doing’.

• The importance of a robust mechanism for joint monitoring, evaluation and reporting on displacement interventions.

• Technology should be exploited to address the needs of displaced people and host communities.

• Importance of partnerships for more cost-effective and impactful responses to forced displacement.

Based on these lessons learned, the report summarizes the way forward for UNDP’s work on displacement (and migration).
Moving Beyond the Emergency: A Whole of Society Approach to the Refugee Response in Bangladesh

Lauren Post, Rachel Landry, and Cindy Huang
CGD-IRC Note, October 2019
Center for Global Development and International Rescue Committee

Bangladesh hosts over one million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, the majority in Cox’s Bazar district, one of Bangladesh’s poorest districts. This paper makes the case for transitioning from a basic emergency response to a development approach that enhances refugee self-reliance, mitigates negative impacts on host communities, and fosters social cohesion.

Key messages:

- The current refugee response is inadequate and underfunded, leading to significant challenges for the wellbeing of refugees and host communities (including significant gaps in service provision, high levels of vulnerability, negative coping strategies), and implications for Bangladesh’s development trajectory.
- Given that refugee returns are unlikely in the near term, the reality is that the refugee crisis will inevitably become a protracted one.
- There are several barriers to self-reliance in Cox’s Bazar including lack of jobs, lack of vocational training, and poor-quality public education. For refugees, these constraints are compounded by national policies that prevent them from accessing accredited education and formal jobs, and restrict income-generating activities in the camps. However some progress has been made (allowing refugees to participate in cash-for-work and paid volunteer opportunities in the camps and approving two out of four levels of an informal learning framework for Rohingya children). The World Bank has so far not been able to leverage its financing to encourage the government of Bangladesh to pursue policies to support refugee self-reliance.
- The authors advocate for a “whole of society” approach that would aim to improve the wellbeing and self-reliance of both refugees and host communities, and foster greater social cohesion over the medium term. This would require incremental steps by the government of Bangladesh to expand refugee protections, access to services and the labor market. It would also require the international community to provide adequate multi-year financing and better coordination between humanitarian and development actors. The authors argue that investing in refugee self-reliance now is important to facilitating sustainable return in the future.