## Annex 1
### IASC Myanmar Mission: Joint HC/HCT and Mission Team Retreat Outcome

1. **NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Current practice in Myanmar</th>
<th>Agreed Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1  | Rapid assessment              | - MIRA informing response planning for natural disaster and conflict (Rakhine, Kachin, EQ, flood)  
- MIRA not currently done jointly with government  
- Communities (Rakhine) resisted access for rapid assessment  
- MIRA not adequately adapted to conflict situations (not unique to Myanmar) | (1) Undertake Rakhine/ Kachin Lessons Learned exercises and adjust the inter-agency rapid assessment form and process accordingly  
(2) Agree MIRA methodology and SOP with Govt.  
(3) Organise additional training and exercising on MIRA |
| 2  | Coordinated/ harmonised assessment | - No HCT-agreed set of emergency indicators and thresholds for response for Myanmar (necessary for response planning and monitoring)  
- Limited coordination of assessment within sectors and at inter-cluster/sector level | (4) Establish emergency indicators and thresholds in consultation with the Government if appropriate  
(5) Clarify triggers for sector specific assessments  
(6) Develop overall assessment strategy and planning calendar (hum/dev) |
| 3  | Needs and situational analysis | - Lack of clarity/transparency around prioritisation of needs  
- Prioritization done as part of CERF submission  
- Prioritization influenced by donors  
- Sector and cross-sector needs analysis remains limited at national and local levels  
- Limited, informal cross-sector sharing of sensitive information (e.g. protection)  
- Inadequate situational analysis and linkage to needs analysis, taking into consideration underlying causes of conflict | (7) Further strengthen short term analytical capacities through training and address long term gaps through recruitment  
(8) Link needs analysis and situational (conflict) analysis  
(9) Ensure coherence in analysis by bringing together various analytical capacities |
## 2. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND MONITORING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Current practice in Myanmar</th>
<th>Agreed Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Country wide humanitarian response</td>
<td>Humanitarian: • Rakhine response plan • Kachin response plan • South East Recovery and Development: • LIFT Fund (strategy?) • Strategic Framework • Gov’t Plans (FESR) Contingency Plans: • HCT + LNGOs + Standing Order on National Disaster Management • Skeleton of a plan for response to natural disasters based on Nargis and Giri</td>
<td>(10) Develop overarching strategic framework to serve as a ‘chapeau’ for humanitarian programme and project planning in Myanmar. In line with the TA Protocol on the humanitarian programme cycle, the framework should include key principles for humanitarian response, the range of humanitarian contexts (e.g. natural disaster, conflict), broad humanitarian and cross-sector strategic objectives, context-specific priorities, a range of strategic approaches as well as high level output indicators. To the extent possible, the framework should be developed in consultation with the Government and ensure linkages with recovery and development. (11) HQ to provide technical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Monitoring, evaluation and feedback mechanisms in place</td>
<td>M&amp;E process (selection of indicators, data collection, monitoring and feedback) not sufficiently developed in all sectors Monitoring is not adequately linked to overall response plans (e.g., Rakhine) No agreed high-level indicators for monitoring humanitarian response Limited sector-specific monitoring is ongoing No capacity/process to monitor potential negative effects of operations (e.g., local tensions, microeconomic impact) Triggers for Contingency Plans not followed (&gt;50,000 + &gt; 20,000 for LNGOs)</td>
<td>(12) Develop and agree, to the extent possible in consultation with the Government, humanitarian emergency indicators and thresholds for Myanmar. (13) Use HCT-agreed set of emergency indicators and thresholds to trigger response in Myanmar (link to assessment and analysis) (14) Review existing triggers to activation of CPs. (15) Adhere to agreed-upon triggers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Operational adjustments made based on feedback mechanisms</td>
<td>Operational decision-making at Yangon-level not adequately linked to operational realities on the ground.</td>
<td>(16) Devolve key operational decisions to field teams whenever possible (17) Identify and address operational constraints linked to political issues at national level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. **COORDINATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Current practice in Myanmar</th>
<th>Agreed Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1  | Appropriate coordination structures | - Good INGO representation on HCT through transparent process  
- HCT core group no longer meeting on regular schedule  
- HCT Core Group discussions not strategic and often dominated by UN-centric agenda  
- Proliferation of cluster and sector groups and coordination bodies; past attempts to rationalize groups not successful  
- UNCT in process of rationalizing groups  
- Lack of clarity on cluster and sector working group basics: global guidance not followed; limited understanding of core functions; activation criteria not applied; accountability for sector working groups  
- Field level coordination is improving, but remains inconsistent among clusters | (18) Develop clear TORs for local and national coordination bodies, aligned with established cluster functions  
(19) Establish training on basics of cluster functioning for government and humanitarian staff  
(20) Conduct monthly meetings of HCT core group, at minimum  
(21) Use HCT Core Group meetings for strategic discussions  
(22) Standardize approach to cluster/sectoral meetings: agendas, minutes, action points  
(23) Explore steps for improved coordination between RC Office and OCHA |
| 2  | Coordination with local partners | - Some UN and INGO focus on capacity building  
- Some local NGOs and CBOs have first response capacity in natural disasters; reluctant to engage in conflict zones  
- LNGOs and CBOs disconnected from HCT-managed coordination system  
- LNGOs with own membership organization, coordination structures, and emergency response plan  
- LNGOs unclear how to engage: what is the path or gateway?  
- Information sharing with LNGOs occurs at local level but not on strategic or planning levels  
- Coordination and operational challenges identified with MRCS | (24) Invite rep from Myanmar NGO Network to join HCT  
(25) Designate OCHA Focal Point for LNGOs |
|   | Engagement with the Government | Clusters and sectors have variable relationships with government  
- Lack of consistent engagement with Government around core humanitarian challenges  
- Government staff limited experience in coordination mechanisms | (26) Conduct joint training and orientation for government and humanitarian staff on effective coordination mechanisms: 3Ws, gap filling, meeting management, rationalizing structures, etc. |
|---|---|---|
|   | Inter Cluster/Sector coordination | Insufficient inter-sectoral coordination  
- Sectors and clusters isolated from HCT  
- Lack of clarity on how humanitarian and development coordination structures should relate to each other | (27) Conduct periodic inter-sectoral meetings and ensure information sharing for priority areas, e.g. health-WASH, food aid-food security  
(28) Conduct periodic meetings and ensure information sharing with development actors  
(29) Early recovery coordination both at the level of inter-cluster coordination – with capacity available to the HC and the HCT, and at the level of the livelihood/early recovery clusters in both Rakhine and Kachin |
|   | Monitoring of coordination performance | Not yet initiated | (30) Apply cluster performance monitoring tool across all clusters and sectors on 6-monthly basis |
|   | Accountability | Efforts have been made to clarify responsibilities of cluster/sector lead agencies  
- Leadership among some clusters/sectors remains weak  
- With overall strategy unclear, collective accountability is difficult to achieve | (31) Advocate with relevant lead agencies regarding strengthened leadership and cluster/sector management |
### 4. **JOINT ADVOCACY AND COMMUNICATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Current practice in Myanmar</th>
<th>Agreed Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1  | Messaging                 | Humanitarian messaging is not discussed or coordinated. Communication Strategy for Rakhine in the process of approval Weak storyline with an insufficiently articulated strategy reflecting the complexity of the situation | (32) Discuss and agree upon key messages for use with government, donors and communities linked to overall strategic framework  
(33) Revisit latest communication strategy and consider monthly key messages  
(34) Strengthen and pool public information and advocacy capacities at national and field levels |
| 2  | Access negotiations       | Access negotiations currently conducted by a wide range of actors with unclear messaging, causing confusion | (35) Establish clear roles and responsibilities regarding access negotiations                                                                 |
| 3  | Donors                    | HCT is not leveraging donors for advocacy                                                                                     | (36) Leverage donors in a strategic manner in support of humanitarian priorities  
(37) Consider inviting 1-2 donor representatives to participate in the HCT (recommendation added following conversation with the HC) |
| 4  | Civ-mil coordination      | Need for greater dialogue on how to engage with the military in new and evolving situations  
Principles of use of military assets to be explained to the government                                                                                       | (38) Conduct training on humanitarian civ-mil coordination with regional support  
(39) Identify an in-country civ mil focal point  
(40) Orient government and the military officials to the principles of engagement |
### HCT Proposed priorities (identified during the retreat):

1. **Undertake Rakhine/Kachin Lessons Learned exercises and adjust the inter-agency rapid assessment form and process accordingly**

2. **Agree MIRA methodology and SOP with Govt.**

5. **Clarify triggers for sector specific assessments**

11. **HQ to provide technical support**

13. **Use HCT-agreed set of emergency indicators and thresholds to trigger response in Myanmar (link to assessment and analysis)**

17. **Identify and address operational constraints linked to political issues at national level**

19. **Establish training on basics of cluster functioning for government and humanitarian staff**

21. **Conduct monthly meetings of HCT core group, at minimum + (21) Standardize approach to cluster/sectoral meetings: agendas, minutes, action points**

26. **Conduct joint training and orientation for government and humanitarian staff on effective coordination mechanisms: 3Ws, gap filling, meeting management, rationalizing structures, etc.**

30. **Apply cluster performance monitoring tool across all clusters and sectors on 6-monthly basis**

31. **Advocate with relevant lead agencies regarding strengthened leadership and cluster/sector management**

32. **Discuss and agree upon key messages for use with government, donors and communities linked to overall strategic framework**